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Summary 
The IIASA Project on 
Economic Reform and Integrat ion-ERI 
In late summer 1989 we were agproa.ched by Academician S. S h a t a l i n  of the 
Soviet Union, Melnber of tlle USS It Presidential Council, with the request to  
consider establishing an activity that could analyze international economic 
interdepelldencies and serve as a scientific forum to support economic reforms 
in the Soviet Union and the other socialist Member countries of our Institute. 
In our view, meeting the followiilg conditions was essential in order to  be 
successful: 
a.ctive interest and rea.diness for cooperation among scientists and policy- 
makers, east a.nd west; 
a readiness among contributing scientists to  engage in risky, policy ori- 
ented research; 
a working a.pproa,ch which would differ markedly from the usual IIASA 
style in terms of preparation, participation, intensity, and timing; 
sufficient resources, probably beyond the regular IIASA budget. 
Visits with high-level policy makers, such as Deputy Prime Minister 
Aba lk in  of the Soviet Union; Mr. At ta l i ,  Special Advisor to  President Mit- 
terand; Mr. Vignon ,  Director of the "Central Advisory Group of President 
Delors, Commissioll of the European Communities" (Lacroix Group); and 
Deputy Prime Minister Reichel  of the CSFR convillced us that  we could at- 
tract major interest and count on support in the policy arena. Academician 
Igor M a k a r o v  Cllicf 1,ea.rned Secrcta.ry of the USSR Academy of Sciences 
assured us of intensive interest. The IIASA Council warmly approved the 
Project la.te i n  1989. Mre have since then received further high-level encour- 
a.gements from policy-maskers in Poland a.nd Bulgaria. Pledges of financial 
(hard currency) support were received froill a number of countries, including 
Finland, ~ S F R . ,  Fra.nce, Japan, a.nd the Commission of the European Com- 
munities. Cash ha.rd currency contributions were obtained from the USSR, 
USA, and Bulga.ria, so far. 
Objectives of the ERI Project 
The general aim of the Project can be formulated as establishing bridges be- 
tween eastern and western economic theory and practice, creating conditions 
for mutually assimilatiilg successful mana.geria1 experience, and for possible 
rapproche~nent of economic systems. 
Two types of objectives are the focus of the ERI Project. Objectives 
of the first type are connected with a.ctua1 problems of economic reform 
in centrally planned economies and mutual East-West institutional ad- 
justments. Objectives of the second type are to  produce methodology for 
East-West compa.ra.tive analysis. Thc development of methodological tools 
is t o  provide a foundation for a.pplicd resea.rc11, and support the preparation 
of concrete policy recoinmendations. In the methodological research, 
special emphasis will be placed on: 
The construction of non-tmditioiaal quantitative indicators for East-West 
compa.ra.tive a,nalyses, for the dct.ermination of conzmons and specifics in 
socio-economic dcvelopment in East and West, for the determination of 
reciprocal influence of different development aspects, for the identifica- 
tion of fea.sible reform stra.tegies a.nd their assessment; 
The elaboration of methodology for international institutional compar- 
isons, including the creation of rcleva.nt qua.ntitative measures. 
During a scoping workshop at  Laxenburg a major meeting on the subject 
of accounting measures (including environmental) was approved to  be held 
in Sochi, USSR from 15-17 October 1990. 
Among the ma.in goals of the Project's applied research are: 
The determination of the most fruitful institutional innovations, the 
study of accunlulated experience in solving social problems, especially 
in countries where attempts to ba1a.nce the extent of market regulation 
were a1rea.d~ successful; 
The elaboration of scenarios of different reform options for Eastern Eu- 
rope, the preparation of recommendations for improving economic 
legislation in various countries, and for harmonizing the international 
economic order. 
The 1-3 March ERI Meeting 
The present volume contains major contriblitions by Soviet scientists, to- 
gether with commet~ts by western experts offered during the 1-3 March 1990 
ERI Meeting. We believe that this material is of wide and timely interest 
and may also serve a.s a reference document for later studies once the time 
has come to penetra.te scientifically the very fast changes we are witnessing 
today in central and eastern Europe. 
F. Schmidt-Bleek 
Leader 
Tcchnology, Economy and Society Program 
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Introduction 
The significance of changes, taking place in Eastern Europe, is difficult t o  
overestimate. The year 1989, without changing any borders, practically 
recarved the political map of Europe. 
Economic reform is among the most important aspects of transformation. 
Attempts to  move away from the centrally planned economy model were 
undertaken several times during the last few decades. Yugoslavia after 1948 
and Hungary after 1968; Soviet Union in 1965 and Czechoslovakia in 1967- 
1969; Poland in the beginning of seventies and again during the eighties 
have been making different (in deepness and success) efforts to  transform 
individual features of the "command" model. However, never before has the 
scale and decisiveness of the reform been similar to  its current endeavors. 
This phenomenon cannot be explained by political reasons alone. The 
internal shortcomings of the "command" model (primarily, the absence of 
stimuli for intensive work and inefficient distribution of resources) clearly 
surfaced during the current stage of industrial revolution, a t  which time the 
complexity of national economic systems has increased tremendously. The 
administrative management, which was more or less successful during the 
period of industrialization, ceased to  cope with the conditions when the pace 
of an economy's adjustment t o  the changing environment acquired decisive 
significance. 
As far as political factors were not the only source for change, they also 
cannot provide the irreversibility of transformation. The reform will "go 
through" only if results of the economic performance begin to  be accepted 
by the majority of population. 
Several reform attempts collapsed in last decades not only due to  the re- 
sistance of vested interests, but also because their realization was accompa- 
nied by inflation, declining growth rates and growing income differentiation. 
The main cause of faults: inconsistency and contradictoriness of transfor- 
mation. 
Two ideas de facto dominated over the reform process: the idea of collec- 
tive ownership and self-management and the idea of "normative" (economic) 
regulation. In the most pure form self-management was implemented in 
Yugoslavia, but its elements can be found in all East European countries, 
embarking on the path of reforms. Normative regulation, i.e., ensuring the 
given output not with the help of directive distribution of plan targets be- 
tween enterprises, but on the base of manipulation with economic parameters 
(including their determination in individual bargaining between enterprise 
and state), in the most consisteilt form has been implementing in Hungary. 
The practice confirmed internal fallaciousness of both schemes. Among 
the shortcomings of collective ownership and self-management are the fol- 
lowing: insufficient disposition to  savings; the low innovativeness; inefficient 
distribution of investment resources due to  the lack of capital market; lim- 
ited mobility of the labor force; special possibilities of political pressure of 
self-managing enterprises on local and central authorities. 
The main problem with the normative regulation revolves around "soft 
budget constraints," which caused by financial paternalism inevitable at  the 
conditions of dialogue "enterprise - the state" and their joint responsibility 
for supplying the market. The inflatioilal potential of an economy managing 
with individualized financial levers is much more than the potential of the 
"command" model. The transition from administrative to  normative control 
is especially dangerous under the conditions of extreme disequilibrium - it 
was clearly demonstrated by the development of the U.S.S.R. after 1985. 
The giving up of centralized responsibility for the production of a selected 
variety of goods is necessary for stiffening budget constraints of enterprises, 
averting open or repressed inflation, lessening of shortages. Three main 
socio-economic fuilctions have to  remain in the hands of the state: the cre- 
ation of conditions for efficient market functioning; the realization of social 
policy; the fulfillment of necessary measures, that  are neglected in the pure 
market environment (support of fundamental sciences, capital investments 
into environment protection, etc.). 
Since the beginning of 1990 Poland has been the first East European 
country, which began to  shift toward a "real" market. No doubt, Czechoslo- 
vakia will follow its example soon. Most probably, all the others also will 
not wait for too long. However, there are various obstacles on the path from 
a command to  a market economy. 
Firstly, the creation of the competitive environment is necessary. Pri- 
marily it assumes demonopolization and privatization of the economy. The 
extreme level of moilopolizatioil in all East European countries not only 
prevents the "liberation" of prices, but also encourages the concentration 
of vested interests opposing the reform and pressuring the government ( to 
soften budget constraints, to  provide preferential foreign trade regime, etc.). 
Among the goals of privatization are: the stimulation of more intensive labor 
efforts and improvement in the level of efficiency; an  increase in innovative- 
ness; the absorption of the "superfluous" labor force, released from the state 
sector; the hardening of budget constraints (state enterprises are not only 
accustomed to  the permanent financial support, but have acquired special 
abilities to obtain it). The very important role privatization may play in 
the creation of the social base of the reform - owing to deetatization (pri- 
vatization "from above") and to increasing number of small private firms 
(privatization "from below"). 
Secondly, modern market institutions (of both product and factor mar- 
kets) are practically absent in East European countries. The two-level bank- 
ing system has only been implemented in Hungary and Poland (although it 
does not work properly). The security market does not exist a t  all (as well 
as stockholding companies, investment funds, etc.). The modern insurance 
system is not known. Commodity exchange, marketing and auditing firms 
and the like are also absent. The management of public property in a market 
environment presents a special problem. 
Thirdly, the labor ( a  specific factor) market is practically lacking. The 
impossibility of unemployment and centralized wage determination resulted 
in overstaffing in the majority of enterprises. Market regulation of labor 
relations calls for the implementation of labor exchange and retraining sys- 
tems, introduction of unemployment benefits, etc. The serious obstacle for 
creation of a labor market is the lack of a housing market (which severely re- 
stricts options for migration). The implementation of the tripartheit model 
of labor relations is also necessary. The new legislation on trade unions 
(which previously just served desires of the state) also has to be altered. 
Fourthly, new forms of foreign economic relations management are needed. 
The state monopoly on foreign trade, existed in all CMEA-member coun- 
tries, presupposed the existence of purely administrative export/import reg- 
ulations, an artificial exchange rate, centralized distribution of hard currency. 
The transition toward mainly economic (primarily, tariff) export/import reg- 
ulations, the creation of the preferential regime for foreign investments (not 
only in the form of joint ventures), the gradual implementation of convertible 
national currencies are necessary. 
Fifthly, the inflationary situation existing in the majority of East Euro- 
pean countries, calls for the realization of a special stabilization program. 
Its main elements are: regulation and unification of the tax system; limita- 
tion of increase in personal incomes; sufficient growth in interest rates and 
the limitation of money supply; stimulation of savings by increasing interest 
on deposits; the rapid cut in budgetary spending and the discharge of the 
deficit by loans. The transitional character of the economic system and the 
extreme degree of disequilibrium have to be taken into account in preparing 
the stabilization program. The non-admission of a deep recession (which 
might depreciate results of the financial renewal) is a difficult and specific 
task. 
Sixthly, market self-regulation presupposes a departure from the over- 
whelming state price control. However, just simple and immediate price 
"liberation" may result in unpredictable (including political) consequences. 
The decisive but gradual liberation of prices (as well as increase in centrally 
regulated prices) must take place under the careful state control. The price 
liberalization and simultaneous introduction of compensational mechanisms 
(for instance, indexation of wages) are among the most important elements 
of the stabilization program. 
Seventhly, the transition to  a self-regulating market calls for the real- 
ization of various social policy measures. Their goal is not only to  support 
those social groups who underservedly lose their share of national wealth in 
the process of the reform, but also to  maintain popular consent for changes. 
The question of the consent is especially important for the Soviet Union 
where the majority of the population is still not convinced of the advantages 
of a market economy and the populistic ideas traditionally dominate over 
the aspiration for wealth. 
Eastern European countries have practically no practice of market man- 
agement. Experience and knowledge, necessary for the administrative con- 
trol, can hardly be used for the regulation of the modern market. Therefore, 
application for the western help seems natural: institutions that are currently 
being established in Eastern Europe have been functioning for decades in the 
U.S.A., Western Europe and Japan. 
However, while western countries have substantial experience in manag- 
ing existing market economies, they are unfamiliar with the optimal transi- 
tion path from the centrally planned to  the market model. The problems of 
the transition, never so actual a t  the past, were not among the most popu- 
lar problems of scientific studies. We are convinced that the most efficient 
way to  solve the transition problems is to  combine the knowledge of East 
European experts (on their economic systems) with the knowledge of their 
Western colleagues (on regularities of the modern market). This is IIASA's 
premise in the organization of the research on the economic reform problems 
in Eastern Europe. 
A simple metl~odological device was proposed for the joint research: East 
European experts had to  prepare papers on their approaches in dealing with 
reform problems in relevant countries. The discussion on these papers, their 
expertise and comments from the Western side provided a basis for the search 
for new solutions, for the elaboration of concrete policy recommendations. 
The collection in this volume reflects exactly this schedule of the confer- 
ence held on March 1-3. The "basic" papers for the conference were mainly 
written by experts from the U.S.S.R. This certainly does not mean that  the 
IIASA Econolnic Reform and Integration Project is more preoccupied with 
the Soviet issues than with the problems of other East European countries. 
The Soviet situation is simply the most intricate and it was easer to  obtain 
the full picture of the existing complications by dealing a t  the first stage pri- 
marily with the Soviet reform plans. Later the role of "stimulator" will be 
played by the materials from Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. 
Experts from these countries participate actively in the ERI project. 
The structure of the monograph corresponds quite closely with the above 
mentioned list of the "main" reform problems. However, certain differences 
also exist. These can be quite easily explained. The practically oriented 
discussion on the problems of transition calls for the combination of prob- 
lems from different areas of the economic science in a single "block." Thus, 
problems of the capital market correspond naturally with the questions of 
privatization - deetatization cannot be separated from the introduction of 
securities and the creation of the relevant market. The deregulation of prices 
cannot be isolated from the demonopolization; questions of the social sup- 
port must be linked with the stabilization program, and so on. The structure 
of the book corresponds with the agenda of the IIASA conference and reflects 
the logic of the elaboration of policy alternatives. 
The book consists of five sections. The first is devoted to  the general 
problems of the economic reform. Focal points of the reform, main obstacles 
impeding its realization in the U.S.S.R. are discussed in the paper of E. 
Yasin. The concrete (and rather detailed) reform plan can be found in the 
article of G. Yavlinsky. The main ideas of the plan correspond with the 
"Polish" variant and might be characterized as a "shocotherapy." Other 
schemes definitely can be proposed, but the analysis of the extreme variant 
allows to  illuminate certain problems more strikingly. The comment t o  these 
paper is provided by M.J. Peck. 
Two "basic" papers are also in the second section. The first, written 
by S. Aleksashenko and L. Grigoriev, discusses the entire spectrum of the 
questions of deetatization and the problems associated with the creation of 
a capital market. The second, proposed by A. Chubais and S. Vasiliev, deals 
solely with privatization as a mean for the restructuring of a "command" 
economy. The comments to  this section are prepared by K. Uno. 
The problems of unemployment and the labor market's formation in 
the U.S.S.R. are examined in the third section. Full employment is among 
the corner-stones of the "East European socialism." Therefore measures, 
discussed in the paper of V. Sherbakov and A. Shokhin influence not only 
the economic efficiency, but also the social equilibrium and may prove to  be 
crucial for the success of the reform. The comment t o  this paper is written 
by A. Rees. 
In the forth section I. Ivanov expounds the Soviet approach to  the reform 
in the area of foreign economic relations. In this case U. Kivikari has made 
the commentary. 
The fifth and largest section is devoted to  the macroeconomic policy 
issues. Papers of the Soviet experts located here deal only with some of 
stabilization mechanisms. However, exactly these mechanisms might become 
especially important in the process of the transition to  the market. The 
first is the mechanism of fiscal and monetary policy. Its analysis (in the 
context of the U.S.S.R.) can be found in the paper of K. Kagalovsky and A. 
Khandruyev. The second mechanism is the tax system. Its new construction, 
under implementation now in the Soviet Union, is described in the article of 
P. Aven. The comment (not only to  the stabilization program, but to  the 
whole reform plan) is prepared by W. Nordhaus. Within the general reform 
context the stabilization problems are also treated in the paper of D. M. 
Nuti. Special attention is paid here to the comparative analysis of different 
reform schemes, chosen by East European countries. 
At the end of each section there is a short resume of the conference's 
discussions. In fact, papers themselves had to  provide a base for further 
debates. The quality of the discussioils confirmed the validity of the proposed 
approach, and East European experts were not the only ones who gained. 
For the decades Eastern and Western economic thinking were separated 
one from another. Different conceptual framework, different languages hin- 
dered the mutual penetration of productive ideas, the assimilation of fruitful 
experience in efficient management (which exists not only outside CMEA). 
We are sure that  the investigation of the East European reform options 
might be helpful not only for these countries. At present, centrally planned 
economies boast of a population more than 1.7 billion. The inadequate com- 
prehension of the economic environment of these states is a serious gap in 
Western economic science. The filling of this gap can give a strong impetus 
to  the development of economic theory. 
The joint discussion on the problems of the transition to  a market econ- 
omy may also prove to  be useful to  the West in a practical sense. Firstly, 
the participation in such a discussion not only allows to  monitor changes, 
but also permits to  influence and coordinate decisions made in the East with 
the situation in the West. This mainly concerns international economic re- 
lations. 
Secondly, such problems of the transition as debureaucratization and 
decentralization of management are of universal significance. Therefore, 
Eastern Europe may, to  some degree, turn out to  be "proving grounds" 
for identifying fea.sible solutions. 
Finally, the participation of Western economists in resolving East Euro- 
pean problems is justified by the fact, that  results of the economic reforms in 
this part of the World will decisively influence the development of mankind. 
A possible fault of the transition to  the market will influence the political cli- 
mate, all aspects of the East-West relations in an unpredictable manner. As 
a result all countries now appear to  be interested in supporting the successful 
development of the others to  attain mutual security and well-being. 
Peter 0. Aven 
Stanislav S. Shatalin 
Friedrich Schmidt-Bleek 

Part I 
General Problems of 
Economic Reform 

Modern Market Institutions 
and Problems of the 
Economic Reform in the 
USSR 
E. Yasin 
The essence of the radical economic reform in the USSR is the transition 
from the administer-and-command system to  market economy. This is a 
difficult process because each of the two economic systems forms a whole, is 
internally coherent and, as a result, incompatible with the other. Therefore, 
speaking in general, without going into particulars, i t  is impossible to  borrow 
elements of the old system to  develop a new one or, conversely, t o  get a new 
system by replacing some structures in the old one. 
Continuity is always desirable. We should never destroy what exists if 
we can find some use for it .  Continuity in culture, traditions, national and 
personal values is particularly important. This is especially true for our 
country where the revolution, based on different assumptions, has caused 
much destruction. 
In this case, however, a drastic and rather painful policy is inevitable 
which will probably extend over a number of decades in the USSR history. 
Whether such radical restructuring is necessary is not a question about 
choosing a strategy for the transition, but whether Russia needs t o  make 
the transition t o  market economy. Debate on this subject is still continu- 
ing in the country and it would be strange if it were otherwise. However, 
for me and the majority of experts the answer is a foregone conclusion. 
Major radical changes in the USSR are necessary both in terms of the 
technological structure of production and in the economic and social re- 
lations. The rationale for this is provided in what follows. 
It should perhaps be pointed out that  Russia has never known highly 
developed market relations. They began to  emerge after the abolition of 
serfdom in 1861 and made difficult progress, hampered by vestiges of feu- 
dalism. There was also considerable traditional interference in the economy 
by the state. 
As a result, social institutions and value attitudes that  are necessary for 
the normal functioning of a market, were few and unstable. The overwhelm- 
ing majority of the population in Russia and outlying provinces practiced 
subsistence economy and communal relations. 
The revolution destroyed even those market structures that  had formed 
by the time i t  began. They were not fully restored during the NEP. As is 
known, they were not developed further and were replaced by the administer- 
and-command economy. 
When this economic system exhausted its potential and its evolution 
brought the Soviet economy to  a crisis, once again it was argued that  the 
only credible alternative for taking the country out of decline and ensuring its 
normal development in the family of civilized nations was a modern market 
in the USSR. 
If the market mechanism is to  function effectively, it is necessary to  
have certain conditions and institutions relating to  the sphere of economic 
relations, technological structures of production as well as social and political 
structures. 
In all these respects the structures of Soviet economy are not only dif- 
ferent from those that  are necessary for the functioning of the market but, 
in a sense, are opposed to  them. 
Let us begin with the economic relations. 
1. A necessary institution of the market economy is full self-reliance and 
independence of agents operating on the market combined with their eco- 
nomic responsibility. The latter manifests itself in strict budget constraints. 
Only when this condition is met, the subjects of economic activity will be 
motivated to  behave in a manner that  will ensure the effectiveness of the 
market mechanism. In capitalist economy these conditions are created by 
private property legislation, even though in real economic relations, given 
the nature of modern production and for a number of other reasons, dis- 
tributed forms of property prevail that can be interpreted as collective or 
public property. Nevertheless the independence and responsibility of market 
agents must exist. 
In Soviet economy a basically different type of relation has predominated 
to  this day. The overwhelming majority of enterprises are owned by the state. 
They are subordinated in administrative terms to ministries and other state 
bodies, and must carry out their orders. In theory they enjoy economic self- 
reliance and responsibility, and in recent years their independence has been 
enhanced. In practice, though, they are dependent on the state because they 
must fulfil state orders and can obtain material resources primarily through 
channels of centralized distribution. What is especially important is that  in 
reality they are not allowed t o  go bankrupt and their budget constraints are 
not stringent. 
In order to  create the conditions for market regulation steps have been 
determined to  de-etatize the economy through promoting cooperatives, small 
private business and transforming state-owned enterprises into share-holding 
companies, joint stock companies, and leasing them, which, in fact, amounts 
to  contractual relations between enterprises and state bodies. 
2. Market economy is contract economy, an  economy of deals between 
equal partners, a developed system of horizontal ties, relying on a mar- 
ket infrastructure - wholesale enterprises, stock exchanges, banks, insurance 
companies, other financial institutions, developed legislation, regulating re- 
lations among the subjects in the market, etc. 
In principle, almost all these elements exist in the USSR but, one could 
say, in a degenerate form, sapped of vitality and real content. In particu- 
lar, relations among partners are usually formalized in contracts but so far 
they are of secondary importance. To a considerable degree their content is 
determined by state orders, limits on material resources, the linkage estab- 
lished by the state bodies between consumers and suppliers, and centrally 
controlled prices. Therefore, not horizontal but vertical ties predominate, 
that  follow the lines of the administrative hierarchy. Under these circum- 
stances, an order usually overrides contractual obligations and legislative 
norms. This is not to  say that  orders are always carried out. However, even 
outside the framework of formal relations, because of the predominance of 
orders, the responsibility of partners and legal discipline becomes weakened. 
The market infrastructure is also poorly developed and the self-regulating 
market exchange institutions are either totally absent or almost non-existent. 
The standard system of communication and information operates from "top 
to  bottom". If most enterprises today are allowed immediate access to  the 
market, many of them will be a t  a loss not knowing who they should best 
sell to, buy from, a t  what prices and on what conditions, or what to  do in 
case of failure. Of course, they won't gain the necessary experience without 
taking the first step but during the initial period problems are unavoidable. 
That  is why a program is needed to  develop the market infrastructure 
and to strengthen contractual and legal relations. 
3. Free prices are a necessary market institution. Although most coun- 
tries regulate prices, free pricing in a market economy is a common truth. 
Without that ,  it is impossible to  balance the economy, to  use the resources 
effectively and to  create a consumer-oriented demand. 
In the USSR a centrally controlled price system based on cost has evolved 
over decades. It is characterized by profound deformations and discrepancies 
with world market prices. As a result of all this, enterprises have become 
disoriented; they often use the independence, which they have been granted 
to  the detriment of society because their interests and the interests of con- 
sumers diverge and sometimes can be reconciled only through administra- 
tive interference. There is no price on land and other natural resources with 
resulting distorted costs and resources-intensive economy, characterized by 
poor management of primary resources. 
Another important special feature of the Soviet pricing system relates to  
disproportions in the correlations of retail prices - free housing, huge food 
subsidies - and, a t  the same time, high turnover taxes on other consumer 
goods. This has resulted in serious and enduring imbalances in the structure 
of the consumer demand and has shaped consumers' specific preferences. To 
correct these imbalances a one-time price review is envisaged and on this 
new basis the gradual transition to  free pricing will begin. However, this 
will be a rather difficult and painful process because i t  entails destroying the 
existing preferences, consumer stereotypes and the structure of production 
costs. 
Generally speaking, it should be said that  in all spheres the Soviet con- 
sumer has grown accustomed to  shortages, that  he must chase goods regard- 
less of their price. Low prices guaranteed by the state are taken for granted. 
Price rises, inevitable during the transition to  the market, are perceived by 
everyone as a violation of assumed obligations. 
The transition t o  free prices in the USSR will also involve difficulties 
resulting from the structure of production in the Soviet economy, its divorce 
from the structure of effective demand and the bigger fraction of production 
of primary resources and smaller fraction of production of consumer goods. 
For that  reason as well as a result of the high degree of monopolization to  
abandon price regulation will entail a high rate of inflation for a long time 
until the structure of production is brought in line with the structure of 
demand. 
4. The effectiveness of market place is contingent on the degree of compe- 
tition and the environment conducive to  competition. Competition requires 
a combination of economic, technological and social aspects. In particular, 
there should be a sufficient number of sellers and buyers in the market place 
for every product. According to  Western estimates the number of producers 
must not be less then 8-15. The market is regarded as monopolized if four 
larger firms control over 80 percent of sales. Free access to  the market by 
any producer is another important factor to  consider. 
In the USSR a policy of concentration and narrow article specialization 
of production has been in effect for over 70 years in the key industries. As 
a result over 1500 groups of articles are manufactured by one sole producer. 
95-98 percent of most ball-bearings are produced by one single firm. The 
same is true of engineering, chemical and some other industries. 
In some sense Soviet industry resembles a machine which is a combina- 
tion of unique aggregates and all duplication has been eliminated in order 
to  generate maximum effect from savings on the scale of production. An- 
other analogy is also possible, a well organized administrative system in- 
volving a very clear-cut division of functions among department. No variety 
whatsoever! Within such a system competition is simply inconceivable for 
technological reasons. 
Getting out of such a situation is very difficult because it would involve a 
radical restructuring of the entire production potential. To adopt devolution 
and breaking up of existing enterprises will inevitably and sharply increase 
expenses as a result of de-specialization. 
The situation is mitigated by the following. 
For one thing, in agriculture, construction, in food and light industries 
concentration of production is considerably lower, specialization is not rigidly 
determined by technological reasons. What is only required is to  remove in- 
stitutional monopolies in the form of administrative bodies which manage 
enterprises and open up regional markets which today are assigned t o  par- 
ticular producers. 
Secondly, the fact that  all enterprises have all kinds of subsidiary work- 
shops intended to  meet their own needs and reduce dependence on unreliable 
suppliers can be used as a basis for production diversification and for gain- 
ing access to  the markets of other articles. Small enterprises also have an 
important role to  play in that  respect. 
However, the main avenue t o  overcome monopolism in the Soviet econ- 
omy and t o  create an environment conducive to  competition is to  step up 
external economic exchanges. This process is impeded by the closed nature 
of the Soviet economy because the rouble is not convertible and there are 
few goods to  export. 
In order to  overcome monopolism and create an environment conducive 
t o  competition an anti-monopolistic program as well as the program to  stim- 
ulate small business are being developed in the USSR. 
5. A stable financial and monetary system is a requirement for the normal 
operation of market mechanisms. In principle market is enough to  balance 
goods and money within an economy. But this is achieved above all through 
free pricing. Only when an economic system has illbuilt effective instruments 
to  limit government expenditure and money supply will free pricing not lead 
to  inadmissible rates of inflation. 
As a result of its imminent laws the administer-and-command system 
inevitably generates a commodity-money imbalance and shortages. Man- 
agement is effected mainly on the strength of in-kind indicators, therefore 
financing of measures included in a plan was always regarded as a secondary 
task to  be taken care of by financial authorities and the State Bank. As a 
rule they could offer nothing but excessive emission. 
In the years of perestroika this financial carelessness played a cruel joke 
on us. The anti-alcoholism drive, shrinking consumer imports as a result 
of the falling world oil prices and finally the loss of control over the money 
incomes of the population in the initial stages of the reform have led to  a 
huge deficit in the state budget and a gap between the incomes and the 
expenses of the population of a t  least 30 percent. At the same time public 
pressures have prevented a hike in prices which could bridge that  gap. 
A program of financial recovery is being implemented now. It calls for 
a considerable reduction in government spending including investment and 
defense expenditure, financing of the budget deficit by issuing securities and 
raising interest rates. A tax  is introduced on increases in remuneration funds. 
Neither retail prices nor social programs have been affected so far. 
Efforts to  achieve financial recovery and strengthell monetary circulation 
will have to  be taken, however painful they may prove. Otherwise, the 
economy will slide into increasingly natural economic relations, erosion of 
growth incentives and an aggravating recession - and these phenomena can 
be already observed today. 
A banking system capable of regulating money supply will be an im- 
portant element in achieving financial recovery. The present system based 
on centralized distribution of credits and administrative control over the ac- 
tivities of loan recipients is ineffective because it can be bent by state and 
party authorities. At present the government is considering bills on which to  
create a contemporary two-tier banking system and channel the operations 
of the State Bank of the USSR towards managing credits and money supply 
by applying economic levers. 
The problem is, however, whether the banking reform should precede or 
follow other measures. This question is broached because there is a risk that  
the banking reform will loosen, if only for some time, control over money 
supply in the absence of free prices which would subsequently restore the 
"goods-money-prices" balance. 
6. A market mechanism is only efficient if the economy operates on 
market principles. I11 the conditions of the Soviet Union that  means creating 
financial and labor markets along with commodity markets. 
While there are already embryo commodity markets in the Soviet Union 
the financial market and its associated institutions do not exist as such. No 
experience in that  sphere is available either. 
Within the command economy the appropriate functions were vested 
mainly in centralized capital investment planning. 
The decentralization of investments right away focused on how to  dis- 
tribute and use them effectively. Besides, the need for financial recovery has 
forced us to  look for ways to  tighten money supply. Such are some internal 
incentives for the formation of the financial market. Obviously it will be 
initiated by the sales of government securities. Later, as the economy is 
de-etatized, industrial securities will also appear on the market. 
The labor market has always existed in the USSR. The attempts to 
squeeze it out through a state labor remulleration system only bastardized 
i t  and stepped up inflationary pressures. The impact of supply and demand 
on the level of remuneration was effected through the need to  raise wages for 
workers of scarce occupations irrespective of their skills and other qualities. 
At the same time there is no market regulation machinery which exists every- 
where. There are no collective bargaining agreements between trade unions 
and employers because almost the sole employer is the state which controls 
trade unions as well. More often than not the management cannot represent 
the employer's interests because it is not interested in saving on wages or 
salaries. On the contrary, the management tends to  settle all labor conflicts 
by granting raises. What is needed therefore is external checks similar to  
plan indicators, limits or, as is the case lately, tax regulations. This is what 
explained the loss of control over the growth of incomes which occurred in 
1988 when administrative methods of planning remuneration expenses were 
abandoned. 
Collective bargaining agreements do exist. Their role has been increasing 
in the last few years, particularly as the trade unions have changed their at- 
titudes and an independent labor movement appeared like workers' commit- 
tees (strike committees in Kuzbass, Donbass, Vorkuta). These agreements, 
however, contain no provisions about pay. 
One distinguishing feature of the Soviet labor market is the low mobility 
of the work force, particularly in Central Asia and the Caucasus, which is 
largely due to  the specific situation in the regions. However, there are other 
factors as well that  heavily restrict labor mobility. Those are scarce housing 
and a residence permit requirement. Those restrictions cannot be easily 
removed. 
The labor ma.rket in its normal forms requires an effective system of job 
placement and introduction of unemployment benefits that would protect 
the working people from the vicissitudes of the market and would relieve en- 
terprises of the need to  deal with relevant social tasks. In the Soviet Union 
those institutions too are in a latent state. The system of job placement is 
there but it is ineffective and needs a radical restructuring. There are no 
unemployment benefits and their introduction in conditions of a huge bud- 
get deficit is likely t o  be too much of a burden on the budget. Even today 
unemployment exists in the Caucasus, Central Asia and some other regions. 
The introduction of unemployment benefits would immediately require ma- 
jor allocatioils t o  pay benefits to  those who are already unemployed at  this 
time. 
Finally, it is enterprises that currently have t o  deal with major social 
tasks, including the task of maintaining manpower reserves. Bringing about 
changes in the existing situation would illvolve significant social problems. 
We plan to  support the establishment of financial and labor markets with 
corresponding legislation, a revision of the system of wages and salaries and 
a program of social support for the population. The latter envisages exami- 
nation of the employment problem, unemployment benefits and the system 
of population income indexation which is mainly aimed at  alleviating the 
adaptation of the population, and in the first place people with low incomes, 
to  market economy conditions, and setting the stage for introduction of free 
prices. 
7. The development of foreign economic relations, making the Soviet 
market open and closely linked t o  the world market is of great importance 
for shaping a market economy in the Soviet Union. It would be appropriate 
to  single out those of the known reasons that  would make highly difficult, if 
a t  all possible, the development of market relations in our country if it were 
cut off from the rest of the world. 
First, transition to  a new economic system would inevitably involve dif- 
ficulties, and probably a decline in production, whereas i t  is particularly 
necessary to  support the consumer market and relieve social tension. An 
invaluable off-setting factor in this respect could be consumer goods im- 
ports and direct assistance by industrialized countries - particularly a t  the 
time when free prices are introduced. People could live with higher prices 
provided they see goods in stores the next day. 
Second, when production is higlzly monopolized only foreign economic 
relations may help avoid major damage from deconcentration and on the 
other lzand establish tlze conditions for competition on the internal market. 
Moreover, the country would badly need foreign investments in order to  
achieve a structural readjustment of the economy, production increments 
and introduction of advanced technologies. 
Third, drawing on the West's experience in market relations regulation 
could be vital for us. In essence the question is whether we shall have to  
go through all tlze stages of shaping a market by ourselves, learning from 
our own mistakes and paying a high price for that ,  or we shall be able to 
assimilate what others have known for years. 
In our country the opponents of market economy frequently argue that  
advocates of reforms suggest that Russia return to  the 19th and even 18th 
century aizd live through tlze stage of an original capitalist accumulation with 
all the accompanying social stigmas. They assert that  in its initial stages 
our market will be so uncivilized as to  raise doubt whether it is worthwhile 
to  submit the society to  all those trials. Regrettably, there is some truth to 
that  assertion. 
However, such developments could be avoided above all by relying on 
world experience and giving priority in the development of market relations 
to  the sectors of economy that may best assimilate that experience. 
On the other hand there are major obstacles in the way of invigorating 
foreign economic relations such as, in the first place, narrow export base, 
disastrous balance of payments and non-convertible rouble. 
The efforts taken to cope with the above problems are apparently insuf- 
ficient particularly as regards boosting the exports and stabilizing foreign 
debt. We are working on a long-term program of making the rouble convert- 
ible, which aims first of all a t  making the rouble convertible on the domestic 
market. The least requirement for that is finding a solution to  the problem 
of pricing and sound finances, and forming a currency market for agents 
operating on the domestic market. 
8. Particular mention should be made of social and political problems 
involved in shaping a market economy. 
Market is a social institution that requires certain rules of conduct from 
people. A11 "economic man" with his inherent rational conduct, strongly 
motivated by considerations of personal profit, calculating, driven by the 
spirit of enterprise, ready to  take risks and assume personal responsibility 
for his actions should be given public recognition. Equally society should 
recognize significant differences in the standards of living. 
The model that  is curreiltly prevalent in the Soviet Union is that  of 
an "administrative man", to  use G. Simon's term - though in somewhat 
different sense. He is typically used to submission and giving orders, to  
living in a structure of prevailing vertical links. 
In his subordinate role he is likely to  show pro forma obedience, he is 
used to  violations of his civil rights but on the other hand he is prone to  
sneak out of control turning to actions without rules. In a supervisor role he 
would consider i t  normal to  use his authority and position - and not only in 
the interests of performing his duty. 
Lower strata of the hierarchy expect the upper strata to  protect them in 
most relations with the outside world while recognizing social paternalism 
as a norm. Entrepreneurial attitudes are far from being generally accepted 
and, if and when pursued, frequently manifest themselves in distorted forms. 
Egalitarian attitudes are widespread. Popular mind views social justice pri- 
marily as equal consumption rather than equal opportunities. 
To complicate the matter a significant portion of the population live on 
the brink of poverty making egalitarian distribution a t  times vital whereas i t  
is all but impossible to  differentiate actual incomes and accumulate without 
prejudice to the minimal standard of living. 
Precisely those factors determine the negative attitude of vast strata of 
the population toward the first results of the incipient market relations and 
in particular toward cooperatives and private entrepreneurs. 
For the above reasons, shaping of a market and dismantling the administer- 
and-command systern will inevitably tend to aggravate political problems 
and make a no small portion of the people espouse conservative political 
views and programs. It would be justified to say that  consensus on a na- 
tional scale regarding reforms, coilsolidation of the majority of people in 
defending the perestroika, confidence in the government and ability of the 
latter to  continue to  inspire that  confidence through flexible policies on the 
basis of a long-term program, those factors constitute a political prerequisite 
for the projected changes in conditions of democratization and glasnost. 
All the above leads us to  the conclusion that  the process of shaping a 
market and its inherent institutions in the Soviet Union will involve great 
problems. The leaders of the country and Soviet scientists and specialists 
are aware of that. Measures are being taken to  have those problems con- 
sistently dealt with. To that  end a legal foundation is being established for 
market economy and a series of programs are being drawn up which taken 
together should bring about a transition to  market economy. As it was 
pointed out, such programs include those for sound finances, de-etatization 
of the economy, social support of the population, antimonopoly measures 
and development of small business. An integrated government program of 
shaping a market is being currently worked out. 
A key question is whether we shall have the time needed for dealing 
with all of the above problems in a consistent and integrated manner. A 
worsening economic situation and growing social tensions combined with 
destabilization of the political system may necessitate the use of emergency 
measures, in particular those that  may be very painful. There are still many 
shortcomings in our work. However, we are confident that  we have chosen the 
right direction and are prepared to pursue our goal with the determination 
and perseverance required by the situation. 

Program of Economic 
Reform: Popular Support, 
Stabilization, Restructuring 
G.A.  Yavlinsky 
I would like to  offer for your consideration a hypothetical model of an overall 
economic restructuring. Conditions required to  realize the economic program 
option outlined below include the achievement of the legitimacy of authori- 
ties sufficient for the conduct of deideologized reforms, achievement of some 
kind of agreement between major social and political forces, the restoration 
of confidence in the leadership and, consequently, a renewed time credit for 
economic transformations. 
The hypothetical economic program is predicated on the assumption that  
the goal to  be sought in the reform period is not the creation of a new and 
effective system as a whole, but rather the codification of the genotype of 
a new economic system and the introduction of conditions conducive to  its 
rapid self-development. 
It is also t o  be borne in mind that  substantial positive results should 
be achieved as early as possible in terms of meeting the vital needs of the 
population. This involves a clearly demonstrated trend toward "day-to-day 
improvement of many little things" with kind of a cumulative effect. 
Furthermore it is, of course, importailt to determine what prospects are 
held out by the proposed system restructuring as a strategic course. 
These are questions that  call for an analysis and answer. 
The situation prevailing in the country and marked by the existence 
of substantial excessive demand and the absence of full-fledged agents of mar- 
ket relations makes it necessary to  stipulate a dual goal in the 
first-phase program - the restoration of a balance and the creation of a 
system il~volvil~g freely functioning economic entities. In the most general 
terms, this may take the form of handing over to  the state the accumulated 
funds by juridical and physical persons in exchange for state property. 
Concurrently, from the very first day, a set of declaratory and symbolic 
measures are to  be taken to  win the confidence of entrepreneurs so that  
further steps taken by the state to  regulate economic activities cause no 
panic. 
The de-etatization begins in the least concentrated and monopolized sec- 
tors of the economy that  are directly related to  the services industry and the 
production of consumer goods. Other sectors may be involved in this process 
primarily through the issuance of shares and through the turning of major 
enterprises within those sectors into joint stock companies not owned by the 
state. 
The creation of the enterprise system is accompanied by drastic changes 
in the macroeconomic policy designed to  stimulate the process of de-etat- 
ization, speed up to  the maximum extent possible the restructuring of econ- 
omy, to  create, re-orientate, strengthen and substantially develop the system 
of minimum social guarantees t o  the population. 
It is envisaged that the program will be implemented drawing above all 
on domestic forces and internal resources. At the same time a very useful 
assistance could be rendered by international organizations and individual 
countries - both material (such as the creation of stabilizing currency funds) 
and intellectual (such as consultations on the legal regulation of the new 
system; the organization of statistics, the establishment of stock markets and 
other market infrastructures, the organization of a banking system, etc.). 
Transformat ion of Property Relations and Creation 
of a Free Enterprise System 
Legal Guarantees 
Ownership rights of Soviet and foreign juridical and physical persons with 
respect to  any type of property, except for the property exclusively owned 
by the state, are guaranteed by law. 
Soviet and foreign juridical and physical persons have equal rights to 
any kind of economic activities, except those prohibited by law, and are 
materially liable in full measure of the value of their property. 
All articles are removed from the penal code and administrative legis- 
lation that  relate t o  economic crimes (speculation, commercial mediation, 
private enterprise, etc.), and those convicted under those articles are par- 
doned. 
State arbitration organs are transformed into a system of independent 
economic courts subordinated to  the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. 
Differences in the maintenance regime of bank accounts in Soviet cur- 
rency for juridical and physical persons are eliminated. Those persons are 
granted equal rights to  maintain currency accounts in any banks in the USSR 
prepared for that  function. 
Subject to  de-etatization as a matter of priority are enterprises of: 
retail and small-scale wholesale trade; 
communal services and utilities and, partly, other paid-for services 
(hotels, tourism, etc.); 
public catering system; 
construction organizations working on contract basis; 
state-owned farms and subsidiary farms of state enterprises operating a t  
a loss; 
food and light industries; 
constructioil materials and wood-working industries; 
other industries with up to  300 employees. 
The value of fixed and working capital assets of the said enterprises 
subject to sale will total roughly 350-400 billion rubles. 
Furthermore, as a result of a housing reform, 10 to  20 percent of state- 
owned housing could be sold a t  the initial stage (estimated a t  50 t o  100 
billion rubles). A portion of state-owned incompletely constructed facilities 
and uninstalled equipment with a total value of 20 t o  30 billion rubles will 
also be subject to  sale. 
Thus, a t  the initial stage, the state will be able to  offer property with a 
total value of about 500 billion rubles. 
The amount of surplus money is estimated a t  400 to  500 billion rubles 
(including 300 to  400 billion rubles possessed by citizens, out of which only 
150 to  200 billion rubles are kept in savings banks, and about 100 billion 
rubles owned by enterprises). 
There is a rough equilibrium between the demand for and supply of 
state-owned property. Such property may be sold for existing prices and for 
balance-shoot prices (possibly detracting wear-and-tear costs). 
The main thing, particularly a t  the initial stage, is to  prevent the pressure 
of the existing surplus money in the market from provoking a growth of prices 
and to  channel the money toward the purchase of state property. 
The order of the day is expeditious creation of diversified channels for de- 
etatization through individual sales, auctions, installment-plan sales, mas- 
sive leasing of property with subsequent sales thereof, sales of shares, etc. 
Making the new economic sector an lucrative filled of business activity, 
coupled with a firm government policy of discontinuing all forms of assistance 
or support to  inefficient and cost-ineffective enterprises and agencies. 
Creation of a most favorable operating environment for small and very 
small business ventures. Favorable investment opportunities for funds kept 
in personal bank accounts. 
Since the reform of ownership is undertaken on behalf of the owner, i.e., 
the state, the latter is in a position to take certain compulsory measures as 
well, such as introducing mandatory short-term high-rate leasing. 
A PR campaign in the mass media with a broad discussion of a possible 
monetary reform (which, however, is not regarded as a necessity a t  this 
stage). 
Furthermore, major industrial enterprises, construction and transporta- 
tion firms receive the right to  sell their stock on the following terms: 
shares can be sold to  physical as well as juridical persons; 
most of the revenue (80 to  90 percent) derived from the selling of shares 
goes to the state budget, and the remainder is left to  the enterprises for 
covering the costs of beneficial treatment reserved for shareholders; 
a regulation securing a 51 percent interest for the state is introduced 
with regard to  certain enterprises; 
government-owned stock property is managed through a State Stock 
Fund (regional? commercial? independent from the government?) or 
a network of holding banks (state-owned?). 
Free price formation is allowed in the de-etatized sector. In the public 
sector, price controls will be lifted after the privatization process has gained 
enough strength, i.e., in about six months. A one-time revision of prices in 
the public sector and manipulation of state order price rates are also possible. 
Government measures in the area of price formation include: 
bringing down the prices of particular goods by means of government 
import policy and flexible use of state reserved; 
a requirement for notification to  (authorization by?) state bodies in 
cases of price increases by enterprises occupying monopoly positions on 
the market, etc. 
The macroeconomic policies of the transition period must lead t o  a bal- 
anced economy through reductions in government spending, inflation control 
and a restructuring of the financial and monetary systems. The objectives in 
the first phase are to  make the ruble as strong as possible and t o  encourage 
de-etatization by every meails available. 
Budget Policy and Anti-inflationary Measures 
The current state budget must be balanced, which will require cuts t o  be 
made in the following items: 
subsidies t o  enterprises operating a t  a loss (10 billion); 
subsidies to  the agricultural sector (30 billion); 
centralized investments (20 billion); 
operational spending (land improvement, mineral research prospecting, 
etc. - 5 billion); 
defense, with an  across-the-board revision of defense spending. 
Parallel t o  this, the centralized funds accumulated by ministries should 
be transferred to  the state budget, and a tax reform should be implemented 
along the following lines: 
a single taxation rate for profits derived by juridical persons (using a 
progressive scale or other forms of withholding supernormal monopoly 
profits); 
progressive income taxation of physical persons on a more restrictive scale 
compared to  taxes levied on juridical persons, t o  encourage investment 
in production; 
taxation of individual property; raising land tax rates as well as legacy 
and gift taxes, while individually-owned production assets are taxed a t  
lower rates; 
establishment of an internal revenue service and introduction of a system 
of tax declarations (on a quarterly basis?); 
severe sanctions against physical and juridical persons in cases of tax  
evasion (fines exceeding 3 to  5 times the amount of taxes due, and prison 
terms); 
to restore the balance in the investment sphere and dramatically change 
the structure of investments, a 20 to 30% tax, calculated on the basis 
of projected costs, is levied on new construction in the production sec- 
tor (preferential treatment is possible for industries producing consumer 
goods); 
indirect taxes on consumer goods may be raised in order to  return to the 
state budget the supernormal profits resulting from the price increases 
that  will be required t o  balance supply and demand. 
A budget deficit not exceeding 2 to  3% of the GNP can be offset only by 
issues and selling high-interest government bonds. 
The income derived form the sales of stock and of government property 
must be accumulated within a special division of the state budget to  be 
transferred t o  the State Bank in payment of the government's internal debt. 
A stock market is formed. The state holds suction sales of hard currency, 
mainly for enterprises. 
The banking reform is designed to  set the stage for the development of 
financial and capital markets. 
As a first step, the Supreme Soviet takes control over the State Bank 
and receives the right to  impose legislative constraints on the growth of the 
amount of money in circulation. A two-tier bank system is established. At 
the same time, the USSR State Bank begins to  function as a reserve bank 
with a high reserve rate (20-40%) in the initial 12 t o  18 months. 
As an urgent preliminary measure, a clean-up of accounts in specialized 
banks is undertaken and all bad debts are referred to  the State Bank to  be 
recovered or canceled in cases of liquidation or juridical persons. 
The local outlets of the State Bank and the Savings Bank are taken over 
by other specialized banks, which together with co~nmercial banks, consti- 
tute the second tier of the bank system. 
A significant increase (up to  15-20%) of credit interest rates. A credit 
reform directed a t  drastically limiting credit expansion. 
Juridical and physical persons are granted the right to  open accounts in 
any bank (including hard currency accounts as the banks get ready to  handle 
them). 
Banks are granted the right to  issue stock and are subject to  the general 
taxation procedure applicable to juridical persons. 
Funds should be accumulated in a growing number of bodies operating 
outside the bank structure, i.e., pension and insurance funds. 
Foreign Economic Policy 
In order to  estimate the state financial reserve, an immediate full revision of 
all financial deposits is carried out ,  and part of the short-term debit is paid 
back. 
Negotiations start without delay on obtaining credits on beneficial terms, 
as well as stabilization credits, on the regime of payments and on subsidies 
and direct investments. Measures are worked out and implemented to  ensure 
prompt repayment of debts to  the USSR by foreign countries, partly in the 
form of consumer goods supplies. 
Establishment of hard currency insurance funds. Devaluation of the ruble 
and transition to  a single ruble exchange rate for trade as well as non-trade 
operations; a large-scale programme of hard currency auction sales. 
Abolition of licensing (adoption of a list of non-exportable goods); intro- 
duction of new customs regulations and new rates of customs duties applying 
to  both physical and juridical persons. 
Massive training of Soviet students and scholars abroad; Western con- 
sultants are invited on contractual basis to  assist the development of new 
forms of economic management. 
Agricultural Reforms 
Parallel to  the establishment of legislative guarantees of the equal status of 
all forms of land ownership, a number of other measures are carried out: 
(1) All forms of direct subsidies to  producers are terminated and replaced 
by subsidies for particular products and the consumer end (to the extent 
necessary for the rationing system to function). 
(2) Centralized investment in agriculture is minimized. 
(3)  Capital funds of bankrupt state-owned farms are leased to  physical and 
legal persons while the property of collective farms is divided among the 
members of the farm. 
(4) The farmers have the right to  leave the farm freely and take with them 
their individual plot of land and the proportionate part of the property. 
A limited market of a land is created by way of passing the ownership 
of land to physical and legal persons. The question about the price of land 
(competitive sales? cadastre?). At the beginning the right is to  be given 
to  collective farmers and workers of state-owned farms, to  family garden 
holders associations and their members to  buy for a small price lots of land 
for individual use; allotment of unused land for sale. At the first stage, as 
an  alternative, land may be leased for a long period of time (up to  50 years) 
with the right to  inherit it and buy by installments. 
At the same time land tax rates are raised; benefits are provided to  
migrants t o  the regions with the shortage of manpower. 
All restrictions on sale by individual or collective farms of their product 
are lifted, however, in case of rationing of basic food products, for certain 
types of products the state order remains 1-2 years. In such a situation it is 
possible either to  limit the sphere of the state order only by highly efficient 
farms (with high sale prices) or to  establish a universal level of "tax in kind" 
for all collective farms and state-owned farms (at lower sale prices). 
The state control over prices is maintained only with respect to  key types 
of agricultural products in volumes necessary for rationed distribution. 
The centralized distribution of material and technical resource to  agricul- 
ture is abandoned; they are sold through exchanges (fairs) and the network 
of dealers. 
The union republics are given the right to  choose specific variants of an  
agrarian reform. 
Social Guarantees 
The main thrust of activities is to  narrow the spheres of social guarantees for 
the active able part of the population and reduce the volume of redistributed 
net income through the state budget. The goal is to  stimulate work and 
entrepreneurship. 
The state refuses t o  guarantee employment at  a particular enterprise, 
a Provisional Act of Bankruptcy is adopted and inefficient enterprises are 
closed down. Labor legislation is changed correspondingly. 
In order t o  stabilize the situation with respect to  the standards of life, to  
ease social tensions, with due respect for psychological climate and existing 
traditions, a special system of social protection is introduced. 
(1) Together with the introduction of de-etatization and free pricing, a sys- 
tem of rationed distribution is organized for basic food and industrial 
products included in the minimum consumer budget (MCB). The min- 
imum consumer budget is officially adopted by the Supreme Soviet of 
the USSR in physical (by elements) and monetary form. The level and 
the volume of distribution corresponding to  the subsistence level consti- 
tute the basis for the estimation of the state order and the necessary 
production resources against the model of intersectoral balance. 
At the first stage the minimum consumer budget becomes an instrument 
in setting minimum wages, pensions and disability (unemployment - ?) 
benefits. 
(2) After the transition to  free prices the indexation of incomesis introduced. 
At the same time: 
the maximum compensation for the growth of prices (up to  0.7-0.8 
percent for 1 percent of inflation) covers only social benefits and 
pensions which correspond to the minimum subsistence level (there 
also can be linkage to  average wages); 
the volume wage index a t  state-owned enterprises should not exceed 
0.3-0.5 percent for 1 percent of the rate of growth of prices (for 
budget sectors, perhaps - 0.5-0.6). 
(3) A state unemployment assistance fund is established through taxes on 
wages fund (profits ?) a t  state-owned enterprises, and through fees on 
entrepreneurs' income: 
unemployment benefits are introduced; 
labor exchanges are established and the allocations for re-training 
of personnel are sharply increased; 
a system of social work for the unemployed is established (communal 
work; road construction, etc.). 
(4) Programmes of assistance to  specific social groups are implemented: 
single old and handicapped people; 
homes for aged people and orphanages, etc.; 
subsidies to  refugees and migrants; 
free meals, help to  homeless people; 
nourishing diets and baby food. 
To implement those programmes there is need to review and partially 
nationalize the property of major social organizations. 
As was already pointed out, the main requirement that  the programme 
should meet is that  is should be very specific in terms of time. 
Dates set for the implementation of progra.mmes should allow for serious 
reforms, however, they should also meet with understanding and trust of the 
people. 
The Beginning 
Administrative introduction of the systems of social protection. Announce- 
ment of the Programme. The beginning of voluntary de-etatization. Ad- 
equate, more rapid changes in organizational forms of the agrarian sector. 
Terms of obligatory leasing and de-etatization are made public, information 
is provided on the dates of termination of state subsidies, changing of terms 
of crediting, introduction of free pricing. Conclusion of the necessary inter- 
national economic and financial agreements. Preparation and adoption of 
the first package of norm-setting and legislative a.cts. 
The First Phase 
The new state budget is adopted. Subsidies and subventions in all types 
of budget financing are drastically reduced or discontinued. Inflationary 
fluctuations begin, prices grow and galloping inflation becomes a possibility. 
The obligatory leasing is carried out. Sale of shares begins. Tax, bank 
and agrarian reforms are implemented. Sales of state property yields first 
100 billion rubles, a part of this money is allocated to  concrete social pro- 
grammes. The de-etatizated sector of consumer goods and services outgrows 
the state sector. 
The process of stable growth of prices begins, the consumer goods price 
level becomes balanced and the structure of prices comes closer to  the world 
one. There are no lines, the products become more expensive but accessible, 
and their consumption is reduced. There is a sharp deficit of money, both 
possessed by individuals and enterprises. Stronger work intensives appear. 
People are rapidly released from their jobs, enterprises become bankrupt. 
The workforce market develops. 
The Second Phase 
A structural change of the economy begins. The State Bank of the USSR 
pursues a rigid restricting policy. Inflation slows down. There is a possi- 
bility of a trend toward reduced prices for a number of consumer goods. 
Entrepreneurship becomes widespread. Stabilizing programmes of the gov- 
ernment begin to  work: expansion in goods supply deflate prices, introduc- 
tion of new target oriented subsidies eliminate disproportions. 
The main set of measures envisaged by the Programme is completed: the 
genotype of a self-developing new economy is created. 

Comments on the Paper by 
G.A. Yavlinsky 
M. J. Peck 
Yale University 
Mr. Yavlinsky has provided us with a wide-ranging survey of many aspects 
of economic reform. I shall focus on only one of his points - the distinction 
between the small and large firm sectors - in the process of a shifting to  a 
market system. The small firm sector includes the services, agriculture and 
small scale manufacturing. 
Mr. Yavlinsky assigns priority to  establishing a market system in the 
small enterprise sector. I agree with him because the problems of moving to  
a market system here are much less complex than those in sectors with large 
firms. 
For small firms, economies of scale are limited, management and technol- 
ogy are simpler, profit incentives are easier to  create for managers, workers 
and owners, and capital requirements are modest. These features all facili- 
tate the establishment of competitive markets in the small enterprise sector. 
Furthermore, the Soviet Union already has cooperatives and individual own- 
ership established in this sector and has legalized private ownership for most 
activities. 
I would add three points to  the discussioil of the small firm sector: 
(1) In many services, courtesy and convenience are important attributes of 
quality. Competition in the services means pleasing the customer so that  
services can often improve without increased resources. 
(2) Labor-intensive services also can be expanded with little use of capital 
and materials. Greater and better provision of services is a way to  give 
the Soviet consumer a way to  spend his rubles. 
(3) Small-scale manufacturing enterprises can play a major role in the reform 
process. Notably, firms with less than 300 employees account for twenty- 
five percent of all manufacturing activity in the U.S. and fifty percent in 
Japan. 
I agree with the American economist Ed Hewitt who says, "If national 
and local authorities encourage small business activity, the state of Economic 
activity could improve dramatically in a relatively short time with very little 
commitment of capital, labor, or material resources." 
Let me now turn to  the large enterprise sector. Fourteen hundred enter- 
prises account for half of Soviet industrial output. 
The large enterprise sector refers to  the 1,400 manufacturing enterprises 
that  account for about half of the industrial output and about one third 
of the industrial labor. Such a concentration, typical of all industrialized 
economies, reflects economies of scale. There is a conflict between achieving 
the lower cost of large-scale operations and increasing the number of com- 
petitors. Still, there are factors that moderate the sharpness of the conflict: 
(1) International trade permits concentrated iildustries to  be subject to  in- 
ternational competition. Relying on international competition, however, 
requires the full convertibility of the ruble, an unlikely prospect in the 
near future. Still, some of the sca.rce hard currency earnings of the USSR 
might be allocated to  the limited import of high quality consumer and 
producer goods as a demonstration of the international quality standards 
that  Soviet firms must eventually meet. 
(2) There may be more potential for effective competition among domestic 
enterprises than is generally recognized. Professor Yasin mentioned the 
need for eight t o  fifteen firms for effective competition. I would put the 
number significantly lower - five to seven firms and even three firms can 
provide considerable rivalry for market share. I do not know enough 
about the structure of Soviet industry to be able to  say whether there 
will be many situations in which competition would be severely restricted 
by the scarcity of competitors. But the experience in the U.S. indicates 
that  it is better to  try to create conditions for competition than to  rely 
on regulation as a means of protecting buyers. 
The present industrial structure reflects a merger movement and the cre- 
ation of production associations as part of the 73 reforms. Western observers 
have considered these peak units as proforma consolida.tions with little im- 
pact on the enterprises. If so, these units could be eliminated a t  little cost. 
The production associations are clearer cases for elimination since these were 
established to assist in the planning process and to coordinate the activities 
of firms in the same industry. A competitive market requires that  firms be- 
have as rivals seeking sales from one another rather than coordinating their 
plans. Anti-trust laws in the United States and elsewhere prohibit agree- 
ments or even discussions among competitors on prices, market shares, or 
product quality - a necessary condition for competitive markets. 
There are other problems facing reforms efforts in the large firm sectors 
apart from those sin creating competition: 
(1) The isolation of the Soviet economy has denied it access t o  the recent 
developments in technology and management practice elsewhere. In this 
respect the USSR is in a similar position to  that  of Japan in 1945. The 
growth of the Japanese economy since 1945 shows that  overcoming man- 
agerial and technological gaps can be the source of impressive economic 
performances if energetic measures are taken to import technology. Joint 
ventures with foreign firms represent a way of importing technology, man- 
agement skills and capital. Soviet law provides for such ventures, but the 
actual progress has been slow. United Nations data  shows that  by the 
end of 1988, only 13 of 191 registered joint ventures were actually es- 
tablished and only 23 million dollars invested. Soviet authorities must 
recognized that  attracting joint ventures depends on provision for man- 
agerial freedom, convertibility of profits, and higher expected returns - 
higher than can be obtained elsewhere. The establishment of the in- 
tegrated market of the European Economic Community as well as the 
continued high level of economic activity in Europe, Asia, and the U.S. 
have given investors many alternatives to  joint ventures in the Soviet 
Union. 
(2) Technological agreements in which the foreign firms offer only techno- 
logical and management services but do not risk their capital are an al- 
ternative to  joint ventures. Japan relied extensively on such agreements, 
signing 5,231 technology agreements from 1963 to  1970. As compared 
t o  joint ventures, such agreements are less costly in terms of foreign ex- 
change since the purchase covers only services and information and not 
the capital contribution, but they require more sophistication on the part 
of the domestic purchasing firm for the domestic purchaser retains full 
control of the use of the technology. 
(3) Soviet enterprises are more highly vertically integrated than those of 
other industrialized countries, which is a consequence of input markets 
characterized by frequent shortages. Large enterprises should devote ef- 
forts to  creating a complex of small firms that  would be their suppliers, 
by providing them financing, technical assistance, and long term pur- 
chasing contracts. These small firm suppliers should be encouraged t o  
develop sales to  other enterprises and eventually become independent of 
the large firms that  started them. 
(4) Large enterprises should be encouraged to be self-financing for their in- 
vestment needs by retaining their profits. In the reform discussions, much 
emphasis has been placed on creating capital markets equivalent to  those 
in industrialized economies and yet external capital markets provide firms 
in other industrialized economies with a limited share of their investment 
needs. For example, 70 percent of investment funds for U.S. enterprises 
come from internal sources - retained earnings and depreciation. 
(5) Bankruptcy for large firms usually means their reorganization, rather 
than their dissolution. All parties - workers, creditors, and suppliers 
- must make concessions to  bring the outlays of the firm to  a level 
where they are consistent with its revenue. Judicial intervention is often 
required to  force these concessions and often management is replaced. 
What should not be allowed is the provision of state subsidies to  permit 
the large firm to  continue to  operate in the same way. 
I regard ownership issues as less crucial for the large enterprise than for 
the small ones. There the employee, perhaps one individual among ten of 
thousands, will rightly consider his own efforts as having less impact on the 
success of the firm than in a work force of three hundred or less. Similarly, 
an outside shareholder, as one of thousands, has little control and influence 
over the decisions of a firm. I would think that  a variety of ownership forms 
mentioned in the paper of our Soviet colleague are consistent with a market 
system. 
Let me now turn to  sequences of reforms. The small firm sector should 
have priority in the reform process. Establishing markets in the large firm 
sector may need t o  wait for greater macro-economic stability. But they are 
not completely independent events. Phasing out subsidies to  enterprises, as a 
market system requires, will reduce the state deficit and so ease the macro- 
economic problem. The taxation of enterprises can also ease the deficit 
problem by raising revenues. I am skeptical about reliance on taxes based 
on the profits of enterprises. Determining profits is a complex task that  
is easily abused. Profit taxation requires the more profitable enterprises 
t o  carry a large part of the tax burden while the unprofitable ones come 
off scot-free. It runs counter to  the logic of a market system which requires 
rewarding profitable enterprises and penalizing unprofitable ones. It seems to  
me that a value-added tax is preferable. It is neutral with respect to vertical 
integration and would give the Soviet Union a tax system comparable t o  the 
European Economic Community, into which the Soviet Union may become 
more integrated. 
I recognize that  the Soviet Union has a tradition of egalitarianism, which 
is best served by inheritance and personal income taxes. The Soviet Union 
system already provides for a marginal tax rate of 65 percent on incomes of 
above 6,000 rubles, about three times the average wage. 
Mr. Yavlinsky's paper provides an imaginative solution t o  the problem 
of the 400 billion ruble monetary overhang. He estimates the value of state 
property to  be the same amount so that  its sale would then soak up the entire 
monetary overhang, allowing the transition to  a market system without the 
crippling effects of inflation. 
Ingenious as it is, I doubt the feasibility of his solution. Property and 
securities are valued by future profits, which depend on a comprehensive 
information system that  the Soviet Union lacks. Hence, it may be difficult 
to  persuade individuals to  buy securities a t  their accounting values. 
Furthermore, much of the currency and bank deficits are held in expec- 
tation of the availability of more and better goods. To the extent that  the 
reforms fulfill these expectations consumers will begin t o  convert their rubles 
to  goods, thus driving up prices. Clearly, the monetary overhang is a major 
problem, but I doubt whether the sale of state assets can be more than a 
part of the solution. 

Summary of Discussions* 
C. M. Schneider 
In general, before one indulges in analyzing the Soviet economy and mak- 
ing recommendations for economic reform, i t  should be completely clear that  
both a liberated or "free" market system and a centrally planned economic 
system have their own internal consistency. Therefore, it is not acceptable 
to  simply suggest an  interchange of a number of the undesirable elements for 
more desirable ones as a solution to  the present crisis situation. The pieces 
in each system are interdependent. In the USSR, the critical elements neces- 
sary for the functioning of a market economy are missing. Reform politicians 
should not singly rely on "one-shot" adjustment measures or instruments. 
For example, radical decentralization of enterprises without free prices can 
easily lead to  monopoly situations which will not result in the desired and 
required efficiency gains. If the inappropriate macro-environment is perva- 
sive during the implementation of reform tools, one must expect negative 
effects such as wage and price inflation as well as shortages. 
The accumulated problems associated with the functioning of a command 
economy model can only be solved by engaging in a transition t o  a market 
economy. Doubtlessly, this is more easily said than done. The transition 
from one non-contradictional, integrated system to  another is a clear step 
toward finding a solution to  these troubles. As stated, i t  is impractible and 
counterproductive to  merge the two systems. A decision must be made to  
either move to  the new system completely or not. The fundamental prob- 
lem in the Soviet Union, for example, lies in the absence of institutions 
characteristic of a market economy. Responsibility and independence of 
'Comments made by Richard Cooper (USA), Ognyan Panov (BG), Leonid Grigoriev 
(USSR) and Karol Lutowski (PL), Alfred Kahn (USA), Pave1 Klima (CSFR) and Heinz- 
Dieter Haustein (GDR). 
economic actors are needed and should be more strongly encouraged. Hor- 
izontal integration and the links between economic sectors and agents are 
unknown elements of an institutional structure that  has been wholly domi- 
nated by vertical connections which are dictated and not subject to laws of 
competition. Along these lines, the need arises for liberated prices that  are 
not set by a central committee irrespective of real costs, output or demand, 
but give true signals of supply and demand conditions in the market place. 
Two of the main barriers to  a price reform are the enterprises, which have 
become accustomed to  obtaining inputs a t  unreal prices, and the working 
class, which panics a t  the thought of not being able to  afford the basic needs 
if inflation should sky-rocket. 
The move of an economy from a command to a market system will usually 
be accompanied by serious adjustments and modifications in the structure 
of production and the distribution apparatus. The Soviet Union is charac- 
terized be a dangerously high level of concentration or monopolization in all 
sectors. Simultaneous to  the establishment of a more horizontally integrated 
production structure that  can be directly encouraged through increased pri- 
vatization, new and well-functioning internal and external links within and 
between sectors will be necessary to overcome the problem of inefficiency 
and shortage in a country rich in resources. Unfortunately, there is a lop- 
sided concentration of investment and production effort in primary resources, 
which inevitably leads to  a feeble consumer sector. At this time, the Soviet 
Union still has no real financial market, a centralized system of resource al- 
location presently substitutes for what should be a capital market and the 
labor market is characterized by an abundance of inadequacies and a lack of 
real structure. A goods market based on supply and demand conditions, as 
well as capital and labor markets supported by a solid financial system and 
incentives and motivation are all essential elements of a market system that  
could help a nation moving away from a command system toward growth 
and security. 
In any case, policy-makers and economic advisors should be aware of the 
fact that  every society has an established social contract on which the rela- 
tionship between government a.nd citizens is based. The relations and roles of 
commerce and industry to  the aforementioned main parties are also inherent 
within the said agreement. The entire labor force relies to  some extent on 
expectations of real wages and job security which in no small part influences 
the overall economic stability. In no instance can a government violate the 
social contract without peril. In the popular mind, social justice is equal to  
social consumption rather than to  social opportunity. The consequences of 
equal opportunity must be socially acceptable in order to  introduce a market 
economy, otherwise social disruption will result, as becomes clear in Profes- 
sor Yasin's statement, "A Soviet citizen would rather die of hunger than of 
envy." Of course, the fundamental advantage of a market economy is that  
it directly encoura.ges the mobilization of each individual in society, as well 
as his talents, tastes and way of taking risks. 
After realizing the great difficulties and costs involved in moving from 
an established centrally planned economic system to  a market economy, the 
question of whether it is actually worthwhile to  change completely from the 
previous system definitely becomes a valid one. What is certain, is that  
a comparative analysis of the expectations of an indicator, such as output 
per capita, under the old system on the one hand and under a free market 
system on the other hand must be made over a certain time profile. Even 
if only in a relative sense, this would at  least allow the determination of 
which plan of attack would be more beneficial for the country in the future. 
The potential gains of a shift between systems and the characteristics of 
the probable adjustment path must be investigated before any decisions as 
whether t o  proceed or not are made. 
The old, traditional eastern European systems as they are today, are 
clearly no longer consistent with the economic situation and progress of 
the industrialized world where the striving for productivity and efficiency 
increasingly dominates the scene. It would prove impossible to  adjust to  
the Western information society based on technological progress within the 
framework of the centralized base in which the activity of individuals for 
the common good of the economy is not sufficiently encouraged. The hu- 
man factor is an  essential element when attempting to  attain productivity 
increases. Unfortunately, the old monopolistic system does not really allow 
for the influence of the individual active human factor. 
Using the real life example of Poland, some short-term effects of a radi- 
cal economic reform can already be seen. In this case, the most unpleasant 
surprise was the incredibly high inflation. As a result of the shock, the 
standard of living and the levels of production and of real income fell signifi- 
cantly. The period of reduction was shorter than expected and it has reached 
a type of temporary equilibrium. Consumer goods do become available a t  
the new higher price level, but only for those few who can afford the higher 
price. The liquidity of the ba.nking system became questionable and many 
enterprises withdrew within themselves. Although i t  seems that  in a number 
of instances the work ethics and moral have improved, enterprises continue 
to  go bankrupt, each time posing a liability for the budget. Additional 
unexpected and expected events continue to occur. Results such as these 
lead to the question of whether the reform program will be delayed, or not. 
The task of overcoming the fundamental hurdles of economic reform pose 
a macro-cosmic problem to the Eastern European countries which neither 
they, nor especially the West, should underestimate. A free market is free 
of governmental controls, free of governmental regulations and incorporates 
a system of free pricing. The complexity involved in a move to  free prices is 
enormous becamuse the target is always changing due to  the dynamics of the 
economy. The introduction of only partial freedoms cause several distortions 
to  arise. This type of process often leads to  the infamous "snowball-effect" 
which can instigate complete economic disaster. The key to  success lies in 
swift movements, actions and policy implementations. Slow deregulation, for 
example, with prices based on average costs causes severe distortions. It is 
always crucial to  recognize the differences arising between the relationships 
in demand and capacity due to the reliance on marginal cost calculations. 
Inevitably, prices and quality move to  the forefront. 
The path of deregulation which is decided upon, must be introduced into 
the appropriate environment and provide the direction for further liberaliza- 
tion and growth in the economy. Anti-trust laws are usually a standard 
requirement to  protect competition, while the deregulation itself directly 
provides incentives for better performance. This economic maneuver should 
also encourage the move away from oversimplified cost/plus pricing systems. 
At the same time, various methods of dealing with the social costs of a 
transition to  economic freedom will be essential. These may include direct 
contributions, transfer taxes (in the form of differential excise taxes - even 
negative excise taxes for food) and awareness not to  double tax consumers. 
A fundamental requirement for a global open market is that individual free 
markets must be consistent and compatible with one another. 
Competition will influence the behavior within the small and large firm 
sectors differently as a result of their structural and managerial dissimilar- 
ities. In the small firm sector, the characteristic problem of competition 
is usually simplified in comparison to  the situation with the larger coun- 
terparts. Although the ownership side is quite clear (where the different 
forms also include employee ownership), the more important issue lies in 
directing or initiating the required capital investment flows to the man- 
agers. The bottom line in the small firm sector is the closer ties to  the 
consumer which encourage the desire to please the customer. The introduc- 
tion of more active competitioil in this area can raise the quality of products 
and service without actually raising (sometimes even reducing as a result of 
rationalization) the utilization of real resources. This trend is frequently 
linked to specialization which leads to sub-contracting due to the compar- 
ative advantages between the enterprises allowing for more entry and as a 
result also increased competition in the small firm sector. 
On the other hand, large firins are generally dominated by self- 
perpetuating management hierarchies. Each one seems to  have the charac- 
teristics of an island in a market economy. The planers and decision-makers 
must be taught to  use the market as a source of information which can be 
utilized to the best of their advantage to increase productivities, efficiencies 
and competitive motivation. The best transition to  privatization and thus 
stock-holding would initially involve the state as the majority stock-holder. 
This type of state ownership is compatible with a competitive environment 
if the state is only a passive owner, the enterprises have financial autonomy 
and are directly involved in international competition. 
When considering the move to  free market conditions from a command 
system, the question of the potential for competition in an economy arises. 
In general, cornpetition domillates regulation. Under each particular re- 
form situation, the policy experts should observe the inherent requirement 
to  maintain budgetary discipline. In addition, analysis with respect to  the 
needs for, and costs and benefits of subsidies and state enterprises would 
clarify a number of the existing inequitable situations. If enterprises are 
privatized, managers will be forced to  work with revenues and profits and 
can no longer rely on the natural competition laming subvention. The tim- 
ing of the implementation of free prices (price liberalization) as an  essential 
element of the move toward competition is particularly crucial in the wake 
of the possibility of negative effects if this is done within the framework of 
a monopoly dominated structure. Structural disproportions can and will 
probably lead to  an inflationary situation in the Soviet Union because the 
structure of production is geared towards primary products and the weakest 
links are consumption and infrastructure. It is true that  liberalization can 
increase the budget deficit as a result of increases in industrial prices, wages, 
inflation, the cost of production and subsidies, but this may prove to  not be 
detrimental to  the economy if it is deliberately undertaken for stabilization 
purposes. 
The policy items in the area, of prices and competition, which must be 
dealt with in order to  facilitate the transition from command to  market 
economies, have different levels of priority. The following are the most im- 
portant issues to be considered under the more general topic of prices and 
competition on the road of econoinic reform to a market system. A specific 
look a t  designing an anti-trust law is needed. This is not the most urgent 
requirement, but increases in importance once privatization and price liber- 
alization has gotten under way. Furthermore, a system of regulating what 
are referred to  as public utilities in the western sense and known as pub- 
lic "properties" in the eastern sense. The reason for this lies in the fact 
that  these are the a.reas where competition is felt to  be deficient or even 
impossible for political and or social reasons, or because the entity is a "nat- 
ural monopoly". In an effort to  determine a system of price regulation for 
these types of situations, agreements must be reached between regulators, 
economists and accountants. The costs and benefits of regulating prices 
must be analyzed to  determine whether such a policy would be economically 
justified. An additional question which appears crucial to  the reform process 
is the designation of which sectors of the economy t o  regulate or deregulate 
first. 
There are still more issues on the list of what is vital for policy reformers 
to  act upon to  encourage the transition to  a market system. For example, 
investment funds (i.e., pension funds, etc.) and holding companies need 
to  be created a.nd mana.ged. Of course, their functions in the new market 
economy must be carefully defined. 
Moreover, the success of a reform hinges to a large extent on the advice 
of qualified practitioners, such as business people and accountants, whose 
experience in various areas including how to  set prices and assess the value of 
capital assets can be applied. As a result, there will have to  be extensive work 
on moving from dual-price systems to  a system where the law of one price is 
not violated. In light of this trend towa,rd deregulation and privatization the 
management of the public sector becomes a paramount question. Analysts 
and policy-makers must consider the alternatives of how the function of state 
enterprises must and will change with the liberalization and opening of the 
economy, and which measures are necessaay to  deal with possible undesirable 
effects a8nd externalities that  may arise expectedly or unexpectedly. With 
respect to  the valuation of assets a substantial amount of technical help is 
required in the countries where there has been no "free" market activity has 
allowed prevailing demand and supply conditions to  determine real asset 
values. Finally, a functional taxation policy is required to cover government 
expenditure on common property and social programs and simulta~~eously 
act as a type of market and social regulatory mechanism. While a general 
draft law is needed immediately, the laws with respect to  taxation will have 
to  be adjusted to  properly accompany an economy in transition. 
Part I1 
Capital Market and 
Privatization 

Capital Market and 
Privatization in the USSR 
Sergei Aleksashenko and Leonid Grigoriev 
In 1699 Peter the Great prescribed that the Russian merchants should 
trade the way it is done in other countries, by companies, and by pooling 
together their capitals. But for lack of habit and trust, they were not doing 
very well. 
V.O. Kluchevsky (the renowned Russian historian, 19th century). 
The experience of economic change in socialist countries, which has been 
under way for more than 20 years now, makes i t  possible to  draw an impor- 
tant conclusion: if reform is to  succeed and if economy is to  improve serious 
system changes affecting all aspects of the economic life of society must be 
undertaken. The neglect of this requirement results in a situation where af- 
ter some time the problems that  were thought to  have been solved reappear 
again in a new spiral of their development. And all the sacrifices that  have 
already been made by society to  achieve certain objectives, turn out t o  be 
in vain, for the very same problems call for more sacrifices. 
The key problem, which is the focal point of any economic system and 
which must necessarily be solved, is relations of ownership. The failure t o  
deal with them reduced to  naught the results of even such a successful reform 
as in Hungary. The nearly full central control with regard t o  capital goods, 
which is characteristic of all the socialist countries in the near past, results 
in a situation where "a unified factory" mechanism is set up, the enterprises 
cease to  be autoi~omous or enterprising, and it becomes impossible t o  deter- 
mine directions for the most effective allocation (and utilization) of various 
resources. It is clear today that  these problems can be solved only through 
the creation of a full-fledged market ellcompassing goods, manpower, in- 
formation and capital. The creation of a capital market is a problem of 
particular importance because it has to  distribute financial resources which 
largely shape the state of economy for a long period of time. What is involved 
here is real investments. 
A. Potential Market for Equity 
The solution of this problem is a difficult thing as is any reform on the 
whole. But it is made even more difficult in the Soviet Union by virtue of 
one fact: it must be started virtually from scratch; moreover a t  this point 
there are neither would-be sellers nor buyers. On the supply side things look 
bleak: the funds that  can be put in securities are available t o  enterprises and 
to population, but their proportions are small. As of the end of 1989 the 
population had some 470 billion rubles, out of which 40 billion rubles were 
invested in state bonds in the 1950s and 1982, 165 billion rubles were "hot 
money" chasing the goods in conditions of shortages, some 100 billion rubles 
more were savings for major purchases (a  condition sine qua non under 
an undeveloped system of consumer credits), and out of the remaining 170 
billion rubles roughly one-half is "rainy day" savings. This leaves some 85 
billion rubles which could potentially be invested as capital. 
The enterprises are even less rich. By early 1990 they kept accounts 
in banks to  the tune of some 100 billion rubles, out of which 33-35 billion 
rubles are incentive funds (clearly, the bulk of these will not be used as an 
investment resource). With the taxes fixed a t  a level somewhat in excess 
of 50 percent, the enterprises will retain some 125 billion rubles out of 258 
billion rubles' worth of profits in 1990, while non-centralized investments are 
planned to  be a t  the level of 95 billion rubles. As a result, the accretion of 
"free" financial resources of the enterprises will be rather insignificant (let us 
not forget the growth of inventories). The question is whether the wealthiest 
among them will deem it appropriate to  be deprived of the cash "fat" which, 
i t  is true, is difficult to  spend in the absence of the material resources market 
they still offered t o  enterprises in prescribed quantities anyway. 
On the sellers' side the situation is even worse. At this time, virtually 
the only borrower is the state which is constantly short of money for cur- 
rent expenditures. The plans for 1990 are to  cover the state budget deficit 
by selling a 60 billion rubles' worth to  banks and 15 billion rubles' worth 
bonds for the l~ouseholds. A decision was made at  the end of 1988, which 
permitted state-run enterprises t o  issue securities. (They were called shares, 
although in terms of their characteristics they fall within the category of 
bonds with the right to  call back.) Two types of securities are permitted till 
the spring of 1990: those to  be distributed among members of work teams 
and among other enterprises. Some 150 million rubles' worth of shares have 
been released to  date (March 1990)' or less than one percent of the annual 
real investments. 
It can be considered that  a start 11a.s been made toward setting up a 
financial market, but there is no free circulation of either state enterprise 
shares or state bonds. No real steps have been taken so far to  form a sec- 
ondary market for securities. Even at  this time when the government is 
adopted (19 June 1990) Interim Securities Regulations (which will remain 
in effect until the appropriate law is enacted), the creation of facilities for it 
is still only discussing. 
It can be stated with confidence that  a full-fledged capital market can- 
not materialize in our country until independent economic entities appear 
that  would be able to  meet both supply and demand. The solution to  this 
problem is seen in a radical restructuring of relations of ownership and in 
implementatioll of a process of privatization. 
B. Present Ways and Means 
It should be pointed out right away that  the term "privatization" in the 
full sense of the word is not quite applicable to  Soviet reality because the 
population's financial resources a t  the present time are clearly insufficient 
for acquiring a significant portion of the state property. It can be said that  
it is not their purpose and that  their level, just like the median income level 
of the population, can secure only a comparatively small range of goods and 
services. On the other hand, this term is politically loaded - something that  
cannot be disregarded a t  least in the near term. 
In this connection, to  characterize the processes which are unfolding in 
our country it would be more correct to use the concept of "de-etatization" 
or disintegration of state property - which is perhaps more accurate a t  the 
first stage. These processes are already under way in the Soviet Union and 
it is possible t o  define their ma.in directions. 
(1) The development of cooperative and individual labor activities. It is en- 
countering tremendous difficulties, resistance and attacks from 
conservative forces the society. But notwithstanding the movement is 
gaining in strength - on the basis of performance in 1989 the share of 
the cooperative sector in economy comprises 5-6 percent as against 0.5 
percent in 1988. And this despite the fact that  the cooperatives have 
been forced t o  operate in very disadvantageous conditions when it comes 
to  acquisition of material resources, capital goods, production premises, 
etc. The cooperators are very insecure about their future (everybody 
remembers the government's decision passed a t  the end of 1988, which 
prohibits cooperatives - sometimes without any visible justification - to  
engage in certain activities); therefore they are not in a hurry t o  invest 
in capital-intensive technologies. Though cases are known cooperatives 
have purchased several industrial enterprises. A inajor role in the devel- 
opment of the cooperative movemeilt will belong to  republican and local 
authorities which determine the tax policies with respect to  cooperatives. 
It appears that  those regions stand to  gain which will create acceptable 
conditions for the cooperators and attract them to  themselves. This may 
result in saturation of local markets with some goods and services. 
(2) Enterprises on leasing contract. Unlike the leasing of capital goods, which 
is widely prevalent in many countries of the world, in the USSR the 
leasing of enterprises by work teams prevails. The enterprise as a rule is 
taken out of the administrative structure, out of subordination to  a higher 
management body, and it arranges its relations with them on the basis of 
a contract. In principle, a work team may buy out an enterprise as its own 
property and transform it into a collective enterprise. From the viewpoint 
of common sense there is no difference between i t  and a cooperative 
enterprise, but again, by dint of some specific features of the social and 
political situation, their (non-existent) difference is highlighted. 
At the end of 1989 more than 2,000 enterprises in industry and construc- 
tion operated on leasing arrangements, some 5000 in agriculture and over 
2000 in trade and public catering. There is an increasing practice of leas- 
ing structural units (such as workshops and sections) a t  enterprises. The 
performance of the enterprises has proved encouraging: their efficiency 
shot up dramatically initially but later began to  decline. Some of the 
enterprises suffered from setbacks. 
On the one hand, the trailblazers were allowed to  operate on favorable 
terms and improved their financial status only after the transition. Later 
on their transition to  leasing arrangements was not expected to  be fol- 
lowed by changes in their financial status. On the other, a number 
of enterprises operating on the basis of leasing arrangements owe their 
successful performance to their able and pushing managers who are real 
team 1ea.ders. 
Some natural limitations have been identified, hamstring future leas- 
ing arrangements. They prove most effective a t  small-size enterprises 
(where every team member is highly visible) with their short techno- 
logical chains, flexible product lines, limited production assets and their 
ability to  perform better by meails of increasing labor inputs (such leased 
enterprises often work for 10 to  12 hours a day). 
At present, leasing arrangements have mustered massive popular sup- 
port, resulting in the emergence of a host of what we call collective, or 
people's enterprises. The strongest supporters of those entities (for ex- 
ample, Professor Bunich and the factory manager Bocharov, both are 
members of Soviet parliament) believe that leasing and collective man- 
agements should be introduced in a majority of government-run enter- 
prises. 
It appears to  us that  the potential of this type of enterprise and the role 
their teams of workers play in management are highly overrated. On the 
one hand, Russians have their traditional propensity for work-sharing 
arrangements (Russian peasant communities are a case in point). On the 
other, collective enterprises and workers' self-management in Yugoslavia 
provide clear evidence of their deficiencies: those enterprises gravitate 
toward maximizing the earnings of their team members, refuse to  retool, 
and introduce advanced technology on, their production lines, resulting 
in human labor savings, la.ck of tools for balancing their current and 
longer-term interests with the former overemphasized and, as a result, 
"eat up" their accumulation fund assets. 
Despite the massive support the enacted Law on Leasing is unable to  
bring any dramatic changes in ownership relations on its own. The 
scope of the law rules out its enforcement on a large scale, for access 
to  leasing arrangements in agriculture is made contingent upon the good 
will of land holders, who are the chairpersons of collective and Soviet 
(or state-run) farms and they are represented in the Supreme Soviet in 
appreciable numbers. The massive transition of industrial enterprises 
to  leasing arrangements runs into formidable obstacles put up by gov- 
ernment ministries: leasing payments virtually prove to  complement the 
main payments (taxes and so on). 
We think that  as a way to  de-etatize the ownership relations leasing ar- 
rangements ought to  be applied countrywide, mostly, in those sectors and 
enterprises where the environment is propitious but those arrangements 
are unlikely to  dominate or play a leading role. 
(3) Enterprises with a share of foreign capital (joint ventures). They have 
begun t o  emerge in our country since 1988, totalling over 1,000 now but 
their operation is not plain sailing. The reason for floating such ven- 
tures is easy to  see: the Soviet Union wishes to  lure foreign capital and 
technologies to upgrade its own economy. But there is a number of legal 
and economic conditions lacking to  make them full-fledged. Firstly, we 
continue t o  lack legislation offering guarantees for our Western partners' 
investment. As a result, only about 10 percent of joint ventures have a 
credible footing for their production operations. Most of those ventures 
opt for operations that  do not call for heavy investment in real estate. 
Secondly, there exists the problem of legislative stability, for our legisla- 
tion may and does change overnight. Thirdly, there is an unacceptably 
large gap in the technical and technological levels of Soviet and foreign 
partners, resulting in Soviet matching contributions made in land and 
financial resources needed for current operations. And, lastly, the prof- 
its earned are impossible to  spend: the Soviet ruble is not a convertible 
currency and that  is the problem to  buy something with rubles in the 
country or t o  invest it elsewhere, while if one starts looking for markets 
paying in hard money for one's products, one will give up one's market 
spot. 
In the future if this form of ownership is to  make tangible headway, our 
legislation should be liberalized substantially as a way of enticing foreign 
capital. But such a step will also entail obviating ideological stereotypes. 
(4) Stock-holding companies. We appear to  pin our greatest hopes on such 
companies in pursuing a policy of de-etatizing our giant enterprises, in 
particular. Today we hold that  this form of ownership will prove best 
suited t o  meet the interest of workers, who may become stock-holders, 
enterprises and our society. 
Of fundamental importance is the fact that a stock-holding company 
reports only to  a meeting of its share-holders and may not be run by 
any other governing body. It is true even of those companies where the 
state owns one hundred percent of their stock. Stock-holding companies 
should be made out of a majority of the enterprises in the state sector, 
primarily industrial ones including both large- and medium-size works 
that  show profit or operate a t  a loss today. 
The need for such a transition arises out of the advantages inherent in 
stock-holding as a form of ownership (which has proved its worth in 
world practice over the last two centuries) compared to state, private, 
and cooperative ownership, especially for big-size enterprises. 
C. To Sell or to Distribute 
Identification of those who will hold stock is crucial to  converting a state- 
owned enterprise into a stock-holding one (newly floated companies are much 
easier to deal with, for their founding members distribute shares on their 
own). In the context of such a transition the pattern of stock distribution 
will, in large measure, predetermine the future development of the Soviet 
economy. Stock distribution is expected to boost economic efficiency and 
mold the mutual interests and responsibility of economic entities (that is, 
enterprises, banks, etc.) as well as personnel. 
The most economically effective way (and the most feasible in our eco- 
nomic environment) to distribute stock a.ppears to be the cross (or mutual) 
ownership of most of the shares by enterprises and organizations as well as 
credit and financial institutions of a new type to be established with the gov- 
ernment's encouragement in our country. Stock held by individuals appears 
to  be a fundamentally crucial but actually a secondary factor especially in 
large-size industries. Stock held by individual (nationals and by foreign phys- 
ical and juridical persons) may be limited with regard to types of sectors. On 
the one hand, the level of earnings and savings of the population is clearly 
insufficient for buying large stock (we have mentioned that  earlier) and their 
prospective rise will be geared mostly to increasii~g levels of consumption. 
On the other hand, tired ideological, social and political dogmas continue to 
exert a fairly strong influence on our society. Those dogmas maintain that 
owning large stock is inadmissible, for it will entail the formation of a group 
of rentiers, or investors. It will take us long to foster the positive image of 
entrepreneurship and all it stands for in popular consciousness. 
D. The Implementation 
And now a few comments on the de-etatization program. This is how we see 
it implemented. No reform in the USSR may be successful if the agrarian 
issue is not solved radically, that  is, the land problem. The notorious food 
problem may be solved only by peasants who are free to farm as they see 
fit, resulting in placing the entire edifice of reform on a solid footing. 
The distinctive features of our country's development over the last 70 
years make it impossible for a combination of various forms of ownership to 
emerge in a natural way. They should be established on orders from high 
on. 
As the first step a department should be set up to  manage state prop- 
erty, a body charged with transforming enterprises, enforcing compliance 
with national interests (this is all the more urgent now that more and more 
state-owned enterprises are converted into various types of associations op- 
erating under the auspices of public organizations, that  is, they are no longer 
government-controlled, resulting in direct losses for our entire society), and 
with conducting all the activities needed to  transform ownership forms. 
Such a body will launch a system (fully owned by the state) of invest- 
ment funds (financial holdings) on a sectoral basis (on the basis of current 
ministries) and/or a territorial one. Initially they will hold the stock of their 
"own" enterprises only, but later they will be able to  buy shares of enter- 
prises in other sectors with the money accrued from selling some of their 
stock and earning dividends. Some of their revenues will be used to pay for 
their participation in newly established enterprises. 
Would-be investment funds will operate as profit-making entities so ap- 
propriate securities markets should be set up, including government obli- 
gations. Such funds become big credit and financial institutions and major 
tools for pursuing government economic policies in the context of an  evolving 
market economy. As their major objectives, investment funds should focus 
on promoting such credit and financial institutions as commercial banks and 
insurance and retirement, or pension funds. This will give rise to  growing 
savings in the country and improving goverilment finances. 
A criterion governing such companies' operations will be a ratio between 
profits earned as dividends and the work of shares and the government may 
rely upon that  ratio in appoiilting enterprises selected for de-etatization. 
The next stage will see retail trade and public catering entities, neigh- 
borhood services and small-size industrial enterprises start to  operate on 
the basis of leasing arrangements. The enterprises that  are unwilling to  take 
such a step should be offered an option to be sold t o  cooperatives, or other 
interested persons. 
At the same time, the government should take a decision to convert 200 
to  250 giant enterprises into stock-holding companies that  will exchange their 
stock. 
Investment funds will issue enterprises' shares that  will be owned as stock 
and mount stock subscription campaigils among enterprises, organizations, 
credit and financial institutions, teams of workers employed by those enter- 
prises and all the Soviet nationals. As a result, a new structure of stock 
property will take shape in the country. Programs are now being designed 
to  sell shares on a step-by-step basis (with all the rights as provided for in 
international standards). 
Investment funds determine the worth of shares that  will be issued by 
evaluating enterprises' current and projected cost effectiveness and by ap- 
praising their assets and financial status (especially with regard to  enterprises 
that  operate a t  a loss). 
After a decision is taken to convert enterprises and appraise their worth, 
big numbers of shares will be acquired free by the following entities: the 
government through an investment fund, local government bodies and enter- 
prises themselves. The latter entities are crucial in that  the team of workers 
employed by a given enterprise gains a chance to influence their enterprise's 
performance through their representative on the board. 
Initially the government should have 60 to  70 percent of shares, some of 
which any other juridical and physical persons are entitled to  claim after a 
share-holding company has been floated. In taking a decision to  convert an 
enterprise the government may determine the minimal size of the stock i t  
will hold in the enterprise's ownership assets but not greater than one-third. 
Shares over and above that  ceiling should be sold as soon as they are in 
demand. 
The share-holding companies converted from government-owned enter- 
prises conduct their operations in conformity with legislation governing share- 
holding companies. The status of those companies does not depend upon 
the proportions in which shares were distributed among share-holders: in- 
vestment funds, credit and financial institutions, stock-holding companies, 
Soviet nationals, etc. In other words, after an enterprise was taken over by 
share-holders as their property, it is the share-holders and the persons they 
select or appoint exclusively who may take decisions. 
Investment fund representatives have no voting privileges in decision- 
making and, as a result, government institutions may possess a controlling 
interest virtually for a long time (plus restrictions in individual sectors). 
Foreign capital should be encoura.ged to  acquire stock on a massive scale. 
Of special importance is the future of payments used to  acquire shares 
that  will be sold on the market. The worst decision that  may be taken is 
to  count those as the government's current revenues, leading to  the "eating 
up" of the people's property. It appears that  a good decision ought to  be 
made along the lines of spending the funds to  pay for our domestic debt 
that  has been accumulated in contravention of the due process of law (it 
totals about 300 billion rubles) and of depositing those funds in special in- 
vestment funds for the government to finance production-unrelated facilities 
and infrastructures. 
The next stage should see a program designed and implemented with 
a view to  converting the remainder of government-owned enterprises into 
stock-holding companies step by step according to a similar scenario. Such 
a massive conversion is basically the takeover by the public of government 
property. 
The implementation of the program will be centrally managed, though 
up to  a point. At the same time, from the very outset of this stage all 
government-owned enterprises that  have bonds and securities issued in excess 
of 20 percent of their ownership assets should be automatically converted to 
stock-holding companies regardless of the program. 
Concurrently, a t  the end of the first stage and in the beginning of the 
second one, financial market institutions are expected to be floated: stock ex- 
changes, property appraisal firms, holding companies, investment societies; 
an interbank money market will gain in scale. 
Now a few comments on the time limits of the process. The first stage 
should be sufficiently brief (two to three months long) and the second one 
should start immediately after the first stage and may last for five to  ten 
years. Afterwards we may hope to succeed in obviating the negative factors 
that  were generated by our etatized economy. 
Privatization in the USSR: 
Necessary for Structural 
Change 
Anatoliy B. Chubais and Sergei A. Vasiliev 
Distorted structure of the Soviet national economy is the main reason for the 
recent financial crisis. Restrictive financial policy makes the latent structural 
crisis the open one. There are two stages of inevitable and painful structural 
reform. The first stage is connected with purging economic structure of the 
obsolete production units. The second one is to  be the intensive process of 
high technology sectors creation. The shift toward the second stage will be 
successful only if there is the mechanism of the rational investment choice 
and capital movements. Private investor has to  be the "dramatic personal" 
of this mechanism. Thus, the privatization appears to  be the main condition 
of structural reform in the USSR. 
Problem Nr. 1: Financial Crisis and its Profound 
Roots 
Nowadays the problems of the economic reform, as well as those of tech- 
nological development fade in comparison with the heavy financial crisis. 
The crisis is only partly due to  the arbitrary actions such as the alcohol 
legislation. 
The process of perestroika made the ministries more dynamic and gave 
them excellent opportunities of obtaining cheap investment funds from the 
budget, thanks to confusion on the highest level of management. On the 
other ha.nd, the social expectancies connected with perestroika made 
inevitable the growth of expenditures on social insurance and social infras- 
tructure. 
All this made the financial situation worse but was not the basic cause of 
the crisis. We should lneiltion here that the rapid growth of nominal incomes 
of the population began already in the sixties, while the total mass of money 
hardly begail to grow faster in the recent years. Those who talk about the 
recent emergence of budget deficit forget about the dynamics of debt money. 
Up to  the begiilniilg of the eighties the debt money grew rapidly from 126 
billion roubles in 1970 up to  520 billion roubles in 1985. Since 1985 the mass 
of debt money has been almost constant, on the other hand a t  this time 
the state budget deficit has been growing. As a matter of fact the credit 
emission was substituted in the middle eighties by the budget emission. 
We only consider the present financial crisis to  be the summit of a pro- 
longed socioeconomic structural crisis connected with decay of the centrally- 
planned economy. The sharp decline in growth rates in the mid seventies 
was the starting point in its development. This sharp decline can only be 
explained rationally if we consider the features of resource distribution in 
the centrally-planned economics. 
The characteristic feature of this system is its incapability to  redistribute 
financial and material resources among the departmental substructures of 
economy.[l] The development of new branches (high-technology sector) is 
limited by the current accumulatioll fund, while the old branches are func- 
tioning in regime of stagnation or even of slow expansion. When the outer 
resources guarantee a high rate of extensive growth, a substantial share of 
accumulation fund call be invested into new branches, which define efficiency 
level of the whole economy. 
The crash of such growth mechanisms as a result of tightening of the 
resource constraints [2] and of general entropy processes during the Brezh- 
nevite epoch put an  end to the above-mentioned type of technological devel- 
opment. From the inid seventies a serious shortage of financing of implemen- 
tation of advanced technologies has been perceived and the output-capital 
ratio has substantially decreased. 
There is no need to  analyze the different manifestations of the Soviet 
crisis to  see that  the exit from the crisis is connected with long-run dy- 
namization of national economy on the basis of new technology. 
Such dynamization requires the fulfillment of the following conditions: 
First, a high rate of accumulation, because new technologies are capital- 
intensive. 
Second, intersectoral resource redistribution in favor of advanced branches 
of economy. 
Third, the presence of mechanism which provides a rational choice be- 
tween investment projects and the effective use of investment funds. 
Exactly from this point of view we shall evaluate present measures of 
financial recovery and economic reform, as well as the global economic per- 
spectives of the USSR. 
Nearest Consequences of Restrictive Policy 
In the course of economic reform reductions in military and investment 
spending will sharply diminish the social demand for the output of the heavy 
industry, while the market orientation of enterprises will cause a reduction 
of intermediate consumption. 
The reduction of the demand can be compensated by different measures 
of economic policy: some branches of the heavy industry are capable of pro- 
ducing consumer goods (residential construction instead of nonresidential, 
the equipment for light and food processing industries, durable consumer 
goods). At the same time even the effective compensation will not permit 
to  keep the production of traditional machinery on the existing level. 
The reduction of investment and intermediate demand creates a situation 
of a profound structural crisis in Soviet heavy industry. As the input-output 
calculations show, only planned investment restriction will reduce demand 
for tractors, lorries of middle-carrying capacity, locomotives and railway car- 
riages, turbogenerators and other heavy machines by 20-60 percent in the 
next 3-5 years. The machinery is overproduced in Soviet economy and the 
rationalization of the economic ties will bring the existing surplus into mar- 
ket. The reduction in production of heavy machinery means a recession in 
the metallurgy industry. The railroads will be delivered from the substan- 
tial part of heavy loads, the route turnover of carriages will be normalized, 
and demand for it will fall. The stagnation in the heavy industry reduces 
industrial consumption of energy and affords to  restrict the construction of 
power stations. 
Under such circumstances the structural crisis turns from the latent form 
into the open one. The overproduction in the heavy industry is a main obsta- 
cle to  fina.ncia1 recovery: such industries as metallurgy and coal extracting 
cannot change their production profile. 
Even if enterprises in these industries are closed, in many cases it will be 
necessary to pay wages to the workforce from the budget. 
The Essence of Restructurization 
Non-viable enterprises can be closed or converted, but in any case we observe 
here a deep structural change in the economy. Among the features of this 
process we should mention the following: 
First, it is a forced structural change induced by the financial crisis and 
economic reform. 
Second, this structural change is by definition connected with utilization 
and conversion of existing production capacities, and does not require 
much investment. 
Third, this structural change is oriented a t  ~lonproductive consumption 
and not a t  technological development. 
We call this process "a restructurization" and not a reconstruction, be- 
cause we do not construct anything in this period, but only purge the econ- 
omy of obsolete techilological systems and branches. 
One should take into coilsideration the advantages and the disadvantages 
of a restructurization. Its positive effects allow the living standards of the 
population to  rise substantially by utilizing the existing industry capacity: 
the machinery can work until its physical wear and tear, and the workforce 
- until their pension age. The structure of economy is adapted to  the real 
social needs, the conditions of operation become more even for the majority 
of enterprises. 
Among the negative consequences of restructurization we should men- 
tion a stable decrease in rate of accumulation, which will be hard to  be 
reversed, and a possible decline of high-technology in capital-goods and de- 
fense industry: the existing R and D potential of these branches as well as 
the qualification of its workforce are not used efficiently when they produce 
consumer goods. All this is very important on the eve of large-scale recon- 
struction of the national economy, based on technological achievements of 
post industrial economies of the West. 
Contradict ions of a Technological Reconstruct ion 
The perspectives of further technological development of the USSR (after 
the end of the restructurization process) rouse our serious anxiety. The 
investment restriction is a necessary condition of the successful reform pro- 
cess, which has been many times used in practice, for example: the USSR 
in the period of NEP (1922-1924), Yugoslavia (1955-56), Hungary (1970- 
1971), China (in early eighties), Poland (1990). Such restriction prevents 
from carrying out inefficient investment projects, but it does not provide a 
mechanism for rational decision-making in this sphere. 
The investment restriction cannot last for a long time and all the above- 
mentioned cases were followed by inefficient invest booms. 
The mechanism of inefficient investment in socialist economy has been 
studied thoroughly [3] and now we can see that  neither the state nor self- 
managing enterprises can pursue the efficient investment policy. Self- 
managing enterprises have only profit (revenue) incentives and low propen- 
sity to  accumulate, while in state structures bureaucrats also do not bear 
the responsibility for the long-run consequences of their decisions. 
The response to inefficient social investment displayed in demands of 
"privatization", a t  least in form of worker's shares. In order to  provide in- 
centives for the workers to invest rationally these shares have to  be evaluated 
permanently a t  financial market, that is to be transferrable one way or other. 
But this nlechanism provides for intersectoral transference of capital in 
less degree as the rate of stock turnover in this case is rather low. The rate 
of accumulation is also low thanks to the workforce propensity to save up. 
"People's capitalism" in any case may only play an auxiliary role, especially 
under conditions of technological reconstruction. 
"Dramat is Personae" of Technological 
Reconstruction and Their Motivation 
In our considerations we see now a, figure, which arises from historical non- 
existence - the figure of a businessman-entrepreneur, which has enough cap- 
ital to  bear the investment responsibility and enough technical knowledge 
and willingness to  support the innovative activity. Unfortunately, these con- 
ditions do not coincide in our country. 
Those who have capital have acquired it in different spheres of illegal 
activity and are mostly ignorant; while scientists and white collars have 
small money savings. But it is not the main point. 
Inflationary tendencies and political instability will exist in this country 
during a long period of reconstruction. Under such circumstances even the 
businessmen of "R and D" origin will think twice before financing innovation 
projects with long gestation lags, while the former activists of the shadow 
economy will undoubtedly invest their money into tertiary labor intensive 
industries, such as trade, tourism, catering. 
Private capital will pour in a broad flow into development of new tech- 
nologies only when capital is overaccumulated and political guarantees for 
private investors are reliable enough. Those conditions have matured for a 
long time. 
Understanding the unreliability of private investment in the process of 
technological reconstruction, some of the Soviet economists are ready t o  
preserve the system of social investment in non-state form. 
There can be created big intersectoral concerns. Investment banks, inno- 
vation foundations can unite available assets of enterprises and population 
with financial resources of State. Such a mechanism presumably provides a 
high rate of accumulation and rational choice of investment projects. This 
rationality is provided only by professional and organizational incentives of 
managing and technical personnel in these organizations. The business mo- 
tives of the rational investment behavior are weak here, unless some type of 
share bonuses is introduced for those employers which take part in decision- 
making on concrete projects. 
The most vulnerable point of those institutions is the absence of a per- 
sonified capital owner. This fact opens wide possibilities for diffusion of 
non-economic criteria into their activity. Effective political pressure and per- 
sonnel corruption are practically unavoidable: "nobody's property" sooner 
or later finds a,n owner.[4] 
There are also social barriers on the way of technological reconstruction, 
besides the problem of its subject. The required increase in the rate of 
accumulation occurs a.fter a comparatively long period of its low values. 
This increase will not have an immediate effect on the growth rates and 
especially on consumption level. The halt in consumption growth will be 
very painful, as well as a continuing resource transfer from consumer goods 
sector into high-technology industry. Social tensions and political conflicts 
will be inevitable. 
Some Possible Recipes 
We do not see a way to  get over these contradictions. It is obvious that  
the alternative to  tecl~nological reconstruction is the further widening of the 
gap between the USSR and the Western world, a complete transition of the 
country into the Third World and its prolonged stagnation as a resource 
appendage and a rubbish heap for world economy. That is why we have to  
pass the way of technological reconstruction, long and agonizing it may be. 
Along this way not only technology basis should be reconstructed, but 
also property relations, political structure and socio-psychological behavior 
have to  change. 
What we suggest is not a complex system, but a compromise set of 
measures, which provide only suboptimal pat tern of reconstruction. 
Our main idea is to  connect individual entrepreneurial activity with fi- 
nancial resources of society. A person or a group intending to invest their 
own capital into technological recoiistruction (R and D, venture projects, re- 
construction of factories and plants) should have an access to the additional 
sources of social capital. 
While the primary responsibility for rational use of capital bear en- 
trepreneurs (by their shares), the total amount of investment is much greater 
than individual capital. Thus, the high rate of accumulation is secured. 
Organizational forms of such joint investment can differ from small ven- 
ture firms in high technology R and D to large joint stock corporations. The 
shares in those corporations should be dispersed between different holders 
(the State, mu~~icipal  Soviets, investmei~t foundations and banks, employees 
of enterprises, population) in order to exclude one-side political pressure in 
process of investment and technical policy elaboration. 
Stock companies can quickly mobilize financial and material resources 
needed for the development of new basic technologies. But a provision of 
tecl~nological development by workforce and infrastructure services is also a 
rather complicated task. 
During the restructurizatioi~ period substantial financial resources will 
be invested into the existing sociad and infrastructure. As a result of this 
sequence of econo~nic policy measures (at  first restructurization, the recon- 
struction) tecl~nological reconstruction will be oriented a t  the traditional 
system of territorial organization of economy. An additional argument in 
favor of such strategy is the low mobility of population in the USSR. 
That is why the new production system will be created on the base of the 
rebuilt enterprises of traditional technology systems, and the organizational 
form of this transition is the absorption of the old enterprises by the new 
corporations. 
The processes of restructurization and reconstruction are no compatible 
due to  the differences in accumulation rates and economic policy priorities. 
But even during the restructurization period there can be carried out some 
preparatory steps in the direction of reconstruction. 
Thus, the research and developmeilt activity on the principal directions 
of technical progress should be activated. The majority of thoses directions 
is well known thanks to the western experience, and the existing R and 
D structures are advanced enough for technological break-through in some 
areas. 
Such a policy will preserve the existing R and D potential, especially 
in defense industries, subject to  conversion. The output of Soviet high- 
technology industries may find its way to foreign markets, where Soviet 
wares can win a competition only thanks to their low costs of production 
(when accounted in hard currency according to the present low real rate of 
exchange). 
Foreign investment in the Soviet Union and joint ventures can also play 
a significant role not as an aid, but as a means of adaptation of Soviet 
economy to World market and of training Soviet people in the spirit of 
entrepreneurship and business. The temporary work of Soviet specialists 
abroad is a step in the same direction. 
Last but not least: social support of entrepreneurship in R and D sphere: 
Talented scientists and engineers should receive high incomes not as a salary, 
but as a royalty on sales from the firms which use the result of R and D. 
Small high- technology firms should enjoy different allowances and get and 
access to services of state-owned R and D infrastructure (computer network, 
information and leasing centers etc.). Small firms can be seen as a potential 
base for future development of large high-technology corporations. 
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Comments on the Paper by 
S. Aleksashenko and 
L. Grigoriev 
Kimio Uno, Keio University at Shonan Fujisawa 
Foreword 
I found the paper by Aleksashenko and Grigoriev extremely interesting and I 
want to  elaborate on five points in order to  set a stage for further discussion. 
In the process, I may try to  inject some Japanese view, not because I am 
from that  country, but because that  country has emerged from a capital 
scarce economy recently and may have institutional set-up which is relevant 
to the topic of the session. In addition, Japanese experiences in privatizing 
public corporations in recent years may have direct bearings on our topic. 
Problems of Ownership, or -the Roles of the 
Privatized Sector and the Public Sector 
It is only natural that the authors focused on production sphere (i.e., means 
of production) when they said "the key problem, which is the focal point of 
any economic system and which must necessarily be solved, is relations of 
ownership" [Aleksashenko and Grigoriev, p. 491. Abolition of private own- 
ership as means of production has been the backbone of socialist economic 
thinking. At the height of the controversy on convergence of economic sys- 
tems in the 1960s, economists in the West tended to emphasize the changing 
functions of market economies on the one hand and planned economies on 
the other, and admitted the converging trends. In contrast, economists in 
the East disagreed on the ground that the forms of ownership are distinctly 
different in the two systems. 
A question the11 arises: what kind of mixture are we talking about in 
discussing the econonlic reforms? Even in a market economy, there exists 
public sector of considerable size. In the U.S., which is the champion of 
the market economy, the ma.gnitude of resources which goes through public 
channels amounts to  40% of GNP (we include here final demand and income 
redistribution through social security). The picture is the same in Japan. In 
Western European countries such as FRG, France, and the U.K., the ratio 
is about 60%. Even in the Soviet Union, on the other hand, the share of 
public sector is not 100%. 
In the Soviet Union today, majority of enterprises are owned by the state. 
"They are subordinated in administrative terms to  ministries and other state 
bodies, and must carry out their orders" (Yasin). Instead, various forms of 
ownership are being discussed. Suggested forms include the following. 
(1) Cooperatives. 
(2 )  Leasing of enterprises by work teams. 
(3) Enterprises with a share of foreign capital (joint ventures). 
(4) Stock-holding companies. 
Greatest hopes are placed on the last one. Soviet economic reformers are 
thinking in terms of converting state-owned enterprises into stock-holding 
companies. "A stock-holding company reports only t o  a meeting of its share- 
holders and may not run by any other governing body [Aleksashenko and 
Grigoriev]. 
Much more discussion should be devoted to the functions of ownership. 
Forms of ownership does not uniquely define the functions of ownership. 
By the "functions of ownership" I mean (a)  Who runs business, capi- 
talist owners or specialized managers? Their motivation may be altogether 
different. In the market economies, tendency has been the separation of 
ownership and management. Business firms are increasingly owned by insti- 
tutional investors such as life insurance fund, and management is relegated 
to  specialists. (b) Who controls the profit? It can be consumed by owner- 
capitalists, distributed to  employees, taxed away and spent by government, 
or reinvested by the business. 
One of the important functions of the capital market is risk taking. This 
is because investment is the act of realizing tecl~~~ological  change, rather than 
perpetuating the existing practice. This fact gave rise t o  various forms of 
organizations such as venture capital, spin-offs which often organized as sub- 
sidiaries, consortiuln (research, etc.), subcontracting, network organization, 
so on and so forth. 
Behavior of various forms of ownership has to be analyzed from this 
perspective. 
Channeling Savings into Investment 
Why privatize? It is because market mechanism is believed to be conductive 
to: 
(1) Production processes which reflect new technological possibilities and 
changing factor prices (wage rate and interest rate). 
(2)  Stringent managerial responsibilities. 
(3)  Efficient logistics, shorter construction period, and faster turn-around 
time. 
(4)  Quick response to  changing demand 
But in a society where investment demand exceeds savings fund, interest 
rate will be driven up if its determination is left for the market. This will 
make investment in plant and equipment economically unjustifiable because 
of the long gestation period and heavy financial risks. The same can be 
said of R&D expenditures. Speculative transactions, which typically do not 
involve production, inay become attractive. 
An alternative is capital rationing where capital is allocated a t  a lower- 
than-equilibrium interest rate and funds are allocated according to  some 
priorities. But, this presupposes sectoral priorities. Who sets the priorities? 
Government ministries? Thus, we are back to  where we started - central 
planning. 
It seems imperative to  introduce market test for investment projects. 
Allocating resources by goverilment decree has proved an inefficient way of 
running an economy, and this is true in the West as well as in the East. 
I11 Japan, for instance, savings are channeled through two routes. The 
one coming through public clla.nne1 is usually mixed with private funds, and 
investment projects are almost always drawn up by private business. Thus, 
any project has to  meet the test of the market (see Figure 1). 
Projection on future demand is often discussed a t  industry level (vari- 
ous industrial organizations such as iron and steel, automobiles, electrical 
machinery, et c.) a t  an aggregated government-industry level (Council on 

Industrial Structure).  This is a checking mechanism regarding interindustry 
repercussions (real side of the economy) a.nd availability of investment fund 
(monetary side) [Uno, 19871. 
Privatization, How to Get from Here to There 
The government should take a decision to convert 200 to 250 giant 
enterprises into stock-holding companies that will exchange their stock. 
. . .Programs are now being designed to sell shares on a step-by-step ba- 
sis (wit11 all the rights provided for in international standards). As the 
first step a department should be set up to manage state property, a body 
charged with transforming enterprises, enforcing compliance with national 
interests. 
Such a body will launch a system (fully owned by the state) of investment 
funds on a sectoral basis and/or a territorial one. Initially they will hold 
the stock of their "own" enterprises only, but later they will be able to buy 
shares of enterprises in other sectors with the money accrued from selling 
some of their stock and earning dividends. [Aleksashenko and Grigoriev] 
We know how a market economy functions once state-owned enterprises 
are privatized. W h a t  is crucially important is the process of transition. In 
this sense, privatization experience of major public corporations in Japan 
may be worth close scrutiny. 
The  case of priva.tization in the Soviet Union is not exactly the same a s  
the case in Japan.  For one thing, capital market already exists and private 
citizens a s  well as  financial institutions are used t o  purchasing stock. This  
involves risks, the price of stock may go up, but i t  may go down. Market 
mechanism worl<s generally well wllen the adjustment is marginal. But  the 
privatization in the Soviet Union is far from marginal. 
Secondly, a mechanism exists whereby market value of the entity being 
privatized can be assessed. Through the market test,  fair price can be set. 
If, however, there is no market evaluation, price can be set arbitrarily low, 
resulting in windfall profit for the purchaser. Even in market economies, 
insider transactions are strictly forbidden for this reason. If the firms are  
sold a t  a bargain price in the course of privatization, public a t  large will 
suffer hidden loss of losing public property t o  private hands. 
A few words a.re in order 011 Ja.pan7s public corporation system. Re- 
cent privatization in Japan had its focus on three public corporations in 
railway transportation (JNR: the Japan National Railways), telecommuni- 
cations (NTT:  the Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation), 
and cigarette production and distribution (JTS: the Japan Tobacco and 
Salt Public Corporation). 
They are in general characterized as follows. 
A special corporation separa,ted from the government structure. 
100% share held by the government. 
Limited business activities. 
President and vice president nominated by the cabinet. 
Budget decided yearly by the Diet. 
Limitation on budget transfer. 
Fund raising and bond issuance must be approved by the Ministry in 
charge. 
Independent fund operatioil not allowed. 
Despite their aims of achieving efficiency while attaining public service 
function, they have grown into bureaucratic organizations of gross ineffi- 
ciency. Such development is attributed to the following factors. 
Lack of self-determining power: budget, fees, investment plans, wages, 
among others, have to await government approval. 
Political intervention: people's expectation on public services, coupled 
with politicians' desire to gain voters' support, tended to put pressure 
on public corporations and bend their decisions. 
Unusual labor relations: strikes are prohibited for the workers in public 
corporations in order to safeguard uninterrupted services, while, actually, 
frequent labor disputes have been experienced. 
Managerial responsibility was obscured by the above. 
External intervention, managerial deficiency, and abnormal labor rela- 
tions, in addition to prohibition of entry into new business field other than 
stipulated in law, made public corporation inefficient. Inefficiency alone does 
not invite business failures. They ha.ve turned into unprofitable entities due 
t o  loss of monopolistic position, which in turn was the result of technological 
change in respective fields. 
The Provisional Commission for Administrative Reform in early 1980s 
recommended privatization of public corporations. Actual process deferred 
slightly in each case, but the general thrust can be observed in the following 
steps stipulated for telecommunication corporation NTT. 
NTT's status shall be changed from a public corporation to a special 
corporation as a provisional measure. 
Table 1. Profit and loss of corporations after privatization. (Billion yen). 
(Estimate) 
FY'84 FY'85 FY'86 FY'87 FY' 88 
1. JNR 0 JR Companies (since 1987) 
Total revenue 3,559 3,725 3,944 3,821 3,718 
Total cost 5,209 5,573 5,305 3,665 3,588 
Profits (before tax) A 1,650 A 1,848 A 1,361 156 130 
Profits of the year - - - 50 63 
Deficit - - - A 1,170 N.A. 
(JNR Settlement Corp.) 
Manpower (in persons) 358,065 326,025 276,774 202,671 N.A. 
2. NTT & new NTT (since 1985) 
Total revenue 4,756 5,091 5,354 5,662 5,613 
Business expenses 4,429 4,407 4,631 4,841 4,925 
Business profits - 684 728 82 1 688 
Profits (before tax) 328 316 358 497 425 
Profits of the year 
- 141 148 243 233 
Manpower (in persons) 326,546 309,201 300,488 294,422 N.A. 
The government shall hold all shares of this special corporation. 
Within 5 years, NTT shall be reorganized into a central company man- 
aging trunk telecommunications lines and a multiple number of local 
companies offering telephone services to  local communities. 
Other companies shall be allowed to  enter the trunk telecommunications 
line market (introduction of competition principle). 
Until the reorganization, . . .rationalization measures shall be applied 
t o  NTT, such as reduction of work force, separation of its customer's 
premises equipment department and data communication department. 
The progress of privatization of NTT is depicted in Figure 2 which shows 
public offer of shares held by the government. As for the results of privati- 
zation in terms of efficiency of management, da ta  provided in Table 1 give 
us clues. We may say that  the outcome has been favorable. 
A mid-way between state ownership and privatization is leasing arrange- 
ment. Leasing arrangement ha,s the a.dvantage of avoiding manipulation of 
capital market by "insiders" of previous enterprise administrators. While 
capital market is yet to  be implemented, step-wise formulation of market 
valuation of enterprises through leasing seems to be a feasible solution. 
Figure 2. Government holding of NTT shares and public offer. 
Capital Market and Technological Change 
Authors stress the creation of full-fledged market in the Soviet Union. 
I t  has become impossible to determine directions for the most effective uti- 
lization of various resources. . . .these problems can be solved only through 
the creation of a full-fledged market . . .manpower, information and capital. 
The creation of a capital market, or a financial market, is a problem of par- 
ticular import an ce because it has to do with the distribution of resources 
which largely shape the state of econoiny for a long period of time. What  
is involved here is investment. [Aleksashenko and Grigoriev] 
Decisions on employment and investment are based on relative price of 
labor and capital. Thus, we are concerned with an integrated factor market. 
Labor market determines price for labor (= wage rate), capital market price 
for capital (= interest rate), and goods market price of capital equipment. 
In earlier days before full employment was achieved, economic growth 
did not necessarily mean rising income levels. Also there are indications 
that  the labor's share in GNP tended to  stay constant or decline. A scheme 
on econonlic development of labor-surplus economy suggested by Ranis and 
Fei is particularly appropriate in this context. Their theorization explains 
why the interest of workers (who a.re interested in consumption in the current 
period) and that  of capitalist entrepreneurs (who are interested in investment 
for the future) tend to  diverge. 
But things are altogether different after the full employment is achieved. 
Capital accumulation necessarily leads to  rising wa.ge levels. What is more, 
capital is increasingly owned by working class directly through acquisition 
of such capital securities. Even when they do not purchase stocks directly, 
life insurance, retirement fund, etc., put their money in the form of stocks. 
Important thing is that  the relative price of labor and capital determines 
the characteristics of production technology. When the labor becomes scarce 
and hence the wage rate higher, business firms are obliged to  adopt labor 
saving, capital intensive technology. 
This point is confirmed empirically for the diffusion of industrial robots, 
NC machines, computers, and other high-tech, which has been the focal point 
of CIM (computer-integrated manufacturing) project a t  IIASA of which I 
am a member. 
Privatization moves the decision making from the top to  the bottom. 
And the bottom-up decision making, a.s opposed to top-down, is absolute ne- 
cessity for smooth diffusion of new technology because only a t  the plant level 
one can evaluate the potentials of new technology. Technological 
potentials are very difficult to gauge a t  the top level. This also underscores 
the importance of free flow of information. 
It is also important to  see the roles played by the financial institutions. 
Banks, themselves competing each other, evaluate new investment plans by 
private business and expand credit for the promising ones. Competition in 
financial spheres is another vehicle through which technological innovation 
is realized. 
Need for Monetary Statistics 
According to  authors, "Population's financial resources a t  the present time 
are clearly insufficient for acquiring a significant portion of the state prop- 
erty." While a t  the same time, "Ideological, social and political dogmas 
continue to  exert a fairly strong influence on the society, which maintain 
that  owning large stock is inadmissible for it entail the formation of a group 
of rentiers, or investors." Therefore it is suggested that  "cross ownership 
of most of the shares by enterprises and organizations as well as credit and 
financial institutions of a new type is suggested to  be the most effective way" 
[Aleksashenko and Grigoriev]. 
Accusation on ideological grounds can be dealt with in a scientific manner 
as we have discussed above. 
We are here concerned with a problem of formulating the privatization 
and creation of capital market in operational terms. This cannot be done 
by decree. In order to  approach the problem of creation of capital market in 
a systematic way, and to  start talking in operational terms, we need flow of 
funds statistics regarding the flow of financial resources and assets and lia- 
bilities statistics regarding the stock. The framework should include sectoral 
breakdown, such as government, financial institutions, business, household, 
and the rest of the world. One may wish to distinguish central government, 
local public bodies, and public corporations. Financial institutions can also 
be broken down into the central bank, private financial institutions, and 
public financial institutions. Each sector has entries regarding their assets 
and liabilities. 
Then we can talk about trailsforining one form of asset (e.g., cash hold- 
ings) into another (e.g., stocks, bonds, etc.). Potential roles of pension plans, 
life insurance scheme, etc., can be explicitly examined. 
This is also essential from the viewpoint of avoiding inflation. Monetary 
side should be kept in pace with the real side. If the government turn to  
deficit financing, and business into mutual borrowing, the aggregate demand 
may easily exceed supply potential. 
Under inflation, it will be extremely difficult to  persuade people to  pur- 
chase financial a.ssets with fixed interest rates because it is the sure way 
to  lose money. Inflation, coupled with privatization, will make speculation 
more profitable than real investment which takes many years before turning 
out yields. 
"A banking system capable of regulating money supply will be an im- 
portant element in achieving fi~la~lcial recovery. The present system based 
on centralized distribution of credits and administrative control over the ac- 
tivities of loan recipients is ineffective because it can be bent by state and 
party authorities" [Yasin]. If capital market is to  be created and made func- 
tional, then statistical system which is capable of monitoring the market 
performance is undoubtedly indispensable. 
Further Remarks 
Questions for future research for the study group on capital market and 
privatization seem to  include the following. 
Banking system: 
(1) Two-tier banking system. 
(2) Role of central bank, political independence. 
(3) Creation of financial market to implement monetary policy (open-market 
operations). 
(4) Assessment of credit-worthiness of firms. 
(5) Market clearing interest rate vs. capital rationing. 
Non-banking financial system: 
(1) Timing of stock market implementation. 
(2) Roles of enterprise management. 
(3) Life insurance and other forms of insurance. 
S tock-holding companies: 
(1) Theoretical justification. 
(2) Appropriate forms of ownership, large enterprises vs. medium- and small- 
sized firms. 
(3) Assessment of the values of the firms. 
(4) Procedure for privatization. 
(5) Merit of leasing arrangement. 
(6) Who is t o  own the  stocks, including the  roles of government investment 
fund. 
These topics will have t o  be elaborated further for t he  economic reform 
and integration process in planned economies. There are undoubtedly ample 
experience accumulated over the  years in planned economies as  well a s  in  
market economies. There are also theoretical inquiries on  the  performance 
of various institutional arrangements. We need t o  mobilize this body of 
knowledge in order t o  come up  with a consistent set of policy prescriptions. 
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Summary of Discussions* 
C. M. Schneider 
When speaking about economic problems and reform, the distinctions 
between stocks and flows in an economic system must be clear. The basic 
build-up of capital markets is central to  the success and failure of a move to  
a market economy. Within the realm of business of the banking system, an 
allocation of the flow of savings a~nong diverse investment applications to  
create new investment opportunities becomes essential. Although the flow 
problem is present, it is the stock problem which is much more serious and 
basic. There should be a transfer of the stock of current assets from their 
present form to  a productive stock in a new form where the stock can accrue. 
The steps of a reform should first deal with the stock problem before turning 
to  find a solution to  the flow problem. Essentially, the sock problem refers 
to  a transfer of ownership. The three objectives that  would be important to  
see a t  the top of the list of policy objectives of the Soviet government are 
the following: 
(1) To make more efficient and productive use of assets. 
(2) To generate revenue to  finance government spending. 
(3) To reduce the quantity of money in private hands. 
Substantial care is necessary when implementing policy reform in or- 
der not to  link the objectives. Any general agglomeration can inevitably 
constrain the pace of achieving different and individual goals. Both quan- 
titative and qualitative measures a.re required when attempting to  reach an 
appropriate solution. 
'Comments made by Benjamin Friednian (USA), Kimio Uno ( JPN) ,  Mario Nuti (I), 
William Nordhaus (USA), Alfred Kahn (USA), Janos Gacs (H) ,  Pave1 Klima (vCSFR), 
Karl-Ernst Schenk (ERG), Konstantin Kagalovsky (USSR), Petr Aven (IIASA/USSR) and 
I1 Sakong (S. Korea). 
The one possible way to  solve existing stock and flow problems simulta- 
neously could be by the sale (of assets) to the public. Initially, the private 
sector may not be able to  absorb all assets and investment possibilities. Some 
measures must be taken that  this situation is normalized within a short ad- 
justment period. Basically, the private sector must buy back assets which 
are in governmental or state hands. The underlying objective of policy in 
this area is t o  organize, encourage and facilitate the transfer of capital assets 
to  the private sector. The question of whether the state should actually be 
compensated for capital turned over to  the citizens, t o  whom it  theoreti- 
cally belonged previously, arises as a rather contentious issue. In general, 
a transfer of financial resources back to  the state is not necessary because 
the governing body was just holding these resources for the private sector 
anyway. 
Once privatization of state holdings has been agreed on as a policy move, 
decision-makers are preoccupied with choosing the optimal form of ownership 
which they plan t o  promote. There are four main models of firm ownership 
that  are presently most popular in the discussion. First, leveraged buy- 
outs, where the owners are simultaneously the managers and vice versa, 
although this does not necessarily have to  be the case. Second, the transfer of 
ownership t o  the workers. The Yugoslavian experience resembles this second 
point to  the extent that  the management rights and responsibilities are in 
the hands of the workers' councils, though actual ownership has remained in 
government hands. Third, a broad dispersion of ownership assets or shares 
among the general citizenry and to  then allow the opportunity for trading. 
Fourth, an entrepreneur system in which the dominant shareholder, who has 
a position equivalent to  that  of an owner, acts as an  entrepreneur. In the 
latter case, the state need not be the entrepreneur, but the new entity must 
have the incentive t o  act as an entrepreneur. If the state does remain as the 
owner, its ownership rights cannot differ from those of the private companies. 
A probability of a loss of economies of scale would certainly be outweighed 
by new and improved competition and the finding of entrepreneurs. 
Overall, the discussion of privatization in the Soviet papers seems to  
concentrate on the production sector. A decision has t o  be made or a com- 
promise reached with respect to  the proportion of private ownership relative 
t o  public ownership. In addition, the sectors (manufacturing, services, etc.) 
in which the implementation of such policy measures can achieve the most 
effective beneficial results in the shortest time need to  be identified. Sub- 
stantial public sectors are known to exist even in many successful market 
economies of today. It would, of course, be ideal t o  have a well-functioning 
and integrated mixture of both private and public sectors to drive the growth 
process of an economy. The role of the government must be clear and distinct 
as either an  entrepreneur or as a taxer in each particular case. 
The ownership concept affects a number of other aspects essential to  a 
competitive economy. An inadequate ownership structure leads to  an in- 
appropriate distribution of profits which itself influences the movement of 
savings back into productive investment. The risks associated with this 
decision path are an important element of a normal capital market. The 
fundamental reason behind privatization is to initiate some of the charac- 
teristics of a market system. The creation of a higher investment demand 
than the available supply of savings could lead to  raised interest rates and/or 
capital rationing. In the Soviet case there is a definite need for a long-term 
credit bank or other financial institutions. A supplementary requirement 
is a horizontally integrated factor market where decisions on investments 
are made with respect to  the cost of inputs (i.e., capital, labor, etc.). As 
a result, these inputs should be traded in the market with as real prices as 
possible. Followingly, a market must exist for evaluating assets, otherwise 
the economy is vulnerable to  insider moves which are classified as a general 
loss t o  the society as a whole. 
As time goes by and political systems adapt to the forever changing 
demands of the people, i t  seems that the definition and characteristics which 
formerly distinguished so clearly the capitalist from the socialist countries 
have become increasingly fuzzy. The fact remains that  socialist countries do 
concentrate to  much on just plain production as their motor for growth, while 
neglecting the budget side. Moving to  a complete capital market should not 
be a t  the beginning of a transition agenda from a command to  a market 
system. The element of privatization is crucial and reasonably successful, 
especially where enterprises rely on a large proportion of their financing to  be 
internal as in the United States. The encouragement of this type of financing 
should be seriously considered by Eastern European reformers. Successful 
firms have diverse ownership characteristics, such as: 
(1) an entrepreneurial group (management) 
(2) incentives 
(3) competition 
Care must be taken to  control the enthusiasm to  achieve a market full of 
straight-forward, text-book Western type firms. 
Aside from the fact that  privatization of state enterprises and assets has 
been proven to  lead t o  a more competitive environment and increases in 
the rate of technological change, a variety of problems still remain to  be 
solved. The most important question to  be faced is not only concerned with 
the choice of which route to  privatization should be chosen, but also with 
what timing this process should proceed. If the is a lack of infrastructure 
and programs of labor reallocation and retraining, privatization can cause 
unemployment. Decision-makers will also have to  deal with the problem of 
the many enterprises that  are destined for bankruptcy under privatization 
due to  the decades of non-competitive and not demand or cost oriented 
production and the heavy reliance 011 government subsidies. Who actually 
sells to  whom and who will and can afford to  be the majority shareholders are 
further unresolved areas. Finally, any move to privatization must be socially 
acceptable. Therefore, reformers need to adjust their policies in a way to  
ensure public acceptance, while still achieving predetermined economic goals 
and largely preventing any negative externalities that  threaten t o  arise. 
There are various ways in which privatization affects the performance 
of enterprises individually and thus also the market as a whole. The pri- 
mary achievement is an increase in the efficiency caused by the changes in 
the control mechanisms. A initial step in the right direction would be to  
eliminate ex-anti controls and increase ex-post evaluation. As a result firms 
would be accountable to  the public and the supply, the quality of products 
and demand-oriented production would improve. The importance for perfor- 
mance evaluation is essential to  the market system. After a proper appraisal 
of assets i t  may be found that  a partial privatization could be sufficient, 
allowing a mutual symbiosis between private and public sectors as alluded 
to  earlier. 
Part I11 
Labor Market and 
Employment 

Employment and Labor 
Market Change 
V.I. Scherbakov and A.N.  Shokhin 
A developed labor market and full and productive employment are among 
the most difficult targets of the econoinic reform now under way in the USSR. 
It stems from the fact that  the processes related to  employment have not 
only economic but also social and even political aspects. 
Section I 
Until recently the situation with employmeilt and labor market in the USSR 
was characterized by the following elements: 
(1) Overemployment resulting from excessive demand for labor on the part 
of enterprises and low levels of utilization of labor potential (by vari- 
ous estimates latent unemployment in the active production industries 
reaches 10 to  25 percent of the total work force). 
(2) Shortage of manpower in some professions, substantial number of vacan- 
cies (around 3 million in the economy as a whole, of which 1 million 
in the industrial sector). Lack of educational and vocational qualifica- 
tion as well as of professional mobility required for the adaptation to  the 
everchanging production environment. 
(3) Low work ethic and poor quality of labor resources resulting from the 
high ratio of unskilled labor (up to  25 inillion people), low cost of labor 
and its insufficient differentiation depending on workers' qualification and 
efficiency factors (in 1989, for example, loss of labor time in the industrial 
sector and construction business exceeded 40 million work-days which is 
equivalent to  140,000 people not reporting for work throughout the year, 
causing 4 billion roubles in losses). 
(4) Distinctly regional nature of employment problems: existence of areas of 
labor shortages (non-black-soil part of the RSFSR, Siberia and others), 
and of areas with excessive labor supply (Central Asia and Azerbaijan, 
Moldavia). (Regional unemployment estimated a t  5-6 million people 
result from insufficient labor and social activity of the rapidly growing 
indigenous population, and low level of its participation in the labor re- 
production mechanisms and labor market on the one hand, and inefficient 
investment policy, location of industries and their structure on the other 
hand.) Concentration of population in large cities and industrial cen- 
ters (resulting from uneven development of the social infrastructure and 
from the policy of centralized distribution of investments and consumer 
resources), exodus from rural areas and small towns. 
(5) Rigid regulation of labor (still largely practiced) which has to  do with 
the forced labor in some areas of activities defined by law. Limited labor 
mobility resulting from housing difficulties as well as from the adminis- 
trative system of residence permits. 
(6) Functioning of the shadow labor market: high ratio of functional changes 
of jobs (the so-called turnover rate reaches 15 percent and as a result up to  
1 million people on the average is out of work throughout any one year), 
which in the conditions of labor shortages and excessive employment 
leads to  unduly inflated cost of labor and poor work ethic; proliferation 
of unregistered forms of labor a.ctivity such as unaccounted overtime, 
growth of private activities, development of shadow economy and so on. 
(7) Shifting responsibility for ensuring full employment towards enterprises, 
weakness of the public job placement and employment system, an  ide- 
ological approach t o  the employment problems (the thesis according to  
which unemployment and socialism are incompatible leads in practice to  
a situation where the country is not prepared to  face temporary unem- 
ployment resulting from innovations and structural changes). 
The radical economic reform and the programs aimed a t  improving the 
economic situation in the Soviet Union introduce a number of new elements 
into the employment equation. These elements include: 
Coming into existence of the entrepreneurial sectors in the economy (new 
forms of cooperatives, self-employed businesses, leased and share-holding 
enterprises and joint ventures), which leads to  re-distribution of labor 
resources (as of 1989 about 5 million people were employed in the indi- 
vidual and cooperative businesses). 
Drastic structural shifts in the economy, changes in the investment poli- 
cies, streamlining of production through the implementation of the new 
economic mechanism, resulting in a massive release of workers. (Over the 
9 months of the last year 4.4 million people contacted government-run 
job placement agencies. 2.3 million people have been helped by these job 
placement a.gencies.) Of all those who went to  job placement agencies 
1.9 million people or 43 percent did not take advantage of their services. 
It is estimated, that  in 1990 unemployinent may reach 1.5 million peo- 
ple. During the 13th five-year plan as a result of growth of leased and 
share-holding enterprises another 2 million workers may be released from 
the economy. 
New forms of interaction between subjects of social and labor relations 
(independent labor movement, strikes, new roles for labor unions) in the 
conditions where a normal "tripartite" system has not yet come into 
its own (workers, trade unions - entrepreneurs - government and state 
bodies). 
Increased demand for jobs as a result of growing inflation (need for ad- 
ditional income); need to provide employment for new categories of pop- 
ulation (refugees). 
Additional difficulties experienced by youth, women with children, hand- 
icapped, and people in pre-retirement age in finding jobs in the public 
sector as a result of growing competition with other sectors of the econ- 
omy. 
Persistence of long-standing einployment problems and the new phenom- 
ena in the labor market make it imperative to work out a new model of 
employment and an effective policy for its implementation. 
Section I1 
Objectives to  be achieved in the field of einployment are universal and can 
be reached through the application of the following principles: 
full employment where all those who want a job can find it;  
productive (effective) employment meaning full use of the labor and pro- 
ductive potential; 
free choice of employment which means that workers are free t o  decide 
where to work, if a t  all. 
Implementation of these objectives in the USSR is complicated by the 
above mentioned employment and labor market crises. The situation is 
further complicated by the fact that the economic system itself is in the 
process of development. 
There are a t  least two cardinally different versions of the economic re- 
form. Employment policy is shaped by the general orientation of the reform. 
As of this writing preference is given to  the scaled-down version which, if 
implemented, is likely to  emasculate the reform itself since this version will 
stress (especially in its initial stages) administrative methods. In the field of 
employment this version will be implemented through administrative means 
and economic sanctions aimed a t  regulating work force migration between 
economic sectors, the scale of layoffs as well as emphasis on organizational 
and structural methods of solving the employment problem. 
The radical scenario as opposed to  the scaled-down version may lead to  
a conflict and explosive snowballing socio-political tensions and collisions 
rather than to  stagnation. However, given broad social support for the man- 
agement structures behind the reform, legitimacy of power, immediate eco- 
nomic benefits of the reform (availability of consumer goods on the market, 
etc.) this radical scenario may promote earlier solution of socio-economic is- 
sues compared to  what can be expected from the scaled-down version. This 
is why preference has been given to the radical scenario. (Naturally, this ver- 
sion will involve detailed study of how to  implement the changes t o  minimize 
its socio-political cost.) 
Main elements of the new employment model are, to  a certain extent, 
identical in both versions of the reform (the two versions putting different 
pressure on the employment and setting the pace a t  which the labor market 
is created). These elements include: 
a. setting up of an economic mechanism offering the enterprises the neces- 
sary incentives to  use rationally its labor force and become a full-fledged 
participant int he labor ma,rket; 
b. creation of a public job placement system (to replace the spontaneous 
mechanism of frictional work force migration), which would act as a go- 
between for participants in the labor market (labor exchanges); 
c. setting up of a compensatory mechanism to  minimize the consequences 
of structural unemployment. The most important of these mechanisms 
being job retraining programs (it is also important to  develop educational 
and qualificational capabilities forming a new basis level of knowledge); 
d. elimination of cyclic employment fluctuations through special state pro- 
grams including public works; 
e. developing differentiated mechanisms to control regional labor market 
with various ethnic and national, as well as social and cultural peculiari- 
ties (creating new job opportunities, developing alternative employment, 
population policies, etc.); 
f. setting up of a system of compulsory and voluntary unemployment in- 
surance to  pay to  the workers made redundant their average wages for a 
period to  be determined by the potential of the insurance system; 
g. setting up of a system of social a.ssista.nce to  the unemployed in the form 
of unemployment benefits. These benefits payable in addition to  the 
material support for the disadvanta.ged segments of population should be 
extended to  cover the unemployed unable to  take advantage (for objective 
reasons) of other systems of social support in the field of employment. 
h. managing the needs of the population in employment opportunities by 
way of: 
extending the duration of general and vocational studies, duration 
and frequency of refresher courses and job retraining programs (cf: 
the duration of vocational training for a Soviet worker is three years 
shorter than in the United States); raising scholarships, offering 
long-term educational loans in order to  ensure decent living stan- 
da.rds for the students; 
pension law reform; increasing pensions to  a level a t  which the re- 
tiree would not require (as a rule) additional income to  maintain 
decent living standards; 
extending the duration of paid maternity leaves for women with 
children under three with a view to improving their working and 
family conditions; 
Experts believe that  these measures, if implemented, may lead to a re- 
duction of professional activities by an estimated 10 percentage points. 
At the same time special measures are required to  raise competitiveness 
of some segments of population a t  the labor market (prevention of unem- 
ployment among youth, occupational rehabilitation of women after long 
periods of professional inactivity, etc.); 
i. de-etatization of property, promoting entrepreneural sectors of economy 
making it possible to  introduce employment security mechanism for spe- 
cific segments of population; 
j. legislative steps to regulate employment and labor market (it is expected 
to  adopt employment act and to streamline labor legislation as early as 
1991), enforcing contractual regulation of social and labor relations. 
Several concepts related to different sceilarios of economic reform were 
raised in the discussions of various mechanisms designed to  resolve the main 
problems involved in shaping a new employment model. 
The first concept is the concept of "shock therapy" in the field of em- 
ployment involving the introduction of unemployment in order to  provide 
work incentives and promote the formation of labor market. 
The second concept is based on the assumption that  unemployment in 
a socialist society may result only from planning aad management mistakes 
and is not related to structural and tecl~nological changes (this assumption 
is supported by the fact that overemployment, labor force shortages and un- 
employment in overpopulated regions may exist siinultaneously). Therefore 
a more rational centralized policy can solve the problem of employment. 
Unemployment should not be regarded as a special means for promoting 
labor motivation. It is equally erroneous to believe that  a radical economic 
reform, accelerated structural adjustment of the economy, and the introduc- 
tion of high technologies can help to avoid large-scale regroupings of labor 
force in relatively short period of time. All this manpower migrations and 
changes of job cannot be accounted for and implemented on a centralized 
basis, and should be governed by labor inarltet institutes and mechanisms. 
Any modern state (especially the USSR, with rich traditions of social equal- 
ity and social security) should minimize the social cost of labor market oper- 
ation. This is why employment policy and state programs are being worked 
out. They are designed to  prevent massive forced unemployment, to  mini- 
mize the number of people living on unemployment benefits and to  create 
effective mechanisms to help the population a,dapt to  the supply and de- 
mand fluctuations oh the labor market. At the same time social support 
measures should not impede early formation of the labor market. Work on 
the new models of labor market and employineilt policy in the USSR is a t  
its initial stage. Many parameters have not yet been defined. Thus, there 
are no reliable estimates as to the number of workers to  be laid off (espe- 
cially for different industries and professional and occupational categories), 
criteria have not been defined to draw a line between voluntary and forced 
unemployment, still to be determined are the financial implications of the 
lay off and social support mechanisms for the state budget and incomes of 
the enterprises and population. 
However, the complexity of these problems makes their early resolution 
imperative. Any procrastination ma,y complicate the situation a t  the labor 
market, largely increasing the costs (financial, economic, social and political) 
of its normalization. 

Comments on the Paper by 
V.A. Scherbakov and 
A.N. Shokhin 
Albert Rees 
Princeton University 
The first section of this paper summarizes the severe imbalances that  have 
developed in the allocation of labor in the Soviet Union. These include the 
hoarding of uilproductive labor by industrial enterprises, shortages of man- 
power in some professions, and very serious regional imbalances that  take 
the form of massive unemployrne~lt in regions of rapid population growth, 
especially Central Asia and Azerbaijan. The hoarding of labor in industrial 
enterprises is in part a consequence of placing the responsibility for full em- 
ployment on the enterprises, which I take to  mean that  an  enterprise that  
does not need a worker in one function is obliged t o  find him a position in 
another. 
The rest of the paper deals with the goal of creating a free and efficient 
market for labor more like those of Western economies and with the methods 
for achieving this goal. In general, I believe that  both the goals and methods 
set forth in the paper are sound, but I should like t o  comment on some of 
the methods. 
The authors argue that  shifting the responsibility for full employment 
from the enterprise t o  the government requires the development of programs 
of job training, labor exchanges, and unemployment insurance. American 
economists would certainly agree. In designing an unemployment insurance 
system, important choices have to  be made about the level and duration 
of benefits. If benefits are too low, the unemployed will suffer hardship; if 
the benefits are too high or last too long the incentive to  find new work 
will be weakened. In the United States, unemployment insurance benefits 
are generally limited to  26 weeks. In many European countries, they last 
indefinitely, which may contribute to the high unemployment rates observed 
in Western Europe in recent years. 
In the area of public job training programs and labor exchanges, Swe- 
den is a better model to  study than the United States. American public 
programs in these areas have not been conspicuously successful. The state 
employment services in the United States place fewer than 10 percent of all 
workers who find new jobs, and these are concentrated in the lowest paid, 
lowest skilled occupations. Placemeilts in higher skilled jobs are more of- 
ten made through personal contacts, newspaper advertisements, or private 
(profit making) employment agencies. The idea of a private employment 
agency may be a radical one for a Socialist economy to  consider, but they 
do have some advantages. In the United States, employees of the state em- 
ployment services are paid a salary, while those a t  private agencies receive 
a commission for each placement, which rewards effectiveness in making 
placements. 
Many American enterprises have had to  reduce the size of their work 
forces substantially in recent years because of competition from imports 
and other changes in markets. Some of these enterprises, such as the Ford 
Motor Company and the American Telephone and Telegraph Company, have 
in cooperation with their labor unions developed successful systems of job 
training for employees who have been let go. These involve counseling about 
the kind of new career the employee would prefer, followed by supported 
training for this new career. The training usually takes place in a trade 
school or a community college, not in the enterprise that  sponsors i t .  
One element of the proposed new Soviet employment model is "elim- 
ination of cyclic employment fluctuations through special state programs 
including public works." This is solnewhat surprising, since i t  is not yet 
known whether a reformed Soviet economy would be subject to  cyclical fluc- 
tuations. In the United States, cou~~tercyclical public works programs are 
not used, and no longer even discussed. The main reason is that  public 
works take too long to  complete to  coincide with a cyclical downturn. Even 
if they are not fully planned in advance, the completion period may last into 
the following cyclical expansion, when they might contribute to  labor short- 
ages. The most recent countercyclical job creation programs in the United 
States, during the Carter administration, focussed on creating jobs in service 
industries, where employment can be increased and decreased quickly. 
One problem not discussed in the papers is the relation between the 
labor market and the housing market. It is my understanding that  housing 
is very scarce in the Soviet Union, with long waiting periods for flats, and 
that  much housing is controlled by enterprises. Workers will understandably 
be reluctant to  leave an enterprise for work elsewhere if this would involve 
giving up the right to  adequate housing. It may well be the case that  in 
order to  create a free and efficient market for labor in the Soviet Union, it 
will be necessary t o  create a free market for housing as well. 

Summary of Discussions* 
C. M. Schneider 
The detailed description of unemployment and the labor market in the Soviet 
Union reveals that  this nation is suffering from both surpluses and shortages 
of labor. In simple words a solution to this dilemma calls for the reallocation 
of labor from the areas where it is in surplus to those where a shortage exists. 
Doubtless to  say, that this is, as usual, more easily said than done. The 
reasons abound for these disequilibrium situations in the labor market of a 
command economy; the most common being of a geographical nature or the 
problem of labor hoarding by enterprises. 
In a changing world striving to  keep up with technical progress, the So- 
viet Union is an example of a nation which still has a concentration of em- 
ployment in the traditional sectors, while other sectors (the tertiary sector 
for example) lag far behind the penetration and development they achieved 
in most Western countries. The Soviet labor scene is characterized by high 
employment, even overemployment, in agriculture, manufacturing and trans- 
portation, while employment in the service sector remains low. This is ex- 
actly the opposite of the picture in the United States and other Western 
industrialized countries, where experience shows that  a large and a strongly 
manned service sector is required to  improve the standard of living. Gener- 
ally, the goal of full employment (or, a t  least, the maintenance of a consistent 
level of employment) is achieved with macro-economic policies. In the So- 
viet case, successfully attaining this target depends on decisions made by 
the individual firms, or in other words, a t  the micro-level. The actual line 
of command for policy decisions is not quite so clear because a majority of 
enterprises were and still are in state hands. 
'Comments made by Albert Rees (USA), Wil Albeda (NL), Ognyan Panov (BG), Ben- 
jamin Friedman (USA), Richard Cooper (USA), Merton J. Peck (USA), S:oren Wibe (S), 
E. Yasin (USSR), Leonid Grigoriev (USSR), A. Chubais (USSR) and Kimio Uno (JPN).  
The major obstacle hindering the development of a functional labor mar- 
ket in the USSR is the lack of labor mobility. The following are a few sugges- 
tions that  could lead to  possible solutions to the problem of creating labor 
mobility: 
( 1 )  Unemployment Insurance (UI). UI is a definite requirement in a free labor 
market environment. It would be more appropriate to  make the man- 
agement and distribution of such benefits the responsibility of regions or 
republics rather than of the central government. Careful consideration 
has to  be given to  the level and duration because overly generous unem- 
ployment benefits will be a disincentive for people to  seek employment. 
( 2 )  Employment Exchanges. The situation with respect to  blue and white 
collar placement operations must be improved or even developed in many 
areas. In addition to  state placement offices private employment agencies 
should be established where a fee might be charged to the employer. As 
a result, unemployed workers and the number and type of vacancies can 
be monitored and matched to  facilitate a more desirable employment 
picture. The agencies could advertise positions as well as people seeking 
work. 
(3) Retraining. The opening of borders and the increa.se in foreign trade will 
inevitably lead to  higher imports that  often have the effect of raising 
unemployment. The surplus of workers will need retraining programs 
supported by enterprises and the unions to  allow the displaced labor 
to  be reintegrated into the labor force. If private companies take over 
the responsibility of retraining, their obligation will no longer be t o  just 
employ and and re-employ depending on swings in the economy, but to  
retain a flexible work force which will prove better for the firms, the 
employees and society as a whole. Both in the training and retraining 
phase, the costs should be shared between companies and government. 
Thus, quality and demand responsive training can be ensured. 
( 4 )  Counter-cyclical Activities. If public works did not take t o  long to  get 
underway and attempted to  engage in counter-cyclical activities, some of 
the employment slack created by the economy could be taken up. These 
measures will generally only work in an active economy and not with big 
projects where the lags may actually lead to  overemployment in certain 
periods. 
In general, two items are paramount to the development and activity of 
a free labor market. They are: 
( 1 )  Freedom to Move. Unfortunately, this is hardly possible in a society that  
utilizes control instruments such as resident permits and the like. 
( 2 )  Availability of Housing. I11 the past, Soviet enterprises largely controlled 
the amount of housing stock; so, a worker was afraid of losing his home 
if he left the company. Therefore, it is clear that  a free housing market 
is necessary. A problem arises when the new prices that  reflect actual 
supply and demand situations on the housing market will be too high 
for the average person to  afford. The threat exists that  citizens may 
interpret this as a breach of the social contract. The housing must not 
only be available, but the coilditions of the dwellings must meet some 
acceptable quality standard. 
The key to  a functional labor market is the free flow of people. Employees 
should not have to  live with the fea.r of possibly experiencing social losses as 
a result of movement. 
Eastern European countries face an overwhelming range of problems with 
respect to labor and unemployment. The much cited surpluses and short- 
ages are the result of a lack of adequate training for job flexibility, the strict 
government regulations concerning trallslocation and the lack of a tradeable 
housing stock (other than on the black market where there are only opportu- 
nities for the select few with sufficient means), which all negatively influence 
the essential mobility factor. During the reform or transition phase it would 
appear appropriate to  have the state managing the labor market. A clear sys- 
tem of job classification is required in order to ensure equal renumeration for 
jobs of equal value. Reforming centrally planned economies should at tempt 
to  adhere to  a transition policy where real wages do not initially increase so 
that  enterprises have time to develop, to  reinvest profits and to  allow the 
development of "true" trade unions. Well-trained workers, entrepreneurial 
employees, market oriented managers and educated trade union leaders are 
all crucial elements required if the entire labor market system is to  work. 
There is no doubt that  a new process of progress has be embarked upon, 
with which a certain loss of security ( that  was considered to  be a t  the very 
foundation of a real socialist system) is associated. Once again, social accep- 
tance of any alterations in the existing labor organization are main points 
of discussion. The labor market is the most developed relative to  the others 
(such as commodity, capital, etc.) in the Soviet Union. In order to  stimulate 
productivity and the working environment, labor must be treated as a team 
or group and always as a system. Problems arise with individualization. La- 
bor market reformers must prepare for the redistribution of the labor force 
between the state and non-state sector. In lieu of the new situations facing 
the labor market, it becomes quite evident that trade unions should play an 
essential role. They are present to  ensure harmony within the enterprise, to 
influence managerial efficiency, to protect workers from malicious managerial 
acts and to  influence the wage levels. 
The new development process needs to be supported by accompanying 
measures in other areas of the economy. In this sense there are a few addition 
comments to  be made on the activation of a free housing market. The 
liberalization of housing is linked to the general privatization of other assets. 
The value of the housiilg assets are probably much higher than the other asset 
stock in the economy. Of course, there is always the alternative available to  
legalize the black market in housing. This might even be possible engaging 
in incremental changes so as not to cause too large a disturbance in the 
system as a whole. 
Part IV 
Opening of the Economy 

An Open Economy: The 
Soviet Model 
I. Ivanov 
In the contemporary interdependent world the USSR is an  integral part of 
the global marketplace. Therefore, the country has to be managed as such 
and the Soviet leadership does pursue in transforming our economy into an 
open one, progressing in an interaction and in competition with the outside 
world. 
This goal may seem overambitious for a country, having 6 percent ex- 
port quota in its national income only. Nevertheless, the movement towards 
an  openness is now under way and represents an important feature of the 
perestroika as a whole. 
Being unprecedental for a planned economy this model is challenging 
enough in both academic and business dimensions. Not all answers are 
ready yet or publicly acknowledged. Thus this forum may be instrumental 
in inviting the outside reaction on the concept and measures concerned, 
summarized below. 
Some Fundamentals 
According to  the foreign economic strategy, adopted by the Soviet Commu- 
nist party and the government in October 1988, the foreign trade turnover 
of the USSR till the years 2000-2005 is expected to  grow 1.2-1.3 times faster 
than national income. This is a tangible manifestation of our world oriented 
intentions. However, the most radical innovations in this domain are mainly 
qualitative ones and rooted in a fundamentally new approach to  the very 
role of foreign economic relations in the development of the Soviet economy. 
The architects of that  approach argue that  these relations have to be used 
not as "shortage-bridging" instruments of an ad hoc nature but through a 
proper market specialization and the positive terms of trade, as an instru- 
ment to  gain an additional increment in the Soviet national income over and 
above its domestic formation. Equally in the long run foreign economic rela- 
tions are expected to  contribute to  modernizing the Soviet economy and the 
management technique. To this end the country is ready to  assume some 
calculated risk and t o  expose by a degree its domestic economy to  a profound 
influence from the world marketplace. 
Accordingly i t  is understood nowadays that: 
A. On macroeconomic level 
The Soviet technological, structural and investment policies ought 
to be oriented not to  the domestic (whatever improved), but to  the 
world standards only. 
The Soviet market ought to be accessible for foreign competition 
with a view of an equalization of the domestic and foreign produc- 
tion costs and a better distribution of the productive factors. 
A pricesetting reform ought to narrow the gap between the domestic 
and world market prices, the justified and transparent link between 
them will be thus played by the new custom tariff, tailored by in- 
ternational standards. 
The exports and imports have to  play alternatives against the do- 
mestic investment and production decisions. 
A shift in the foreign trade planning is essential from "shortage- 
bridging" to comparative production costs approach. 
"An openness" has to  engulf a.11 regions of the USSR. 
B. On the level of foreign ecoilomic relations as a whole 
In addition to  products, which are domestically physically unavail- 
able or in short supply, the imports are expected to  replace the 
nonefficient local production, to modernize industrial and social fa- 
cilities, t o  enrich the consumer supply and to  play the instrument 
of regional development. 
In addition to  gaining foreign currency the exports are expected 
to set a yardstick to  measure the quality of domestic products, to  
support the Soviet investment abroad, to  ensure the economy of 
scale and to contribute to regional development. 
All types of the legitimate business transactions will be open for the 
Soviet business entities, including trade, industrial cooperation, in- 
vestments, leasing, consulting, credits, stock operations, commodity 
exchanges, money market etc. 
The Soviet business and foreign trade legislation ought to be compa- 
rable with illternationally acknowledged norms and standards and 
on that  basis the USSR shall cooperate closely with international 
economic organizations and renovate its commercial treaty network. 
C. On the enterprise level 
All interested enterprises will be allowed to transact internationally. 
A part of these export proceeds (after taxes) will be reserved to  the 
enterprises. 
The business unions and associations will be formed particularly 
with the aim to lobby the authorities concerned on the matters of 
common interests. 
The enterprise may mobilize currency through loans, currency auc- 
tions, securities, etc. 
With the deceiltralization in decision-making, conceptual and legal re- 
structuring, described above, the USSR cannot be treated any more as 
"state-trade country" in the old, segregative sense of this definition. U1- 
timately, one may expect to see the Soviet territory as a part of the world 
marketplace. 
Sectoral Developments and Innovations 
The aforementioned is not merely a philosophy. The developments and 
innovations concerned are under implementation step by step in all sec- 
tors, related to  foreign econo~nic transactions. Planning is no more detailed 
commodity/country matrix. The plan contains aggregate value indicators 
for exports for the ministries (republics, business associations) concerned, 
which are free to  choose the specific products and countries to  sell. The 
imports are specified for national programs only. The rest of foreign cur- 
rency is either allocated as bonuses for exporters or distributed among them 
on a commercial basis (loans, auctions, etc.). Therefore the plan now looks 
like a balance of payments, divided into three currency zones: transferable 
rubles, clearings and free currencies settlements. Within the last part no 
country-by-country allocation is practiced and the actual imports are deter- 
mined on the competitive basis. 
Exchanges Rate and the Ruble Convertibility 
The present official exchange rate of ruble to  foreign currencies looks artificial 
and inappropriate for business use. The new economically justified rate is 
under calculation. It will be based on the relative purchasing power of the 
Soviet and foreign "basket" of products traded and introduced after the 
price-setting reform in the USSR. 
The new rate is expected to  provide a,n objective yardstick t o  measure 
the final effect of the trade exchange on both macroeconomic and individual 
transaction levels. Reportedly, it will be lower than recently. It also implies 
that  a t  least a part of current Soviet exports will become then nonprofitable 
and imports more expensive in domestic prices. However, these risks are 
unavoidable a,nd calculated. 
As to  convertibility, despite some radical voices, it is a rather distant 
goal and in the majority view may represent by itself rather the result of 
the profound modification within the Soviet economy than an instrument 
for these modifications. At latter, a "big bang" approach in the USSR is 
nowadays socially unaffordable. Therefore, the experts see a t  least four 
stages (pre-requisites) for a meaningful convertibility such as: 
A stabilization of domestic financial system, especially state finance, be- 
cause the ruble cannot be stronger abroad than within the country. 
A professionally made price setting reform, narrowing the gap between 
domestic and world market prices, is needed to  determine factural pur- 
chasing power and thus a new exchange rate for the ruble. 
A more or less developed internal market in the USSR with the wholesale 
trade as the dominating channel for domestic business turnover (so-called 
"internal convertibility"). 
A strong competitive export sector to  support the ruble on international 
money markets. 
All in all, these prerequisites may be ensured not earlier than the year 
2000. Nevertheless some practical partial or limited version of the convert- 
ibility can be imagined in the meanwhile with the priority to  profit remit- 
tance on foreign investment. 
The specialists recommend to  start the convertibility for the current ac- 
count transactions first with postponing the goal t o  make the ruble an in- 
ternational reserve currency for the latter stages. 
Investment 
The business in the USSR is growing beyond the traditional trade. More 
than that ,  the government intentionally promotes various types of interna- 
tional production, structural adjustments in the Soviet economy towards its 
interdependence with the world market. 
As a result the special investment program to  strengthen and to  industri- 
alize the Soviet export sector is planned for 1991-1995. Foreign investments 
in the USSR are legalized and the Soviet enterprises are also entitled now to  
invest abroad in marketing, production lines a.nd securities. As of February 
1, 1990 about 1500 jv with foreign participation were registered in the USSR 
with total authorized capital of about 5 billion US dollars, including 250 in 
operation with total production volume in 1990 of about 1 billion US dollars, 
divided by 9:l for domestic market and exports. There are also about 150 
mixed companies with Soviet participation abroad. There are also mainly 
marketing networks (selling, as an example, 50-100 percent of the Soviet 
machinery in some Western European countries), but will be supplemented 
by production and mining units soon, particularly in the fra.mework of debt- 
to-investment swops in developing countries. 
Labor and Capital Flows 
The Soviet view of the socialist market is a complex one and covers not 
merely goods but also services, ca.pita1 and eventually labor force. As to  
capital the foreigners are entitled to have deposits in the Soviet banks, to  
take part in currency auctions, credit syndications, to operate on the Soviet 
commodities and stock exchanges. 
Foreign labor is already in use (more than 120 thousand persons in 1989) 
in the USSR from Eastern Europe, Finland, Turkey, China, Cuba, N. Korea, 
India, and Syria. On a regulated basis, this practice will continue alongside 
with an  innovative draft legislation, allowing the Soviet white and blue collars 
to  get temporary jobs abroad, now under scrutiny in the Supreme Soviet. 
Regional Policy 
On the basis of perestroika a new shape of the Soviet federation is emerg- 
ing. Some constituent republics (regions) either have already gained "eco- 
nomic homerule" (Bielorussia, Baltic Republics), or pretend to  map it up 
soon (Moldavia, Kazahstan, Russia), this process does inter alia facilitate 
the exposure of their economies t o  international market, particularly by its 
decentralization of the decision-making and the setting up of the local infras- 
tructure t o  transact internationally (local middleman organizations, cham- 
bers of commerce, etc). Some regions, mainly remote, are entitled for the 
general preferential foreign trade regulation (Far East, Kola Peninsula). 
At the same time the prevailing mood is that  the decentralization con- 
cerned has to  have its regional limitations and not to  fragment the single 
Soviet market and custom territory or deteriorate the state foreign economic 
policy and regulations. The latter have to  be kept intact as the federal (cen- 
tralized) functions exclusively, thus corroborating the Soviet commitments 
before the trading partners. 
The Council of Mutual Economic Assistance 
For the last 40 years the CMEA was the major sphere for an  internation- 
alization of the Soviet economy with the most far-reaching instruments and 
arrangements to  pursue it. The CMEA share in the Soviet foreign trade 
turnover was around 60 percent and real structural adjustments t o  the So- 
viet socialist economic integration are already the fact of life in the USSR. 
However, this integration had progressed mainly on the intergovernmen- 
tal level, through the regular coordination of the national plans. On the 
business level i t  was rather weak and sporadic. This scheme of the integra- 
tion proved itself as a noncomplex one and is challenged now by the internal 
market oriented reforms in Eastern Europe. The Soviet specialists also be- 
lieve that  such regionally limited openness is not a model to  run a large-scale 
economy as ours in the interdependent world and thus ought to be viewed 
in a broader framework. 
Up to  February 1990 no member country claims to  disband the CMEA, 
arguing instead for its profound market-oriented restructuring. The Soviet 
Union persists in particular in denominating its commodity exchange with 
CMEA partners in free currency and world market prices. The next round 
of the intra-CMEA talks on the matter is expected in May-June 1990. 
The Frontier and Coastal Trade 
With the decentralization in decision-making underway, this trade flow shows 
a particularly remarkable growth, "melting" the economic borders of the 
Soviet economy. This is the domain of mainly small and medium-size local 
businesses, enjoying the state promotion measures. The latter are a more 
liberal regime for barter transactions (not taxed by state) and a relatively 
free matering of local resources between the domestic market and export. 
This type of trade will be promoted further on, but under a rational 
regulation (excluding for example the interpretation of the coastal trade as 
overseas or even global) resembling that  of the GATT. 
Taking together these trends form the new atmosphere for the business 
cooperation with the USSR, particularly favorable for long-term projects 
and international production. More than that  the trends concerned are now 
legally corroborated and facilitated by the development of the Soviet business 
legislation and its regulatory instruments. 
The Legal Setting for an Openness 
Driving towards an openness the USSR does codify its horizons preferably 
in accordance to  the international law. The major legal and regulatory 
blocks concerned are the following: Basic legislation intended to  regulate 
in a new way the domestic economy, but applicable as well to  international 
economic cooperation. This is for example the property law (draft) legalizing 
the foreign property within the USSR and protecting it on the same basis 
as national ones. Besides it opens the gate for new types of property as 
republican, collective, companies and quasi private. The law on enterprise 
(draft) entitles all interested business entities to  transact internationally, the 
tax law (draft) keeps the preferential treatment for joint ventures etc. 
The draft custom law and custom code, tailored in accordance with the 
GATT rules, custom cooperation council recommendations and the Kyoto 
convention, is ready to  be introduced before the Soviet parliament. The 
antitrust legislation, the joint stock company law, new currency and banking 
regulation and, a t  last, new foreign investment law are on the agenda of the 
Soviet law-making bodies too. 
International Treaties Network 
The progress in the USSR integration in the world economy evidently de- 
pends on the regime for this process and the balance of the rights and obli- 
gations concerned. Equally, the previous Soviet economic diplomacy, merely 
bilateral, has to  be transformed into a multilateral one. 
To this end the network of the Soviet trade treaties is under renovation. 
In December 1989 the broad based trade, commercial and economic agree- 
ment (the largest ever for both parties) was signed between the USSR and 
the European Communities. Replacing 12 previous bilateral trade agree- 
ments ( to be nullified by the EC-1992) it expands the scope of EC-USSR 
cooperation much wider, on about 20 sectors of production, research and 
services. One may note also, that  the USSR for the first time in its ne- 
gotiation practice accept in this agreement safeguard and price clauses in 
internationally standardized wording. The talks over USSR-US trade and 
cooperation agreement are also underway, absorbing, inter alia, some topics 
of the Uruguay Round (intellectual property, services, etc.). We are also 
open t o  negotiate with EFTA, ACEAN and Japan. 
The USSR does pursue a rapprochement with GATT. The noticeable 
preparatory homework has been done a t  this end, but due to  a delay in the 
domestic reform (prices, wholestock market, new exchange rates) the USSR 
is not as yet ready t o  apply for full membership in the agreement decided to  
claim in i t  an observer status first with the full membership in due course. 
Between these two steps we foresee a period of education and adjustment, 
when GATT expertise will be used to our foreign economic mechanism and 
legislation used to  modernize our foreign economic mechanism and legisla- 
tion. The observership application may be filed with the GATT secretariat 
in early March. 
There are also some voices in favor of our entering the IMF. However, 
this action is questionable in many facets and need further feasibility studies. 
Trade Policy Instruments 
Their arsenal is also under renovation in accordance with international stan- 
dards, namely: 
The new custom tariff is prepared on the basis of the harmonized nomen- 
clature and in accordance with GATT rules, which will be introduced 
right after pricesetting reform. 
the set of non-tariff regulations is already in force since March 1989 
(quotas, licenses) and if necessary may be supplemented by price control. 
The new form of custom declaration is in use since April 1989, which is 
the replica of EC single administrative document. 
The system of the special registration of the Soviet business entities, op- 
erating internationally is in action with 12.5 thousand entities appearing 
in the State Commercial Register in February 1990. 
The representative offices of the foreign companies from November 1989 
are allowed to be open, in addition to  capitals, throughout the USSR. 
The new non-commercial exchange rate for ruble (6.3 rubles for 1 US 
dollar) was announced in November 1989 for both to  facilitate foreign 
tourism and t o  suppress black currency market. 

Comments the Paper 
I. Ivanov 
Urpo Kivikari 
Turku School of Economics and Business Administration 
The restructuring of the Soviet economy was initiated a few years ago in the 
field of external relations. Now, recent developments in the USSR as well 
as the revolutionary events in Eastern Europe and in the East-West set-up 
have accentuated the need for drastic re-evaluation, re-orientation and re- 
organization of the Soviet participation in the international division of labor. 
Professor Ivanov's article gives us an analytic description of this complicated 
topic. 
The present situation is clearly characterized by the modest export quota 
in the Soviet national income. This indicator will still remain low in the 
coming years, even if the income elasticity of imports would be somewhat 
over one as expected. It should also be noted that  even the export ratio of 
the US economy, though higher than the Soviet one, is not comparable with 
the export intensity of smaller developed economies. But, as is well known, 
commodity exports from the USA are modest compared with the global 
production pursued by American subsidiaries abroad. Observing the Soviet 
model of open economy also emphasizes internationalization of production, 
there is good reason for bringing it up as the first point in this comment. 
1. Foreign direct investment. Considering Soviet resources and the pre- 
vailing shortages, it is natural for the Soviet Union to  internationalize its 
production within its own borders now and postpone investments into the 
outside world. Direct investments on Soviet territory, which unfortunately 
have been limited to joint ventures thus far, provide the Soviet economy 
with capital, technology, management skills, access to western markets, etc., 
on favorable terms compared to  alternative operations. The undisputed 
advantages of western investments manifest an incentive for the Soviet lead- 
ership to  modify the country's economic environment more more lucrative 
for foreign companies, i.e., t o  introduce market economy. Without such de- 
velopments the disappointments experienced by many Western partners in 
joint ventures will not pass as merely starting difficulties but will form a 
lasting impediment for foreign investment. 
If the Soviet Union is to  have a net inflow of capital in the 1990s, a consid- 
erable net outflow of labor, including permanent and temporary emigration, 
is expectable. 
2. Decentralization of foreign trade. While there used to  be less than a 
hundred Foreign Trade Organizations in a monopoly position to transact 
internationally, principally any enterprise or organization now may become 
involved in international business. Such "normalization" is required to  raise 
the international competitiveness of Soviet production. An extended range 
of exportables and appropriate use of international operations can only be 
achieved through business contacts with international markets. State au- 
thorities, banks, and the enterprises still lack the skills needed in the new 
situation, yet changes in the behavior of Soviet exporters and importers can 
gradually be expected by western partners. The motivations and strategies 
of the new transactors will differ from those characteristics of the old-type 
FTO monopolies who controlled export and import transactions using both 
separate and mixed deals. 
The activities of FTOs have been led by central authorities in Moscow 
where these companies also are located. In my opinion, the decentralization 
of foreign transactions will involve a more impressive rise of regionalism 
than was anticipated in Prof. Ivanov's article. At present there is no "single 
Soviet market". Nor is i t  possible to create an integrated Soviet market 
"from above" by federal laws and orders, but only by integrating regional 
markets of republics and smaller areas. It is obvious that  the inevitable 
process of bringing about regional market economies will also entail a shift 
of responsibility for and earnings from foreign trade to  these regions. This 
is not in contradiction with the fact that  the Soviet Union as a whole should 
have effective tariffs against the external world, which for its part would also 
help break up the status of a "state-trade country". Of course, it would not 
be desirable a t  all if separate customs territories or non-tariff barriers would 
appear to  hamper intra-Soviet trade. 
3. Convertibility of the Rouble. All reforms of foreign economic relations 
suffer seriously from the fact that  the USSR is lacking SCU, "Soviet Cur- 
rency Unit", money really workable in intra-Soviet exchange as well as in 
international market transactions. It is therefore natural tha t  speculations 
about the convertibility of the Rouble be presented on various occasions. 
The point here is t o  clean one's own back-yard first, i.e., t o  carry out the 
reforms that  are mentioned in the article. To fulfill all the required prereq- 
uisites of full convertibility in the entire country will take even longer than 
the 10 years estimated by Prof. Ivanov in his article. There is, however, 
nothing to  prevent a partial convertibility which should be put into effect 
immediately. As a first step, the profits earned by western partners on their 
investments should be rendered convertible at  once. 
4. CMEA - f rom aid to trade. Practically all the foreign trade of the USSR 
will be based on convertible currencies after the abolishment of the trans- 
ferable Rouble in intra-CMEA trade in 1991. In fact, the CMEA has ceased 
to  exist as an organization for division of labor among the centrally planned 
socialist economies. Whether there will be mutual cooperation within the 
CMEA framework in the future or whether other organizations will be em- 
ployed is yet to  be seen. 
A general impression observed recently is that  the European members of 
CMEA find it frustrating to  be involved in "Mutual Assistance", it appears 
that  most of the countries regard themselves as the parties to  give and not 
t o  receive. A decision has been made to  adopt the priilcipal of "Trade" from 
the year 1991, and - as is well known - trade only materializes when each 
of the parties finds it beneficial. The adoption of world market prices and 
convertible currencies as per the decision of the 45. Session of CMEA in 
Sofia, January 1990, will presumably be more problematic for other member 
countries of the CMEA than for the USSR whose terms of trade are expected 
t o  benefit a great deal from change. The change of the nature of CMEA trade 
will also support the economic reforms of the Soviet Union, as it does support 
the reforms of other CMEA countries, but the problem encountered is that  
intra-CMEA trade and unfinished projects run into the danger of collapsing 
during the upheavals. 
5 .  Friendship, not fear: EC, GATT,  IMF, etc. In summer 1989, during 
his visit to  West Germany, President Gorbachev said it t o  be desirable that  
trade creates interdependence between the USSR and the FRG. This was an 
expression of a completely opposite attitude to  that  prevalent in the past, 
namely the doctrine of avoiding dependence in east-west trade. The USSR 
no longer considers the EC as an economic bastion of capitalism but as a 
builder of a Common European House. Soviet attitudes toward international 
organizations like GATT and IMF have also changed radically. 
Both in the East and the West, in the USSR and the USA, the ap- 
proaches are moving from those of rivalry and confrontation between blocks 
toward mutual cooperation. Naturally, this new atmosphere is decisive for 
the Soviet goal of becoming an integral part of the global marketplace. I fully 
agree with Professor Ivanov's statement that  new contracts and international 
memberships in the first stage particularly serve educational purposes. The 
best way of learning business is doing together. 
The key words in the perestroika of external economic relations are open- 
ness of production. But what is there behind this facade that is shown to  
the world outside? 
For the Soviet economy to be effectively integrated with the world econ- 
omy, fundamental changes are required in domestic economy. Much atten- 
tion is needed to  develop domestic industry and production, including de- 
velopment of the main source of export income, energy production. As the 
perestroika of external economic relations has started without correspond- 
ing reforms in other sectors of the Soviet economy, the results are seen in 
confusion, frustration, and even disorder. Joint ventures cannot find sup- 
ply markets for procuring inputs. Organizations newly engaged in foreign 
trade do not possess the required skills - nor can foreign trade partners 
obtain the background information (e.g., on creditworthiness) needed for 
establishing business relationships. The banking system, business services, 
and the infrastructure must be renewed. Appropriate order in the Soviet 
House, stability in its political and economic life, is a necessary prerequisite 
for becoming part of the European House. This development, desirable for 
everybody, deserves all the support from the external world it can get - and 
not just passive sympathies but also concrete assistance. 
Summary of Discussions* 
C. M. Schneider 
Today it is becoming more and more evident that  there exists a general 
world-wide desire to open economies as a whole or a t  least in certain markets 
(i.e., the financial markets of France and Japan). Certainly, "opening of the 
economy'' is no ambiguous concept. It basically refers to  foreign capital 
movements, domestic capital movements, merchandise and other trade, and 
SO on. 
The question of why there is so much interest in an  opening of the econ- 
omy inevitably arises during the discussion of this topic. A wide variety of 
reasons are heralded to  be a t  the heart of the move of a centrally planned 
economy to  one more intensively integrated in the world market. This al- 
lows both the taking advantage of its unique talents, status and resources 
and the utilization of the strength and support of the group. Four of the 
main reasons for participating in an economic environment characterized by 
relaxed national frontiers are: 
(1) Resource Requirements 
A growing economy with the desire to  improve production generally re- 
quires quantities a.nd types of resources which must be imported from 
the rest of the world. Although this is not always necessarily a necessary 
feature of modernization, the goa.1 here is to  increase investment rates. 
( 2 )  Technology, Ideas and Know-How 
Countries which have come to  lag behind the rapidly advancing levels 
of know-how in the western industrialized nations have, therefore, diffi- 
culty to  compete in the international market place. These states need 
'Comments made by Richard Cooper (USA), Anthony Solomon (USA), Urpo Kivikari 
(SF), John Montias (USA), Janos Gacs (H) ,  William Nordhaus (USA) and Alfred Kahn 
(USA). 
to  encourage the transfer of technology and management strategies that  
have proven to  be successful in improving productivity, efficiency and 
competitive vigor. This utilization of indirect investment can be a very 
successful instrument to  stimulate growth as can be seen in the examples 
of Japan and South Korea. Joint ventures are also examples of a com- 
bination of knowledge transfer and capital. Finally, the implementation 
of new technologies and strategies develop to  be sources of badly needed 
foreign exchange. 
(3) Gains of Specialization 
An opening to the international market place motivates the utilization 
of domestic talents and resources. When a nation utilizes its compar- 
ative advantages, i t  can produce in a more cost-effective fashion and 
maximize profits, while simultaneously allowing the preservation of the 
environment and the longevity of non-renewable resources. 
( 4 )  Competition 
Opening the economy will assure the establishment of a competitive envi- 
ronment. Competition and incentives are vital to  drive economic growth, 
while improving the consumers freedom of choice which, in turn, spurs 
consumption that  once again fuels the competitive atmosphere in a non- 
monopoly market. Doing away with artificial border restrictions will 
inevitably increase competition in the areas of prices and quality. The 
foreign competitors can and often will act as a motor for internal or do- 
mestic competition. Finally, comparative advantages can be exploited. 
The nature and timing of a conversion from the traditional closed com- 
mand economy to an open market economy are still unresolved points of dis- 
cussion. An opening will in the normal sense be accompanied by the imple- 
mentation of tariffs. The reforming economies should try to stay away from 
quotas and other quantitative restrictions that  tend to  impede efficiency, 
productivity and motivation. The timing and severity of such controls will 
inevitably have an impact of the functioning of the market. Consequently, i t  
would be advisable to  keep the tariff quite reasonable and apply it in a similar 
manner as a tax which should not only target imported, but also domestic 
products. Clearly, this provides the government with a relatively reliable 
source of revenue. Real competition will be influenced by the use of tariffs; 
nevertheless, this situation can present new challenges for entrepreneurs in 
their attempt to maximize profits under the presence of different restrictions. 
During the opening of a market economy, competition and incentives 
play a crucial role. Import penetration definitely influences internal mar- 
kets. If a price reform should take place, import competition must be pro- 
vided a t  world prices, particularly during the early stages of adjustment. 
Of course, this will require the free availability of foreign exchange for im- 
ports. The question of the need for an actual market determined exchange 
rate is invariably linked to  an opening of the economy. Experts and policy- 
makers are faced with the problem of choosing the initial rate. It may be 
appropriate to  select a slightly undervalued rate which is favorable for ex- 
ports and simultaneously makes imports less attractive. This is no pledge 
to  increase protectionism, but simply to  encourage domestic production for 
export. Eventually, the goal must be to reach world levels of quality, com- 
petition and other market characteristics. Once the situation stabilizes, it is 
likely that  an appreciation can be expected. 
A number of elements must be in place in order to  facilitate a successful 
opening of an economy, although no guarantees can be made in any case. 
One of the most important factors is macroeconomic stabilization, which 
includes implementation of policies to  soak up excess purchasing power and 
to  solve the current account surpluses and budget deficits. Furthermore, a 
price and enterprise reform must be undertaken and well under way, so that 
the foundations of a competitive system are in place. At the same time, firms 
in the Eastern European reforming economies must be assured greater and 
freer access to  Western technology, training and information. In addition, 
successive steps of liberalization should involve the opening of the import 
system and a move toward convertibility. In simple terms this means that  
the "complete" openness of the economy can oi~ly  be achieved within the 
framework of a market economy. To a large extent, the benefits of opening 
the economy will be influenced and to  some measure predetermined as a 
result of the established policies within a country. 
In general, the central authorities will still have to  maintain certain con- 
trols during the transition phase. Especially in conjunction with attempting 
to  attract foreign investment, the government must provide various guaran- 
tees and must ensure that  profit can be remitted. There remains little doubt, 
that  the initial step toward trailsforination involves the collection and anal- 
ysis of sufficient macro-economic data to  allow any macro-economic policy 
decisions. Centrally planned economies would surely profit from a member- 
ship in a number of the international organizatioils and funds, but they must 
beware not to  join with too much haste because a premature membership 
is accompanied by numerous restrictions which may be detrimental in the 
long-term. Of course, joining in multi-lateral activities will help the social 
and political images of socialist countries and will improve and speed up the 
integration of these countries into the global open market. 
Part V 
Issues on Stabilization 

Economic Stabilization: 
Monetary and Fiscal Policy 
K. Kagalovsky and A. I(handruyev 
Recent years have witnessed sharp deterioration of the financial situation in 
the USSR. In the period from 1985 to  199 the state budget deficit has grown 
five times achieving 10.7% of GNP. By the beginning of 1990 the internal 
state debt has grown almost four times making up 440 billion rubles or 44% 
of GNP. The reason for this lies in the continuation of the old financial 
policy under the changed conditions. As before the budget expenses grew 
regardless of real financial capacities of the state. Whilst from 1985 to  1988 
the real budget funds (less the money attracted for debt servicing) grew by 
1.7%, the expenses grew by 19%. In 1989 the USSR State Committee of 
Statistics gives the inflation rate a t  7.5% which is a modest estimate to  our 
mind. 
In 1989 the situation began to  change. If before the problems of finance 
were somewhat in the shadow, then now the society and the government have 
become gradually aware of their importance. Attempts have been made to- 
wards the so-called "fiscal sanitation". Still neither all seriousness of the 
situation, nor the measures taken allow to  follow the rapid deterioration of 
the financial situation. If one one hand the awareness of the fact grows arith- 
metically, then on the other hand the situation itself worsens geometrically. 
The political situation has also changed bringing about the politization 
of economic decision-making with the new Soviet parliament having a con- 
siderable influence over this process. 
In the first instance it concerns the fiscal policy. The public choice in 
relation to  the most important economic priorities and basic directions of 
the spendings of state resources has become institutionalized though before 
i t  happened in a latent form. All this was reflected in the adoption of the 
budget law for the year 1990. This time a more serious budget reduction was 
a t  tempted. Investments were visibly cut off. For the first time in many years 
spendings on defense were reduced. Still the Parliament agricultural lobby 
did not allow the government t o  reduce budget spendings on agriculture 
which exceeded all reasonable limits. In the plan for 1990 they make up 
24% of all budget expenses (12% of GNP). These government measures have 
reduced the budget deficit down t o  40 billion rubles (7.4% of GNP) for the 
plan for 1990. Nevertheless, all these measures are quite insufficient in order 
to  get out of the crisis and t o  stabilize the economy. 
Purely theoretically the working out of the program aimed a t  the eco- 
nomical stabilization is not difficult. It includes such widely known mea- 
sures of harnessing the inflation and balancing the market as liberalization 
of prices, fixed limits on population income, sharp increase of interest rate, 
cutting down of the state budget, including here liquidation of dotation bur- 
den, freezing of investments, making the national currency convertible, doing 
away with the monopolistic structures, etc. 
In the report we tackle only fiscal and monetary aspects of the policy of 
economic stabilization. 
Fiscal Policy and Stabilization of Economy 
Fiscal policy should be changed in two ways. Whilst stabilization requires 
for more drastic reduction of budget spendings, the market reform demands 
that  the principles of budget formation should be changed and the sphere of 
its application be shifted. 
The Soviet economy is known for the excessive development of its redis- 
tribution processes. Over 50 percent of GNP is redistributed in the state 
budget. In 1989 the budget redistributed 55 percent of GNP. The 1990 plan 
reduces the figure by three percent and still the cosmetic reduction in the 
centralized redistribution processes achieve nothing because principally new 
approach for determining the sphere of activity of the state budget is nec- 
essary. The budget financing should include only those needs of the society 
that  cannot be satisfied through the market mechanism. Only the expenses 
requiring political decisions should be budgeted. And this is the general 
principle of organizing the activity of the state budget. Today to  get out of 
the financial crisis one should dramatically reduce all his expenses by means 
of shrinking the sphere of budget activity as well as by cutting down the 
traditionally budgeted expenses, defense for example. As a result the bud- 
get share in GNP should fall down t o  35-40 percent. The restriction should 
concern almost all budget items except social and cultural events. If sta- 
bilization of economy is the goal, then all other goals should be sacrificed. 
In 1990 centralized investments except investments in social and cultural 
sphere comprise 40 billion rubles or 8% of budget expenses. These should 
be reduced by a t  least 10 times. All new construction a t  the budget expense 
should be excluded. Reduction of dotations and expenditure on defense 
should be not less strict. It  is also understood that  one should refuse all 
kinds of free aid to  foreign countries. Economic stabilization is incompatible 
with the financing of great-power ambitions. 
As the process of adoption of economic decisions becomes more and more 
politicized liquidation of budget deficit becomes a convenient political slo- 
gan. The Parliament should consider the "zero" variant, i.e., the budget 
scheme with balanced income and expenditures. Additional demands for the 
financial resources of all interested social groups might be satisfied through 
additional targeted taxation or by the reduction of concrete expenses that  
should be defined by those who ask for these resources. This should be a 
clear process so that  both the Parliament members and society in general 
could easily see the price of their suggestions. 
The budget deficit is to  be calculated according to  the IMF methodology. 
This will help us to  avoid debatable points when determining the budget 
deficit to  deprive the Ministry of finance of the possibility t o  manipulate the 
statistics, thus disinforming the society and the Government. 
Stabilization of economy demands thrift-mindedness not only from the 
state, but from enterprises as well. In the Soviet-type economy there is no se- 
lection mechanism of investments on the basis of their potential effectiveness. 
Under these conditions economic stabilization demands sharp reduction of 
all investment activity. In the USSR 1989 saw an attempt to  limit such an 
activity. Budget investments were somewhat reduced but this did not bring 
about construction on a smaller scale because the reduction in budget invest- 
ments had been compensated by investments coming from the own funds of 
the enterprises. In order to  limit their investment activity radical measures 
are necessary among them sufficiently high investment taxes are necessary. 
Supporting the activity of unprofitable enterprises makes a heavy burden 
on the economy. At present 7-8% of all enterprises are unprofitable. In 1988 
the total cost of unprofitable industrial output was 43 billion rubles (5% 
of GNP). Though with the distorted prices system existing in the USSR 
unprofitability is not necessarily connected with ineffectiveness, there is a 
substantial number of enterprises whose unprofitability is caused by exactly 
this factor. In those cases where i t  is not possible the losses should be 
covered not from the budget and not by a ministry but by a corresponding 
trade union perhaps with the help of the All-Union Council of Trade Unions. 
Let the official trade unions which stepped up their activity in the time of 
reconstruction demonstrate their "solidarity with the workers" instead of 
fighting with high income obtained by cooperatives. 
Reduction of the expenses alone is not enough, and it should be accom- 
panied by a bigger state income. When a person is unable to  pay off the 
debts he should sell his property. The same should be applicable to the 
state. If the state cannot decrease its expenses than the outstanding deficit 
should be covered by the sales of enterprises, earth, buildings, housing funds, 
freely convertible currencies, etc. The sales are done a t  free prices (with a 
wide recourse t o  auctions) to  all those willing, both to  collectives and private 
individuals including foreign organizations and residents. The program of 
economic stabilization requires purchases of consumer goods a t  the external 
market. The goods are to  be realized a t  the internal market a t  increased 
prices which should not be below their price in freely convertible currencies 
recalculated by the black market rates. The basic part of price increments 
should come from customs duties and turnover taxes flowing into the budget. 
The imported merchandise may be paid through changes in import structure 
(reduction or complete ending of equipment imports, etc. for the period of 
stabilization program) and/or greater external indebtedness. 
Normalization of sales of alcoholic drinks, their greater production and 
sales in accordance with demand make up a certain reserve for the increase 
in the state budget income. 
What  is required now is a complete overhaul of taxation system and 
taxation policy. In the context of finance deceiltralization there comes a 
question as to  what extent should the illcome of enterprises be withdrawn 
into the state budget. In 1989 49% of industrial profit was channeled into 
the budget. The greater part of these funds withdrawn from enterprises re- 
turns then into industry in the form of budget allocations. In 1989 budget 
allocations into the national economy less dotations t o  compensate for price 
differences almost equaled that  coming into the budget from the profit of en- 
terprises. Having unleashed the market reform there is no reason t o  deprive 
the enterprises of half of their profits just to  distribute this money later as 
centralized allocations. The part of the industrial profit withdrawn into the 
budget should be reduced to  30-35%. 
System of profit taxations of enterprises must be as simple as possible. 
Taxes and rules of taxation should be universal for all enterprises regardless 
of their financial condition, branch membership, administrative subordina- 
tion, forms of ownership or some other factors having to  do with individual 
peculiarities of this or that  enterprise. The tax rates are not to  be allowed 
to  come down with lower profitability and vice versa. Any possibility for 
bargaining between an enterprise and the state on the question of tax rate 
should be eliminated. 
Tax rates are determined on the basis of the following three principles: 
A. ensuring fiscal interests of the state budget; 
B. enterprises should have money left for an unfailing functioning of econ- 
omy and its normal development; 
C. taxation scale should be moderate without causing destimulation effect. 
One should reject all forms of administrative reglamentation as to  the 
expenses of enterprises. The latter should have a possibility to  spend the 
money the way they want to. 
Whilst the enterprises are not privatized they will unavoidably be in- 
terested in inefficient spendings. In hierarchical system they are interested 
in inefficient investments. When transferring t o  self-management there is a 
need to  maximize payments for labor expenses. Under these conditions both 
these kinds of payments and the investments should be taxed. In this way 
the taxation will include profits, property and expenses of enterprises, i.e., 
investments and wages and salaries. 
Monetary Policy and Stabilization 
Within the historically conditioned framework of Soviet socialism model 
there have been functioning two parallel processes. On the one hand the 
state turning the emission mechanism into a plan appendage used effec- 
tively the methods of inflation financing of expanded reproduction, on the 
other hand i t  followed the policy of suppressing inflation symptoms by way 
of a rigid control over wages and salaries, administrative price formation 
and forced placements of bonds. For this reason the inflation processes took 
place in three forms simultaneously, i.e., suppressed, latent, and open ones. 
Inflation causing chaos and destabilizing the economy reinforced social 
tension posing a serious danger to  democramtic achievements. Hence not an in- 
significant temptation arises to  put it under control within the shortest time 
by means of extraordinary measures. One should not forget however that  
inflationary tendencies are "built-in" in modern economic structures and all 
attempts of forced balancing between demand and supply being aimed a t  
the consequences and not a t  the causes will have only a partial and tem- 
porary effect. Economic environment which would include "stabilizers" of 
unbalanced situations cannot be created with one stroke. 
The main task now is not simply to withdraw excessive money but to  put 
barriers on the way of incoming excessive means of payment. The more so 
that in this country we speak about excessive money against the background 
of its insufficient merchandise coverage. One should concentrate attention 
on the working out of such mechanism of monetary and credit regulation 
which would cause a disciplinary effect on the national economy as a whole. 
The Soviet economy is faced with a dilemma: the increasing state control 
may stifle the inflationary growth of prices only at  the expense of further 
growth of deficit and the strengthening of the "shadow economy"; the weak- 
ening of the state control will legalize the "shadow economy" and soften the 
deficit problem while sacrificing relative price stability. The vicious circle can 
be torn only by coming out of the limits of circulatioi~ sphere. Under these 
circumstances at  the initial stages of stabilization policy it is worth while 
to  put an accent on the production factors of economic growth, attempting 
to  form antimonopolistic economical ei~viroi~ment promoting various forms 
and ways of labor activity. 
Simultaneously it is necessary to  start forming in the most energetic way 
such mechanism of monetary and credit regulation which would allow the 
State bank to  have means t o  influence effectively the dynamics and structure 
of aggregate money supply. Inflation can be harnessed and controlled if only 
the passive emission policy is rejected. Enterprises should be facing more 
and more "rigid" financial limits and the State should learn to live according 
to  its means. 
In every country inflation process has its own specifics which means the 
use of various combinations of short- and long-term financial sanitation. In 
the USSR inflation has interwoven with goods and budget deficits, with 
enormous above the norm stocks of goods and material valuables, growth of 
external indebtedness, latent unemployment, aggravation of national rela- 
tions and industrial stagnation. The present situation is best characterized 
by such terms as deficitflation and stagflation, i.e., combinations of deficit 
and stagnation with inflation correspondingly. 
Anti-crisis program to  our mind should have specifics of a continually 
recurring compromise market with realism and continuity. It is worth while 
to  determine short- and long-term aspects of economic sanitation which in 
real life will overlap. 
What is to  be done in the long-term perspective? 
(1) It is strategically important to  form gradually an antimonopolistic eco- 
nomic environment which might be called a system of regulated market. 
The existing economic mechanism does considerable factors of ruble de- 
preciation is the artificial monopolization and undeveloped competitive- 
ness of economic environment. 
The difficulty of overcoming the actual situation lies in the fact that  the 
historically formed administrative and command environment rejects the 
introduced market elements which become deformed thus causing quite a 
reverse effect. One cannot admit as expedient the organization of social- 
ist markets by non-market means. The more extensively such measures 
are used the further the full-fledged market becomes. In force of what 
has been said before such transfer will be a long process with the gradual 
implantation of new elements into the old structure and its qualitative 
change after sufficient enough "critical mass" is achieved. 
It is important: 
to  deepen the reconstruction of credit and finance system in ac- 
celerated tempos without the radical renewal of which the market 
economic environment will be devoid of stability and integrity; 
to increase the role of monetary, credit, budget and tax  regulation 
which are called to  occupy with time the key position in the mech- 
anism of state control over the economy; 
to  develop purposefully but without artificial pushing the financial 
infrastructure, i.e., money markets, credit, securities and currency 
markets, bearing in mind the system of the ever growing "rigid" 
financial limitations and flexible mechanism of overflow of material 
and money resources; 
to  create conditions for the gradual discontinuation of directive 
price-fixing and tentative widening of the scope of flexible price- 
fixing depending on demand and supply through several methods 
of pricing policy; 
to  stop with time the administrative coiltrol over wages and salaries, 
their regional and branch structures giving these functions to labor 
markets which would be strictly controlled and socially protected; 
to  come gradually from the lowest to  more and more sophisticated 
forms of wholesale trade by means of production putting an ac- 
cent initially on marketing and information services and then - on 
specialized companies and real commercial centers; 
t o  form prerequisites to  the step by step transfer t o  the ruble con- 
vertibility, first a partial one, and ill future - more and more com- 
plete one; 
to  end the working out of the package of legislative acts, among 
them - antimonopolistic one which would form legal mechanism for 
the functioning of the socialist market and its control. 
(2) Normal functioning of the Soviet economy is impossible without its grad- 
ual integration into the world economic structure. These ends should be 
pursued by the strategy of structural and investment policies. At present 
it is critically important to  determine in what sectors of the world market 
the Soviet Union can assert itself on the basis of expert analysis, possi- 
bilities of the Soviet economy and world industrial trends. 
If one wants to  be realistic, it is high time to  recognize that  the break- 
through to  competitiveness is impossible to achieve on one's own. Hence 
the need for long-term orientation on supply and sell, industrial, scientific 
and technical cooperation with industrialized and in some cases devel- 
oping countries. It would be expedient t o  refuse rather chaotic changes 
in the foreign economic activity what has been reflected in particular in 
hasty decisions and then in prohibition on certain types and forms of 
cooperation with foreign partners. 
(3) Normalization of the national economy is impossible without the grad- 
ual overcoming of structural disproportions. This concerns correlation 
of production of means of production and consumer goods in indus- 
try, branches of extractive and processing industries, lagging behind of 
agriculture, social and information and transport infrastructure lagging 
behind the national dynamics, non-coordination in the development of 
many branches, sub-bra,nches and regions of the Soviet economy. First 
comes the task of achieving real changes in structural policy, overcom- 
ing the established priorities in nlateria.1 and technical supply, wages and 
salaries, policy of capital investments. Changes not in words, but in real- 
ity should be subordinated primarily t o  the developmeilt of agriculture, 
consumer goods production and social infrastructure. 
Besides long-term strategy short-term set of mea.sures is necessary. 
(1) It is important to  create conditions for stimulatiilg the supply of goods 
without substantial growth in capital investments. This can be achieved 
by the all-out development of shareholding elements and stimulation 
of alternative forms of economy like leasing, various models of cost- 
accounting, joint ventures, cooperative and individual labor. Freeing of 
enterprises, unions and different associations from the dictate of vertical 
structures is also very important. Support of small enterprises may be 
a great reserve of effective~less growth giving the quick pay-off especially 
in agriculture, trade, services, and utilization of waste. 
(2) Determining the time limits and the scale of diminishing the state budget 
deficit is much worthwhile. In any case the Supreme Soviet of the USSR 
should annually confirm the maximally allowed limit for the state debt. 
Besides the budget deficit should be formed in the way of government 
securities. 
(3) Conditions for stimulating savings among enterprises and population are 
necessary. Forms and ways of outflow of monetary funds from the sphere 
of active t o  passive circulation should be developed. Now one very rarely 
uses such forms of funds attracting as long-term a.greement deposit, tar- 
geted interest-free deposits for the durables, real estate loans, pension 
funds with a premium, stamp deposits, securities placements. Interest 
with a premium, stamp deposits, securities placements. Interest rates on 
deposit operations should become more flexible, depending on the terms 
and kinds of money deposited. 
(4) Restructuring of the banking system should be critically important in 
the program of anti-inflation measures. Its basic lowest level should be 
comprised of commercial banks and other credit and financial institutions 
acting on the principles of cost-accounting and interbank competition. 
The state specialized and commercial shareholding banks should be put 
in equal conditions. All of them should function on the basis of really 
attracted funds and be governed by the uniform rules of monetary and 
credit regulation. Interbank relations as well as the relations of banks 
with enterprises and organizations should be built exclusively on the 
agreement basis. 
The State Bank of the USSR provided with the functions of banks bank 
and creditor of last resort should form the upper level of the banking system. 
Especially acute is the question of substantial changes in the status of the 
State Bank of the USSR within the structure of central economic bodies. 
Not in the least interfering into the cost-accounting activity of the banks the 
USSR State Bank should get in his hands the control of operative regulation 
of the aggregate cash and cashless monetary circulation in accordance with 
the legally established goals of monetary and credit policy. It is worthwhile 
to  gradually leave the principles of cash and credit planning substituting 
them by government securities placements in the banking sector (operations 
in the open market), variations by reserves, flexible interest policy and fixing 
standards of bank liquidity. 
One should foresee a gradual transfer to the fixation of goal-reference 
points of monetary supply which should harness and discipline the national 
economy and state expenditure. These points should be correlated with 
the dynamics of the social product, ilational income, prices, and other basic 
economic variables. They should be fixed depending on the basic economic 
conjuncture and priorities in the monetary and credit policy. Taking into 
account the primitivism of economic mechanism of the monetary and credit 
regulation it is not expedient to fix rigidly goal-reference points in the use of 
monetary funds. For that  end it is necessary to accumulate the experience 
of the working out of corresponding ecollomic and mathematic models. 
The Soviet Tax System: 
Heritage from the Past and 
Blueprint for the Future 
Peter 0. Aven 
"The radical economic reform", announced by the Soviet leader Michail Gor- 
bachev in 1985, is still on the drawing board. Inconsistency and indecision of 
the "reformers", the lack of clear idea about "the good economy", opposition 
of different social groups and several other reasons did not allow to carry out 
crucial measures, indispensable for the transition t o  market economy. How- 
ever, the significant feature of the last few months is the emergence (for the 
first time since 1964) of the system of practical measures proposed by the 
Government for subsequent implementation. Proposals for the tax  reform 
are among them. The analysis of these proposals permits to  comprehend not 
only the position of the Government concerning the reform, but also some 
obstacles impending its fulfillment. 
The state sector. In spite of rapid development of the private sector, 
in 1989 state enterprises still have been produced more than 90% of the 
GNP. Therefore, changes in "their" taxation system are of specific impor- 
tance. As a matter of fact, this system ought to  be created from scratch. 
"Command" (or, more precisely, "bargaining") economy, existing in the So- 
viet Union, does not presuppose strict division of financial resources between 
an enterprise and the state. In fact, payment of expenditures and distribu- 
tion of earnings until recently have been accomplishing from the one "joint 
pocket". (Let us recollect F. Engels' vision of a socialist economic system 
as of "one large factory"). The amount of resources, obtained by the enter- 
prise, was and still is determined not only by efficiency of its operations but 
(and mainly) by its ability to  "squeeze out" money from the state (usually 
represented by branch ministry). Not only the assortment of goods for pro- 
duction, but also financial plan (containing certain planned earnings and 
proportions of their distribution between the enterprise and the state and 
also between various funds, created in the enterprise) were given to  each 
producer in the beginning of each year. 
Naturally, the financial plan was linked with the assortment plan, planned 
expenditures, etc. Also naturally, all these plans frequently could not be 
fulfilled (partly because of their poor quality and partly due to  changing 
environment). The concordance of "deviations", the distribution of "super- 
fluous" (non-planned) earnings or, on the contrary, the discharge of unex- 
pected losses have not been accounted for in the legislation. Such ques- 
tions have been solved in permanent vertical (hierarchical) haggles, where 
the solution of financial problems has been linked with the assignment of 
various material resources to  the enterprise, its readiness to  fulfill new, and 
often non-profitable, work quotas, etc. (Hence: "bargaining economy", "soft 
budget constrains", and rules of resource allocation which hardly could be 
formalized.[l] 
In fact the actual absence of any rules with respect to  the immobilization 
of financial resources from a firm has been reflected in the legal existence 
(until recently) of the notion of "spare remainder of profit", that  is "su- 
perfluous" income, which has to be withdrawn from the enterprise. Under 
such conditions any discussions about "the tax  policy" did not look serious 
- all questions of taxation have been solved on an individual basis, although 
certain preferences, for instance, for specific branches have always existed. 
Despite general "fuzzy" financial relations between enterprises and the 
state, several attempts to  introduce some fixed, obligatory payments were 
made in the last 10-15 years. Among them: payments for fixed capital, labor 
and natural resources. In the economy of "common pocket" all such pay- 
ments (which were intended to  stimulate efficient use of various resources) 
could not seriously influence the behavior of the enterprise. Frequently en- 
terprises were liberated from such payments or their rates were reduced. (In 
October of 1989 Soviet Prime-Minister announced that  only 28% of state 
enterprises could afford payments for fixed capital a t  the usual level of 3% 
of its value. Therefore, the rest pays less or just nothing.[2] 
Persistent attempt to  establish more formal, clear relations between the 
state and enterprises took place in 1985 within the framework of the so- 
called "Large-scale economic experiment". The main idea of this experiment: 
introduction of stable rates for income distribution both between the state 
and the enterprise and within the enterprise. Stable rates ("normatives") 
had t o  provide certain guarantees for enterprises and, therefore, t o  stimulate 
more intensive operation. Although, normatives ought to  be not only stable, 
but also unified (a t  least for the group of enterprises), neither the first, 
nor the second requirements were fulfilled. The impossibility t o  provide 
the unification of normatives has been caused by essential differences in 
production conditions and by deformations in the price system (so, instead 
of a real tax,  individually settled "quasi-taxes" were implemented). 
Instability of tax  rates resulted from the preservation of the traditional 
system of simultaneous allocation of plan targets and material resources 
between state enterprises. In such a system the state (imposing plans and 
providing resources) is obliged t o  share the responsibility with the enterprise. 
Hence, if the financial situation of an enterprise has been worsening, then 
tax  rates should be reduced - the state ought to  provide necessary help. 
On the contrary (though less typically), normatives could be increased for 
"disobedient" or "too wealthy" enterprises. Their money has been used to  
support "poor" producers. (Impossibility to  maintain the stability of tax  
rates within the context of centrally planned economy was widely discussed 
in Hungary in the middle of seventies.[3] The Hungarian experience also 
proves that  in conditions of "quasi-market" haggles on tax  rates supplement 
more important bargains on plan targets and supply in material resources.) 
The role of the state in "correction" financial status of enterprises and the 
role of enterprises in forming the state budget are reflected by the magnitude 
of payments from profits and their share in the state budget. In the period 
from 1970 to  1987 the share of state enterprises in total earnings of the budget 
varied from 29,2% t o  34,6%; average enterprise paid from 59% (in 1970) 
t o  46% (in 1987) of its profit.[4] The certain decline in payments resulted 
from the general decentralization of the economic system - until recently 
decentralization and increased rights of enterprises remain main features of 
transformation associated with the "radical economic reform". According t o  
the plan in 1990 90% of increase in state enterprises7 profits will be left in 
their disposal. [5] 
The ideology of stable economic normatives was consolidated by the "Law 
on state enterprise" in effect since January 1989. Individual settling of rates, 
as well as their factual instability were not overcome. However, the intro- 
duction of the new law marked a further step into direction of clarification of 
financial relations between the state and enterprises. Thus, spare remainder 
of profit, whose share in earnings of the state budget declined from 15,8% 
in 1970 to  2,9% in 1987.[6] was eliminated totally. 
At the same time, legal framework for further and crucial decentraliza- 
tion, provided by the "Law on state enterprise", resulted in growing dif- 
ficulties to  increase tax rates. Frequent reduction of normatives without 
adequate increases is among main reasons for the rapid growth of the state 
budget deficit (11% of the GNP in 1989.[7] 
The private sector. The emergence of private firms ("cooperatives") 
in 1987 called for the elaboration of specific taxation rules. While cooper- 
atives were obtaining candid support from the Government, tax rates were 
relatively low. Contrary to  state enterprises where tax was paid on profit, 
private firms were obliged to  pay tax from the so-called "gross income" (earn- 
ings minus expenditures on material resources, compulsory and debt service 
payments). Irrespective of production, the tax rate was equal to  3% of the 
gross income a t  the first year (year of firm's establishment), 5% - in the 
second, 10% - later on. 
In accordance with the changing attitude towards private business, tax- 
ation rules were also modified. Several modifications took place during last 
two years - after each of them conditions for private firms became less fa- 
vorable. In the beginning of 1990 private companies that sell their products 
by regulated ("state") prices have to  pay tax on gross income with the rate 
6,25% in the first year of operation, 12,5% - in the second, 25% - later 
on. For those who operate with free, market prices corresponding numbers 
would be 8,75, 17,5, 35%. (As a result some entrepreneurs have already 
"closed" their "old" firms and opened "new" cooperatives in the beginning 
of the year.) For firms involved in certain types of activity (i.e., retail trade) 
tax rates might be increased by local authorities - the limit of such increase 
is 60% of the gross income. 
Some additional payments also exist. The most important ( tax on the 
wage fund) will be discussed below. The other important tax is the "tax 
on hired workers" - in order to  lessen the threat of "exploitation" and to 
compel owners to  accept employees for cooperative, gross income tax ought 
to  be increased by 25% for those cooperatives where the number of hired 
workers exceeds three times the number of employers. Payments for fixed 
capital, labor resources, etc. also take place. As a matter of fact, permanent 
strengthening of the "tax pressure" puts under question future development 
of the private sector (whose production has grown for about eightfold during 
last year). In the attempt to  prevent growing outflow of employees from the 
state sector the government jeopardizes the existence of private business in 
itself. 
The turnover tax. While different schemes of taxation are applied to  
state enterprises, private firms and population, one unified tax  is used for 
all. It  is the so-called "turnover tax", that  is addition to  a seller's price paid 
by a consumer and transferred to  the state budget. Traditionally receipts 
from turnover tax is the extremely important mean of fiscal policy - in 1960 
such receipts exceeded 40% of the budget 8, in 1989 their share was more 
than 25%.[8] 
However, the main aim of this tax  is not a fiscal one. Its existence is 
determined by the necessity to  correct discrepancies in the price system, to  
balance the situation on the market. Today receipts from turnover tax  are 
almost totally compensated by subsidies to  retail prices on consumer goods 
(in 1989: 111,l bln. roubles from the turnover tax 191, 87,8 bln. subsidies only 
for food stuffs.[lO]. Although certain corrections of prices are absolutely legal, 
their level in the USSR is definitely excessive. The magnitude of receipts 
from the turnover tax  reflects the artificial character of the price system. 
The turnover tax,  whose rate without any consistency is individually settled 
for every good produced in the economy, cannot help to  overcome such 
artificiality. 
Despite several proposals to  substitute turnover t ax  by more "civilized" 
taxation (for instance, by value added tax), such substitution never was se- 
riously discussed by the government. On the contrary, a 17,l bln. roubles 
increase in receipts from the turnover tax is planned for 1990. Such orien- 
tation naturally results from the impossibility to  perform radical reform in 
the price system in current social conditions. 
Enterprises: the new blueprint. The new blueprint for the tax policy 
("The draft law on unified tax system in the USSRn) was proposed by the 
government in October 1989 and after rather long discussions approved by 
the Parliament in March 1990 with minor changes. 
According to  the blueprint, the Soviet state and leased enterprises, share- 
holding companies and joint ventures will be subject to three different pay- 
ments: 
t ax  on profit; 
tax  on wages fund; 
turnover tax. 
For the private firms and public organizations tax  on gross income sub- 
stitutes tax on profit. 
Payments for all resources except land will be abandoned (though, ac- 
cording to  official statements, payments for labor may be reintroduced later 
on). 
The blueprint reflects the general logic of the economic reform. According 
to  it the state and enterprise pockets ought to  be distinguished for all firms 
irrespective to  the form of ownership. Declaring once again the path to  
stable tax rates, the Government took serious step in the direction of their 
unity. It is assumed that  all state and leased enterprises will pay profit 
tax  consisting of two parts. The first, transferred to  the union (federal) 
budget, will have unified rate of 30%. The other, paid into the budget of a 
republic and settled by i t ,  may vary between republics (but has to  be unified 
within each of them); its rate can not exceed 25% of profit. (Within the 
framework of the economic reform special attention is paid to  the "financial 
independence" of Soviet republics. For the first time the share of republics 
in the state budget is going up - in 1990 it will reach 49,3%, compared to 
45-46% in 1988-1989).[11] 
Simultaneously, system of tax  privileges will be introduced. According 
to  the Prime-Minister, such privileges will be obtained only by those en- 
terprises, who increase production of consumer goods, invest into ecological 
programs or are in the period of technological transformation. Taking into 
account the system of privileges, planned average level of taxation ought to  
be equal t o  48-49%. 
Total receipts from the profit tax, calculated on the new basis, for 1990 
are estimated to  reach the level of 98 bln. roubles. If the scheme, used in 1989, 
would not have been changed in 1990 the receipts would be approximately 10 
bln. less.[l2] Therefore, the new proposals indicate further movement in the 
direction of decentralization. (The weakening of the tax burden is directly 
connected with the crucial decentralization of capital investments. From 
1986 t o  1989 the share of "local" (enterprise) investments in total capital 
investments into the state sector grew from 3,1% [13] to  46,6%.[14] 
The idea of tax, which consists of two parts, reflects the aspiration to  
exclude tax  rates from a set of objects used in bargaining. As for a large 
number of enterprises plan targets still "come down" from the state level, 
their admission no longer can be linked with changes in normatives. How- 
ever, the introduction of privileges retains the possibility to  bargain legally 
for tax rates - it does not seem very difficult for almost any enterprise to 
link itself with one of the  prerequisites, necessary for exemption. Moreover, 
possibilities t o  haggle with the republic authorities (who now are obtaining 
more rights in planning and distribution of material resources) may be in- 
creased - in a certain sense the state is shifting the responsibility to  adjust 
economic regulators to  the "shoulders" of local managers. 
It seems that  definite stability and a t  the same time flexibility of eco- 
nomic normatives could be provided not by the system of privileges, but by 
clustering enterprises according to  their conditions of production. Proposals 
on such clustering exist.[l5] However, the Government has chosen another 
road, which better coexist with the preservation of administrative control. 
As for the private sector, the new blueprint in general does not presup- 
pose serious changes in taxation. Maximum tax rates of 25% and 35% will 
stay. For cooperatives involved in some type of services and retail trade 
these rates can be increased (limits of such increase are not determined in 
the Law). Private firms in areas of construction, agriculture and food pro- 
cessing, selling their production a t  state prices, are liberated from any tax  
on gross income during first two years of their existence. All others pay 25% 
and 50% of the tax  respectively a t  the first and the second year. Precise 
determination of tax  rates is given to  republics. Receipts from the tax  are 
transferred into local (municipal) budgets. 
Precise scheme of taxation for joint ventures and foreign firms, operating 
in the USSR, will be defined separately. 
The tax on wages fund. The decentralization of decision making, 
growing rights of enterprises (especially in areas of pricing and wages) re- 
sulted in the increase in average wages outstripping labor productivity. In 
1989 average wages in the state sector grew 9,5%, labor productivity in- 
creased only by 2,3%, production of consumer goods by 5,9%.[16] Rapid 
growth in both shortage and prices (despite state control) made it necessary 
t o  constrain further increase in wages. 
Contrary to  the generally "soft" taxation of profits, special (and very 
tough) regulation of the increase of the wages fund was introduced in October 
1989. According t o  the decree, issued by the Soviet Supreme, all s tate and 
cooperative enterprises ought to  pay special tax if the annual growth rate 
of their wages fund exceeds 3%. The scale of rates for such payment can be 
found in Table 1. 
In fact such a system (which for some time has been used in Hungary) 
has frozen wages. No doubts, it could not stimulate intensification of labor 
efforts. However, within the framework of this system average wages a t  
the enterprise might be increased: all what has to  be done is t o  reduce 
the number of workers. Hence, further growth of unemployment can be 
anticipated. Additional outflow from the state into the private sector also 
Table 1. The tax on wages fund: the scale of rates.[l8] 
Payment into the state budget 
Annual growth of (roubles for every rouble of 
wages fund - % increase in wages fund) 
less than 3 0 
from 3 to 5 1 
from 5 to  7 2 
more than 7 3 
seems probable: by establishment branch companies cooperatives may try 
to  escape new taxation. 
Results of the last quarter of 1989 corroborated all these threats. Under 
the pressure from state enterprises, losing their labor force and decreasing 
production, the government issued numerous exceptions, permitting enter- 
prises to pay less. As a result of individual bargaining on tax rates, receipts 
from the tax on wages fund appeared to  be two times less than it was antic- 
ipated (0,5 bln. roubles instead of 1 bln.).[17] 
Realizing this situation the government changed its mind and in the 
beginning of February announced important modification in the tax scheme 
(although in October the promise was not to change it during 1990). From 
now on the basic wages fund (earlier the fund of the previous year), which 
is used for the calculation of growth rate, can be increased to 0,5% for every 
1% growth in production (for machine building and metal-working industry 
the rate is 0,3). Simultaneously the basic fund ought to  be reduced to  0,7% 
for every 1% decrease in production.[l9] 
Population. According to  the traditional system of proportional taxa- 
tion, which has been existing since the twenties, every soviet citizen, being 
paid by the state, had to  pay 13% of his earnings as an  income tax  every 
month. Some exceptions (in timing of payment and its rate) took place for 
freelance persons. 
The emergence of cooperatives resulted in widening of legal possibilities 
to  earn money outside the state sector. After some discussions all personal 
incomes of members of cooperatives and their employees were taxed a t  the 
same level of 13%. At the same time incomes from legal but not registered 
(at the status of private firm) activities (i.e.,from growing and selling fruits 
and vegetables from "private supplementary holdings") until now have not 
been taxed. 
Table 2. The income tax: the progressive scale. 
Income per month (I) (roubles) Magnitude of payments (roubles) 
less than 80 0 
81-100 0,41 * (1-80) 
101-700 8,2 + 0,13 * (1-100) 
701-900 86,2 + 0,15 * (1-700) 
901-1100 116,2 + 0,20 * (1-900) 
1101-1300 156,2 + 0,30 * (1-1100) 
1301-1500 216,2 + 0,40 * (1-1300) 
1501-3000 296,2 + 0,50 * (1-1500) 
3001-5000 1046,2 + 0,65 * (1-3000) 
more than 5001 2346,2 + 0,80 * (1-5000) 
In addition to  income tax some less important taxes also have been exist- 
ing. The most controversial one is the tax on bachelors and married people 
without children - 6% of earnings are under taxation. Among other minor 
taxes: the road tax  (on private cars), the agricultural tax (on land property) 
and the inheritance tax. No other property taxes have been existing. 
All together tax receipts from the population stably reached 7-7,5% of 
the state budget.[20] 
"The draft law on change in organization and rates of taxation on popula- 
tion" was proposed for nation-wide discussion in April 1989.[21] According 
to  the draft law, first of all, some evident "unfairness" ought to  be excluded 
from the tax system. One of them: the tax on bachelors and married people 
without children which will be a t  first abandoned for low income persons 
and then in 1993 for the rest of the population. 
However, the real significance of the new blueprint is connected not with 
such minor changes. The main thing is that  traditional system of propor- 
tional taxation ought to  be substituted by progressive income tax. Its scale, 
proposed in April, presupposed progressive taxation only for rather high 
incomes - for more than 7 hundred roubles per month (average wages in 
the state sector in 1989 was equal to  240 roubles).[22] Later on progres- 
sive taxation was widened for all levels of income - its scale (proposed by 
the Government and almost without changes approved by the Parliament in 
March 1990) can be found in Table 2. 
The transfer to the system of progressive taxation reflects growing anx- 
iety with the probable incomes differentiation, which might result from the 
development of the private sector and market in general. In fact, such 
fears are essentially overestimated. The transition t o  the market can hardly 
increase current differentiation, where inequalities in earnings (in 1989 in 
12,6% of families per capita income was less than 75 roubles per month, 
in 7,1% the income was over 250 roubles, for families with income from 75 
to 100 and from 200 to 250 roubles corresponding numbers were 15,7% and 
10, l% respectively [23]) is supplemented by complicated system of privileges. 
The destruction of such a system (which, for instance, allows social groups 
with higher incomes to pay for some consumer goods a t  half the average 
price) may influence factual distribution on national income much stronger 
than proposed changes in the tax policy. 
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My remarks will be divided into three general areas. First, I will begin 
with an overview of the general problem of radical economic reform faced by 
centrally planned ecoilomies like the Soviet Union. In the second section, I 
will address particular problems of economic stabilization, or what is called 
"macroeconomics" in the West. The final section contains some reflections 
upon the distribution of income in a market economy. 
Before beginning, however, I would emphasize one point. The path of 
making the transition from a thoroughly centrally planned economy to a 
market ecoilomy is one that  is without precedent in economic history. It 
is ironic, indeed, that  the Soviet Union should for the second time in this 
century be forced t o  travel down a road that  no country has taken before. 
Unlike the first journey, however, the shift from a command t o  a market 
economy is moving toward a well-mapped territory. We know a great deal 
about how the economies of the east will function once they have been trans- 
formed into market economies. The uncertainty revolves mainly around the 
transition from centrally planned market economy. 
In light of this uncertainty and lack of experience about the transition 
path, we must be especially cautious about our prescriptions. In giving 
advice to  policy makers, we must be prudent and admit that our analysis is 
based on analogies, theories, and hunches rather than on the wisdom from 
accumulated experience. It would be irresponsible for us western economists 
t o  propose bold and draconian measures - especially when we can go home 
and enjoy high incomes even if the proposals fail. Caution must be the 
watchword. 
Section I 
It is useful to  begin with an overview of the problem faced by radical eco- 
nomic reform. There are three important themes that  emerge from the 
papers for this meeting and in the background paper circulated a t  our last 
meeting [I]: (1) the ultimate goal of the radical reform, (2) the steps neces- 
sary to make the tra,nsition to  the final goal, and (3) the sequencing of the 
transitional steps. 
a. The ultimate goal 
With respect to  the goal of radical reform, the goal of economic reform 
is to  replace the comma.nd-a.dministrative mechanisms of today's socialist 
economies with an economy primarily driven by a decentralized system of 
markets for most inputs and outputs. This is clearly stated in Radical Reform 
PI : 
[Tlhe main features of the model of a new economic system are . . .the 
use of the market as the main form of coordinating the activities of the 
participants in production. We have become convinced on the basis of our 
own experience that there is no wortliy alternative to the market mechanism 
as the method of coordinating the activities and interests of the economic 
subjects. 
The major exceptions will be a number of industries that  will continue to  
have heavy state intervention, such as the power grid, defense, transporta- 
tion, and communications.[3] 
An important point about the ultimate goal is that  a market economy 
is not a laissez-faire capitalist econoiny. There are a wide variety of both 
microecoi~omic aad ~ ~ ~ a c r o e c o ~ ~ o ~ n i c  interventions in a market economy that  
may be desired. But these intervent.iolls will, I assume, operate in the frame- 
work of a market system. That is, governments affect markets, but markets 
will determine the outputs, prices, and allocations of the multitude of deci- 
sions that  must be made every day. 
b. The  transition steps 
Professor Yasin has stated clearly the question before us: "The essence of the 
radical economic reform in the USSR is the transition from the administer- 
and-command system to  market economy." The background papers for this 
conference, pa.rticularly Radical Reform, are a useful and thoughtful analysis 
of the problems of the transition. I find it useful to  break the transition issues 
into the following set of questions: 
o Stabilization: ensuring that  the overall economy, or aggregate supply 
and demand, are in rough equilibrium in the economy. Some indications of 
aggregate disequilibl.ium exist, although the situation is different in different 
countries. This is the problem of "macroeconomics" that  will be addressed 
a t  length in the next section. 
o Price reform: Prices of both inputs and outputs are often far from the 
levels they would find if they were market determined. Schmelev gives the 
example of meat (selling for 50 percent of "realistic costs and world trends"), 
shoes and automobiles (twice realistic levels), and a color television set (2.5 
times realistic levels). Sooner or later, if prices are to  be market-determined, 
relative prices must be moved to the levels. 
o Institutions of the market: The Soviet economy lacks many of the 
institutions that  are required to nnke a ma.rket economy function. These 
include accountants and accounting standards, lawyers and contract laws, 
market resea.rc11 and salesmen, banking regulations and bankers. This list is 
written to  emphasize that  a market requires not only rules written on paper 
(decrees and laws) but also experienced people who understand and operate 
the institutions of the market. 
o Privatization (or marketization) of individual sectors: At some point, 
in a gradual or abrupt way, the actual decisions about buying and selling, 
pricing and production, borrowing a.nd lending must be made on a decentral- 
ized basis in ma.rkets. Buyers a.nd sellers must negotiate, bargain, and argue 
about prices, quantities, and qualities. They must have alternative buyers 
and sellers available. The thousands of people who currently regulate prices 
and quantities must find other jobs. 
There are many other things that will happen in the transition from a 
command economy to a market economy. But these stand out from the 
papers, and from my experience, a.s the crucial steps in the transition. 
c. What is the best sequence of steps? 
There is little disa.greenlent about the need for these steps on the road to  
a market economy. The critical question is the sequencing and speed of the 
transition. 
(a )  Big-bang approach. 
One approach, which has been undertaken in Poland, is the "Big Bang" 
approach of simultaneous aad immediate transition from a centrally planned 
t o  a market economy. This is lambelled the "radical" option in Radical Reform. 
In this approach, you would remove all barriers to markets, decontrol all 
prices, and privatize all sectors inlnlediately and simultaneously; then force 
markets to  take over the role a.bandoned by the government. This approach 
is labelled purely "theoretical" in the bacliground paper, but i t  is in fact a 
live option. 
Is such an approach appropriate for the Soviet Union as a whole? I 
think not. This approach is a possible one for a small, open economy and 
one with some memory of markets (as occurred in Chile or may occur in 
Poland); or for isola.ted sectors within a largely capitalism system (as oc- 
curred for the airlines in the United Sta.tes or for nationalized enterprises in 
the United I(ingdon1). However, in my opinion, such an approach is too risky 
for as large, closed, and l~ierarchical a.n economy as the Soviet Union. As 
an economist, I simply could not, guarantee that  such an abrupt transition 
would not lead to a major breakdown of tlte economy, with mass unemploy- 
ment and even, potentially, widespread economic distress, breakdowns in the 
distribution chain, and hunger. 
To use an analogy, we might a.sk how a country could best change from 
an inefficient language to a more efficient language (I use this example to 
emphasize that  a market is as much a culture, a way of talking, and a 
complex set of human interactions like language as it is a new set of rules 
and regulations). Moving to  the new system would be painless for those 
who already know the language, just as East Germans can easily adapt 
to  West German regulations. But for those who are ignorant of the new 
language, it would be more efficient to introduce the new language gradually, 
to train people to spea,k the 1angua.ge of the market, to spend some time in 
countries where the language of the market is spoken, and so forth. To 
require a country to speak the new language immediately would lead to  
chaos or revolution or both. 
(b)  Staged a.pproach. 
If we reject the "Big Bang" approa.cl1 for the Soviet Union, the next question 
is the appropriate sequence of radical reforms. I believe the best sequence 
is in two major stages: first, is to  move the economy as close as possible to  
macroecoi~omic and microeconomic equilibrium and to  set out the legislative 
framework for the market; then, second, to  decontrol prices and privatize 
production. This approach is close to  the "radical-moderate" option in the 
background paper. 
The first stage should attempt to  move the economic variables as close as 
possible t o  the market and to  remove the source of macroeconomic disequi- 
libria. This would involve a thorougll price and accounting reform to  align 
prices as closely as possible to  what free market prices would dictate. In 
doing this, it would be useful to  introduce accounting and reward systems 
that  would be appropriate when the transition to  the market is made. We 
should not fool ourselves into thinking that  the prices and incentives will be 
"correct" under this alignment stage. Rather, it is the purpose to  remove as 
much as possible of the disequilibrium so that  the disruption a t  introduction 
of markets is minimized. 
In addition, the alignment stage should include the major macroeconomic 
adjustments to  reduce the government budget deficit and align taxes and 
subsidies to  reflect tlie new social priorities. 
Finally, the alignment stage should begin the stage of introducing the 
institutions of the market, of training ma.nagers and others t o  "speak the lan- 
guage of the market ." This would involve legislation on contracts, bankruptcy, 
joint ventures, and banking; experiments on decontrol of certain markets; 
setting up a stock market; and esta~blishing the social safety net (such as 
employment insurance) for those persons who are injured by the market 
economy. 
(2) Decontrol. 
The second and crucial step is actual decontrol of prices, freedom of entry 
and exit and bankruptcy, and privatizing markets. Much has been written 
on this subject a.nd I will not expand on this second sta.ge. 
The final issue of the sequencing of the transition is how rapidly i t  should 
occur. There is no way to  answer this question in general. It  is useful to  recall 
that  most western countries required decades if not centuries to develop the 
institutions of the market, to train mana.gers and workers, to  find an efficient 
balance between sta.te and market in each sector. Surely, the economies of 
the East can learn from mistakes and successes of the West. In my opinion, 
it is hard to see how the first stage could be accomplished in much less than 
two or three years, and the two stages in much less than five years. To make 
the move more quickly would require gambling on the Big-Bang approach. 
(3) A tie-breaking rule. 
In the course of the transition, there will be a large number of options or 
routes to  the ultimate goal of an efficient market economy. In cases where 
it is a close call between alterna.tives, a useful rule to  help break the ties 
is the following: Choose the transition strategy that  will do the maximum 
extent sinooth or speed the transition to  a decentralized market economy. 
The logic behind this tie-breaking rule is obvious. 
An example is the following: Assume that there are two strategies for 
containing an inflationary burst a.fter markets are introduced. One would be 
slow decontrol or control some prices; the other would be to  open borders 
so that  foreign goods could reduce market power. The tie-breaking rule 
will favor the second, for it will help marketize the economy more quickly. 
Although this sounds innocent, it is surprisingly powerful in many transition 
decisions. 
The peril of ignoring such a transitional rule is seen in the current prob- 
lem in the USSR, as I understand it.  Beca.use the reforms from 1985 to  1989 
led to  incomes outrunning supply, a movement has arisen to  recontrol prices 
and move toward tighter central control. A defender of the recontrol might 
cite the famous dictum that  progress requires two steps forward and one step 
backward. Without great vigilance, this easily becomes two steps backward 
for every one step forward - and thwarts reform altogether. 
Section I1 
I next turn to a discussion of the n~acroeconomic issues covered in the pa- 
per by I<agalovsky and I<handruyev arid in the background paper. In my 
discussion, I will make a few background co~nments on the role of macroeco- 
nomic policy and then turn to the specific suggestions in the papers for this 
conference. 
To begin with, it is useful to understand the role of macroeconomic policy. 
Macroeconomic policy has the respollsibility of ensuring that  the economy is 
in overall or aggregate balance. In the market economies, policies generally 
focus on the short-run stabilization and the long-run need for efficiency and 
economic growth. In my remarks I will discuss only the short-run stabi- 
lization problems, which a.re the most urgent in making the transition to  a 
market economy. 
For short-run macroeconomic policy, the most important goals are to 
ensure: that  output is close to  its potential, that  unemployment is a t  as low 
a level as is sustainable, that  prices a.re stable, and that  the economy is in 
balance with the rest of the world. The major tools to  attain these goals are 
fiscal, monetary, and external policies. That  is, the goals can be achieved by 
fiscal policies ( that  relate to the structure and overall level of expenditure 
and tax  programs), by monetary policies (which relate to  the control of 
various monetary aggregates with a.n eye to influencing asset prices, interest 
rates, and credit conditions), and external policies (which include a variety 
of measures including the exchange-ra,te system and trade policies. 
The central need for macroeconomic policy is to  ensure that  nominal 
aggregate demand does not grow much more rapidly than the potential out- 
put of the economy. In other words, the amount that  different entities in 
the economy (households, enterprises, and the government) want to  spend 
should be close to the current-price value of output. In addition, incomes 
should not be growing much more ra.pidly than the potential output. If 
either the total desired spending in the economy is much greater than the 
current-price level of output, or if the growth rate of current-price spending 
is much greater than the growth rate of real output, then the economy will 
have the tendency toward a burst of inflation, a sustained inflation, or even, 
potentially, a hyperinflation. Of course, if the opposite is true - if spending 
is much less than output - the economy may suffer a depression and high 
unemployment, but insufficient a.ggregate demand hardly seems the most 
immediate difficulty in most Eastern European countries. 
The papers points to  a variety of macroeco~~omic issues, but five partic- 
ularly stand out. 
First, the budget is seriously out of equilibrium. The budget deficit 
is almost 11 percent of GNP a.nd a.bout 22 percent of expenditure. The 
government debt is around 44 percent of GNP. There is both "stock" and 
"flow" disequilibrium in the government budget. That  is, the accumulated 
stock of money and other liquid a.ssets has let to  a "ruble overhang." Unless 
neutralized, the ruble overhang will produce a sharp, one-time rise in prices 
when prices are decontrolled. The papers mention a number of options for 
soaking up the ruble overha.ng, none of them particularly attractive. If the 
ruble overhang is small, a small one-time price rise (up to, say, 20 percent) 
might be a reasona.ble option. If estiinates point to  a larger figure (say a 
100 percent increase in prices), then some kind of monetary reform might 
be necessary. 
What kind of monetary reform would be desirable? I believe that  the first 
criterion should obviously be to  sta.bilize aggregate demand. Among those 
many options that  do so, remember the tie-breaking rule suggested above. 
In that ,  preference should go towa.rd solutions that  help rather than hinder 
markets. This would include introducing a new and convertible currency 
(such as the German reform of 1948), selling of state assets, or selling high- 
yield government bonds. Solutions that would impede markets (such as 
freezing a.ccounts) should be rejectecl as hindering the movement toward 
more efficient capital markets. 
Second, it is necessary to  reduce the budget deficit so that  the contin- 
ued inflationary pressures are reduced. Put differently, if the budget deficit 
continues at  high levels, the increase in aggregate demand will grow and the 
"inflationary gap" between desired spending at  existing prices in real out- 
put will grow over time, producing continued inflationary pressures. I would 
therefore concur with the view of the papers that  it is important to  reduce 
the deficit so that  whatever inflation occurs upon price decontrol does not 
ignite a self-sustaining continuing inflation. On the other hand, a budget 
deficit of 10 percent of GNP is not outside the range of experience of suc- 
cessful market economies. Japa.n a.nd Italy, for example, have had deficits of 
this size in recent years, and the U.S. federal government deficit a t  its peak 
in the 1980s was G percent of GNP. 
A related issue concerns the need on the one hand to  protect those living 
on fixed incomes alld the need to reduce inflationary risks - this is the issue of 
indexation. It is tempting to index pensions, transfer payments, and wages 
so as to  protect those who suffer most from the ravages of inflation. While 
such steps a.re justified, care must be taken not to  set the rate of indexation 
a t  too high a level. Full indexation (raising pensions or wages 1 percent for 
every 1 percent rise in prices) is an invitation to  galloping inflation. The 
papers propose partial indexci~tio~z - around .3  percent per cent on wages and 
.7 percent per cent on traasfers - which is a level that has worked in Western 
economies. 
Third, almost all observers of ecollolnies of the east believe that the struc- 
tures of tlle budgets and of taxation are inefficient and undesirable. There 
are substantial subsidies to  food and agriculture (amounting to  24 percent 
of the USSR budget or 12 percent of GNP) and to  unprofitable enterprises 
(about 10 percent of the budget or 5 percent of GNP). Defense probably 
absorbs 20 to  30 percent of the budget. An early objective of reform, which 
is a theme running through the papers, is the need to  restructure the budget 
both to  ensure inacroeconomic stability, to align relative prices with social 
priorities, and to  make room for growth in private consumption. 
Fourth, i t  is a mistake to  assume that centrally planned economies can 
avoid difficulties from excessive demand by controlling prices. In the last 
few years, as the papers point out, the USSR has lost control of the budget, 
and incomes are rising more rapidly than output. In an economy with price 
controls - whether the USSR in 1990 or the USA in 1944 - the result of excess 
demand is shorta.ges, long lines, and an increasingly inefficient distribution 
system. One result of Germa.11 decontrol of 1948 or of the Polish decontrol of 
1990 is that goods ma.gically appear in the shops. (The problem, of course, is 
that  they are too expensive to buy!). The inefficiencies of repressed inflation 
are yet another rea.son why it is impera,tive for Eastern economies to  get and 
retain control of their fiscal and moneta.ry policies. 
Fifth, the most difficult, is thc need to reform money and capital mar- 
kets. The papers correctly point to two elements in this strategy. First is 
the need to  sepa.rate tlie central ballkillg function from the commercial or 
retail banking function. All (sensible) western economists agree that  the 
functioning of the monetary system, the provision for a limited supply of 
money and a stable currency ca.nnot be left to the market. Here, the govern- 
ment has an important function as the monopoly supplier of bank reserves 
and as domestic lender of last resort. Gosbank is one institution that  has a 
future no matter how marketized the Soviet economy becomes. 
On the other hand, the retail lending functions should be decentral- 
ized and subject to regulated competition over time. The Soviet economy 
needs t o  develop a private, decentralized capital market, with strong banks, 
through which banks are middlemen between savers (in households, enter- 
prises, and foreigners) and borrowers (for housing, plant, equipment, and 
inventories). Some investment of course will be financed by enterprises or 
households themselves. But in an efficient market economy, credit markets 
raise and distribute a siza.ble fsa.ction of the funds for investment. 
Section I11 
As a final word, I would like to say something, speaking as a citizen, about 
the aesthetics and morality of a ma.rket. One of the major differences be- 
tween a market economy like the United States of the 1980s and a socialist 
economy revolves around the importa.nce of equality of incomes. Socialist 
societies value equa.lity, while market economies permit, and sometimes even 
encourage, great inequalities. 
Many people in today's America a.re repelled by some of the values that 
the market sets. I wonder about a society where a new lawyer gets paid more 
than a professor of physics; where a rich inan caa get his name on an airline 
("Trump Air") or can own a baseball or hockey team; where baseball players 
make 100 times more than factory workers; where an investment banker can 
draw a bonus of $500 million for selling junk bonds. It was this arbitrary 
income distribution that led my colleague Arthur Okun to say, "Two cheers 
for the market, but not three." 
But whatever we feel about this issue, these excesses are the price of a 
market economy - where wages and prices reflect how well a product sells 
rather than how much it is rea.lly worth. Prices and incomes in a market are 
determined by dol1a.r votes in the ma.rlietplace, not ballot votes in elections 
or bullet votes at  the baaricades. 
But societies ca.n talie steps to correct the greatest distortions of incomes 
produced by a market. The lesson we would suggest is that the most effective 
and efficient interventions in the market distribution of income come from 
income-tested taxes and subsidies rather than from direct interference with 
price a.nd allocations. 
For example, most people would a.gree that  the poor should not starve. 
One way to make food ava.ilable to everyone is through food subsidies. This 
is unnecessarily expensive, however, because it benefits high-income as well 
as low-income groups. A inore efficient policy is to target income-support 
activities on particular groups. In the United States, this is done through the 
food-stamp program, wherein low-income households (but not high-income 
households) can purchase a t  heavily subsidized prices. The same principle 
applied to medical care and housing. Or an  even broader approach is to  
provide income to needy groups rather than providing specific subsidies. 
Similarly, many economists from Eastern economies are uncomfortable 
with the concept of an individual holding large amounts of assets or hiring 
large numbers of people. I have seen suggestions on prohibitions of such ac- 
tivities. The difficulty, of course, is tha.t such prohibitions might significantly 
inhibit tecl~nological change and capital accumulation. Perhaps, if a society 
wishes to encourage entrepreneurship and private enterprise, it would be well 
to allow practices that are somewhat distasteful and to tax the proceeds of 
the investments rather than prohibit them. If I had a Russian grandfather, 
he might have said, "It is better to have rich peasants with fat hens than 
poor peasants with skinny hens. It is better still if we can tax a few of the 
eggs of the rich pea.sant to share with the rest of us." 
Notes 
[ l]  The background paper is Rarlical Ecortomic Reform: Top-Priority and Long- 
Term Aleasures, paper distributed by the Organizing Committee of the All- 
Union Conference and Mrorkshop on the Proble~ns of Radical Economic Reform; 
this paper will be called Radical Refornz. 
[2] Radical Reform, pp. 2-4. 
[3] Radical Refornz, pp. 25. 

Stabilization and Reform 
Sequencing in the Soviet 
Economy 
Reform Progress to Date 
In the last four years the Soviet Union has introduced many measures of 
economic policy and radical reform intended to  reduce the scope of central 
planning and to  activate market mechanisms, in order to mobilize resources, 
increase their productivity directly and through greater integration of the 
Soviet economy into world trade, so as to  resume and accelerate economic 
growth. 
The first steps of Gorbachev's economic perestroika were neither felic- 
itous nor effective: initially the emphasis was placed again on investment 
and technology in heavy industry, as in the old model; the anti-alcohol cam- 
paign aggravated the state deficit and had spillover effects on the demand 
for other goods, leading to  shortages not only of sugar for illegal distill- 
ing but also of other consumption goods, whose imports were also reduced; 
the anti-absenteeism campaign relied on penalties, and economic incentives 
were reduced by the attack on speculation and individual enrichment; the 
new quality control procedures (Gospriemka) and the merging of five agri- 
cultural Ministries into Gosa.groprom continued indeed intensified admin- 
istrative control. Soon however genuine reform measures followed: the le- 
galization and encouragement of individual labor activity; the promotion 
of cooperatives (originally without limits to  earnings and to sector of ac- 
tivity, then subject to  alternate restrictions and relaxations) and of joint 
ventures with Western partners, not allowed majority stakes and expatri- 
ate mana.genlent; the direct untlertaking of foreign trade by a number of 
Ministries and enterprises without the necessary intermediation of the tradi- 
tional Foreign Trade Organizations; the indicative and non-obligatory nature 
of central pla.ns, the use of governmeilt contracts instead of direct orders, the 
establishment of direct links between enterprises (even across borders); the 
foundation of several new banks, illcluding joint-stock-companies set up by 
state enterprises; authorized privatization of some state assets, through leas- 
i n g ~  ("arenda") as well as direct sales beginning with some of the housing 
stock; partial retention of foreign currency earnings by Soviet exporters. 
In the last year there has been an acceleration of the reform drive, espe- 
cially in connection with international trade, namely: 
(1) The replacement of the traditional coefficients (variously estimated a t  
between 2,000 and 5,000) correcting the ruble exchange rate according 
to specific tra.de areas and commodity groups, by a uniform 100 percent 
bonus on convertible currency exports (i.e., equivalent to  a devaluation or 
revaluation in a given sector according to whether the previous correcting 
coefficient was lower or greater than 2), from 1-1-1990. 
(2) The announcement of a subsequent devaluation of the ruble in trade 
transa.ctions. 
(3) The pa.yment of additiona.1 agricultural deliveries by Soviet peasants 
partly in foreign currency from next year. 
(4) The announcenzent of Special Economic Zones similar to  those operated 
by China. 
(5) The 25 October 1989 devaluatioil of the ruble by 90 percent (from $1.6 
to  $0.16) for non-trade transactions, i.e., personal transactions for both 
foreign and Soviet citizens; the rate was pitched close enough t o  black 
market rates as to  reduce substantially if not abolish black market trans- 
actions; the official rate would be maintained for essential imports, while 
an intermediate commercial rate would be introduced for non essential 
imports and possibly also for the promotion of new exports. 
(6) The first foreign currency auction held by Vneshekonombank on 3 Novem- 
ber 1989 (similar to  those already operating in Poland and Bulgaria) a t  
which the ruble was traded among state enterprises at  a discount of over 
95 percent with respect to the official rate; (as a result of the large dollar 
premium the export bonus anilounced for 1-1-1990 may now be raised 
above 100 percent and kept diversified). 
There are also pla.ns for further privatization, the overhauling of the 
banking system in order to  replace automatic credit with competition in 
commercial banking, a tax reform, the establishment of a capital market, 
and further steps toward ruble convertibility. These measures were confirmed 
in the economic reform plan associated with Vice Premier Leonid Abalkin 
published by Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta in early November 1989. 
Sequencing Failures 
At first sight this picture suggests that gradual but steady implementation of 
radical reform, bringing the Soviet Union ever closer to  a model of "market 
socialism'' and integration into the world economy, improving its efficiency 
a t  every step. In practice there is no sign of either greater efficiency or 
any significant change in the mode of functioning of the Soviet economy, 
t o  the point of Soviet and Western commentators lamenting the economic 
failure - so far - of perestroika (see for instance J.P. Hardt and S.N. Heslin' 
pamplet recently published by the Group of Thirty, and Oleg Bogomolov's 
comments). 
On reflection, economic reform has not so much failed, but has failed to  
(1) Take all the steps necessary to the activation of markets, namely: the per- 
mission of ma.rket clea.ring prices (whether through inflation or stabiliza- 
tion); the severance of enterprise links with central government bodies; 
the abolition of the nlonopoly power of large enterprises and their as- 
sociations (moreover specialized by sector); the guarantee of the strictly 
residual nature of enterprise income, without enterprise-specific compen- 
satory subsidies and taxes, individually negotiated ex post and ad hoc. 
(2) Follow an appropriate logical and operational sequencing of reform steps, 
and t o  follow it without reversals. 
(3) Reach, in any case, the scale necessary for the emerging system to  have 
the minimum critical mass. 
All these failures fall under the heading of "sequencing failures" in a broad 
sense, i.e., including under this 1lea.ding the ordering not just of the steps 
actually undertaken but also of those which are missing, the irreversibility 
of those steps, as well as how far a.nd on what minimum scale the sequence 
must be implemented for refonrl to succeed. 
Unfortunately these failures are characteristic of all centrally planned 
economies attempting reform, in and outside Eastern Europe, none excluded. 
Partly this is due to  the lack of a clear cut, unambiguous and complete design 
for the ultimate target model to be a.chieved. As Alec Nove says, if you do 
not know where you are going all the roads will take you there. Obviously 
if such a lllodel was fully developed and agreed upon the reform process 
would be greatly facilitated; unfortunately it is still not clear whether the 
target model is market socialism or a. "socialist market" (Gavril Popov said 
recently: "We do not want to ea.t socia,list sausage, just ordinary sausage"); 
whether this is to be a set of policies or a set of system-specific institutions, 
and what these might be. Nevertheless, reformers know perfectly well in 
which direction they want to go, the questions are rather how far to go, 
what to carry on the way a.nd wha.t to build once one gets there; these 
difficulties should not be overwhelming. The failures mentioned above are 
rather due to the silnplistic nature of reform orthodoxy, and to ideological 
and above all political constra.ints. 
Reform Orthodoxy 
The orthodox approach in~plicitly 01. explicitly dominating the reform pro- 
cess virtually everywhere is the following. Decentralization of economic de- 
cisions and the activation of markets has an instant, or a t  any rate very 
rapid, effect on resource mobiliza.tion a.nd the efficiency, amplified by the 
reduction of defense expenditure (10 bn rubles this year, or 14.2 percent 
of the defense budget) and the restructuring from heavy industry to light 
and technologically a.dvanced sectors. This supply response (Gorbachev's 
"uskorenie)) or acceleration effect) will over a short period of time take care 
of existing excess demand without substantial price rises, though initially it 
may be necessary to use an  injection of additional imports (figures of up to 
US$25 bn have been mentioned; in October 1988 Gorbachev raised US$10 bn 
in ten days, and some of it has already been spent). Of course relative prices 
will have to change but this can be done once the economy has recovered, 
by a price reform fixing prices and price criteria on the basis of interna- 
tional prices and long run domestic costs. Eilterprise independence from the 
center ca.n be achieved by a.bolis1iing bra.nc11 Ministries and, as in Hungary, 
replacing them with a, single Ministry for Industry. Banks will monitor them 
extending credit not automatically but a.ccording to  their credit-worthiness. 
Competitive behavior even of la.rge specialized firms can be obtained through 
international competition, hence the importance of trade liberalization and 
an early convertibility of ruble. Ideally the reform should be implemented 
all a t  once (the "shock therapy" or "cold turkey" treatment advocated by 
George Soros for Poland; "you cannot cross a chasm in two leaps", according 
to  an unknown Polish economist quoted by Jeffrey Sachs). This is impracti- 
cal, especially in a country the size of the Soviet Union, therefore the process 
has taken a couple of years. Any single step toward the reformed model is an 
improvement independently of its timing and sequential position. Parallel 
progress can be made on different fronts, naturally proceeding from where 
resistence is weakest, except when some stages naturally suggest themselves; 
for instance, ruble convertibility into foreign exchange will be realized first 
domestically, then within CMEA, then worldwide. The Abalkin Report rec- 
ognizes that  "We had no concept or theory of the transitional stage, no idea 
of the sequence of how to  implement our reforms" and its envisaged stages 
of economic reform are no more t11a.n a bunching of measures according to  
increasing difficulty of implementation rather than a well reasoned sequence. 
Ideological/political constra.ints, which are also responsible for this se- 
quencing failure of economic refor111 in the Soviet Union and other countries, 
are, first and foremost, the tra.diti0na.l commitment to  price stability and 
the fear that extensive and large price rises would not be socially accept- 
able; the rejectio~i of a, confisca.tory replacement of the currency (converting 
wages, savings and cash a.t progressively worse rates than applied to  the 
conversion of prices) because it might uildermine the credibility of the gov- 
ernment, and because of memories of similar operations undertaken after the 
last War in the USSR and Eastern Europe (as well as West Germany and 
many other countries in financial distress before and after); the commitment 
to  egalitarianism a.nd the reluctance to remove subsidies out of concern for 
adverse distributive effects. 
Soviet Proposals for a Parallel Currency 
A peculiar fea.ture of the Soviet approach, which is not present in any of the 
other reforming countries, is the idea that  a parallel convertible currency 
might be introduced next to  the ordinary ruble, first in selected areas and/or 
sectors and gradually pervade the whole economy, gradually and painlessly 
replacing the old inconvertible ruble. This a.pproach is clearly rooted in the 
1924-1926 NEP monetary sta.bilization based on the "chervonets" (equiva- 
lent to  10 pre-wa.r gold rubles). 
There are several versions of this particular approach. Viktor Belkin ad- 
vocates issuing special rubles to enterprises producing (additional?) 
consumption goods; those rubles would give an entitlement to deliveries of 
domestic and imported inputs outside the central allocation systems; they 
would spread from consumption to intermediate goods and investment in- 
dustries; the positive supply response would allow the gradual withdrawal 
of the old rubles. 
Wassily Leontief and George Soros, in a project discussed over the last 
year by several Soviet- Western working groups a t  the State Committee for 
Foreign Economic Relations, headed by Ivan Ivanov, advocate setting up an 
Open Sector, made up of non-state enterprises (private, cooperative, joint 
ventures) and state enterprises or their subsidiaries only after they have 
been duly "sanitized" (i.e., after they have shed surplus liquidity and have 
cut their access to  easy money). The OS enterprises would use a convertible 
Valutny Ruble obtained through exports and loans, import freely, obtain 
any shorta.ge domestic input a t  international prices, export freely and retain 
or sell freely all their export earnings; their activities, and especially rela- 
tions with the rest of the economy, would be monitored by an OS Managing 
Authority; the reform of the Soviet economy would be achieved by the pro- 
gressive expansion of the Open Sector (in the final version of this project the 
special currency has been repla.ced by the direct use of hard currencies, with 
a view to gradually making the ordinary ruble convertible). In the version 
preferred by the Soviet side the Open Sector has a territorial basis, i.e., it 
amounts to  a set of Special Economic Zones instead of a sectoral (Belkin) 
or functional (Soros-Leontief) basis. The idea of a parallel currency was re- 
cently put forward also by Nikolai Petrakov, a,nd is reiterated in the Abalkin 
report published by Ekonomicheskaya Gazet a in early November. 
There is neither theoretical nor hisorical justification for suggesting a 
parallel convertible currency. Theoretically the case for it implicitly rests on 
the presuinption that  there is a positive supply response from economic re- 
form which however is only available for a slow diffusion of reform measures 
via the growth of a parallel monetary circulation. Historically, the ruble sta- 
bilization via the introduction of chervoiltsy during NEP was accompanied 
by hyperinflation and the demise of the other ruble, the sovznak, and there 
is no reason to  suppose that  this would not happen again today. 
The Primacy of Stabilization 
The single main step out of sequence in the Soviet reform process is the liber- 
alization of some markets, especially foreign exchange, and the 
decentralization of enterprise decisions, in conditions of persistent excess 
demand for most goods a.nd of centra.lly fixed, upwardly rigid prices. Abel 
Aganbegyan puts the ruble overhang at  rubles 150 bn, equivalent to  about 
half of sa.ving deposits or four months wages; the quantification of the over- 
hang is a difficult task, since it requires information about the money in 
circulation (which is not available, probably also to the highest authorities) 
as well as est i~na~tes of demand for money, which are a matter of opinion. 
The detection of overhang, however, is impossible t o  miss; it is continuously 
fed by wage settlements (like t11a.t with the striking miners) not matched 
by available consumption, by 1a.rge (in spite of systematic underestimate) 
budget deficits, rising from 18 bn rubles in 1985 to  90 bn last year and 120 
bn this year ( a  fall to  a 90 bn rubles deficit is planned for 1990, which is still 
absolutely and relatively large). 
Obviously without the prior elimination of the ruble overhang - whether 
through inflation or stabilization - the entire excess liquidity will be thrown 
t o  each market that  might be liberalized: the rate of exchange in free seg- 
ments of the foreign exchange market will have nothing to  do with either 
the preconditions of improving tra.de flows, or the relative purchasing power 
paaities or any other notion of rela.tive conlpetitiveness; the exchange rate de- 
valuatioils without the parallel reduction of demand absorption will worsen 
terms of trade not promote net exports; the persistence of excess demand in 
the regulated markets or market segments will either lead to  random access 
to  goods - which is unfair, disruptive and inefficient - or require the in- 
definite conti~luation of central controls, i.e., the indefinite postponement of 
radical reform. Paying peasants partly in foreign exchange simply acknowl- 
edges officially the debasing of the domestic currency and secures its further 
debasement; while talks of convertibility of any kind, before stabilization, 
arefatuous, not to  say perverse. 
There is no likely supply response large enough - if any - to  stabilise the 
economy in the course of economic reform. The only instance of such a sup- 
ply response are Chinese agriculture and, in the last year, the Vietnamese 
economy which is also 1a.rgely a.gricultura1; in general, on the contrary a tem- 
porary deterioration in current performance might be expected of economic 
reform, only later to  be overcoinpeilsated by improvements. Reform is best 
seen as an investment - a good one, but still a.n investment. Market balance 
can only come from an injection of imports, or through demand reduction 
via taxes and bonds, or through price increases. 
If a gap remains after supply and de~nand conditioils have been improved, 
market balance cannot be achieved in a single round of price increases, 
because the once and for all price increase that would eliminate excess money 
balances in the hands of the population and enterprises (stock equilibrium) 
is greater than that consistent with the balance of current incomes and real 
supplies (flow equilibrium); if prices are used to achieve balance then further 
rounds of compensatory increases - possibly through indexation of equilib- 
rium real levels - are required to adjust flow equilibrium. The alternative to 
confiscatory currency reform (of the kind outlined above) is an inflationary 
spiral. In any case, the avoidance of hyperinflation on the current Polish 
scale (projected a t  850 per cent in 1989) requires, prior to stabilisation, the 
adoption of strict inoiletary discipliile (no more automatic credit) and the 
avoidance of budgetary deficits which would either be monetised upsetting 
monetary discipline or if funded through bonds add to  the subsequent bur- 
den of public debt. Seeing that trends in real wages are the most important 
factor in determining enterprise demand for either credit or budgetary sup- 
port, a prices and wa.ges policy, agreed in a social pact between government 
and workers must be a necessary ingredient of the stabilisation package. 
Sometimes it has been suggested that excess purchasing power should 
be mopped up by the privatization of state assets (as suggested by Soros 
and Sachs for Pola.nd) or by the sale of bonds indexed either to a consumer 
index (as those issued in Poland in October 1989) or to  the price of shortage 
durables (as suggested by Abel Aganbegyan). This alternative is better 
than persistent imbalance but can be extremely costly: given the state of 
uncertainty assets on average will be necessarily underpriced; while indexed 
loans ma.y turn out to involve a monetary cost to  the government far in 
excess of non-indexed loans, especially if - as recently in Poland - the flight 
out of the domestic currency is stopped by a combination of higher money 
interest rates (though still negative in real terms) and volatility of the free 
rate of exchange. A high and rising return obtainable on the appreciation 
of currency holdings, conversely, wea.liens the domestic currency further, as 
witnessed by the recent ruble devalua.tions. 
If it is felt that  the difficult and unpopular course of stabilization is not 
politically feasible then it should be recognized that  radical reform is not 
possible, and all efforts should be concentrated instead on the elimination 
of the more glaring inefficiencies and on minor piecemeal improvements of 
traditional methods (i.e., on what used to  be called "the continuous per- 
fecting of methods of planned ma.na.gement" , as opposed t o  radical reform). 
However, the recent Polish experience shows that the ideological and politi- 
cal implications of what we have broa,dly labelled "sequential failure" can be 
incommensurately greater than the ideological and political preoccupations 
that  may have led to that failure. 
Monopoly, Tutelage, Redistribution 
Once stabiliza.tion has been achieved it is possible to proceed with the uni- 
fication of the price system, elimina.ting the two-tiers or many-tiers price 
regimes and bringing relative prices closer to opportunity costs in domestic 
production and in international tra.de, not by decree but through policies af- 
fecting the quantities supplied (i.e., through resource redeployment, capacity 
expansion and foreign trade). Autonomous enterprises, whose managers are 
chosen not for political merits but for their professional qualities can be ex- 
pected to overcome the inertia of former central planning structures, i.e., to 
raise efficiency, a.djust and innova.te, and be rewarded or penalized according 
to  enterprise performance. 
Three major obsta.cles must be removed for this entrepreneurial function 
to  arise. First, the lnonopoly power of 1a.rge-scale specialized enterprises and 
their associations must be eliinina.ted or a t  least reduced, not just through 
potential competition througli interna.tiona1 trde but through the fragmenta- 
tion of large multi-plant units, aa  anti-trust regulation, and above all access 
to markets on the part of new small and medium scale enterprises. 
Second, the link between enterprises and central administration must 
be severed - a link which implies their dependence through managerial ap- 
pointments, salary scales and career structure, through allocations of scarce 
materials and foreign exchange, through negotiated incentives and disincen- 
tives, formal and informal pressure. One way of ensuring such independence 
is privatization, transforming state enterprises into joint stock companies 
whose shares are distributed or sold to employees, managers and other in- 
vestors. This is not, ho\vever, the only possible way of severing the link 
between enterprises and central a.dministration; the shares can be held by a 
State Property Fund, aa envisaged in 1iunga.r~ and Poland or, preferably, by 
a number of state holding companies (a.s in Algeria) and other institutional 
as well as private investors; enterprise capital can be leased rather than sold 
out. The danger should be noted of privatization without publicity and 
competition, resulting in divestiture rather than sale and in the parallel ap- 
propriation of state property by a, few well informed people in position of 
power. 
Third, the redistribution fullctiol~ of the state budget, subsidizing loss- 
making enterprises out of tra.nsfers from profitable ones, and compensating 
net revenue changes after the event, must be eliminated so as to  reinstate the 
residual nature of profits as net revenue after contractual fixed payments. 
Markets have not only an allocative function and one of success verification, 
but also a much neglected function of forcing economic agents t o  live within 
their means under penalty of ba.nliruptcy; the budgetary validation of enter- 
prise losses removes this kind of fina.ncia1 discipline without which the sound 
budgetary policies advocated in the previous section are not implementable. 
These three obstacles must be removed jointly, because the first and the 
other two are somewhat interlil~lied; for instance, monopoly power by firms 
makes a case for central control over price, supply and capacity expansion, 
as well as for some redistribution of possible monopoly profits. The removal 
of central control while maintaining monopoly positions is bound to  involve 
a deterioration of market supply and econolnic efficiency. 
A Tentative Sequencing Pattern 
There is no reason to suppose that just any step toward reform is an 
unambiguous improvement. Before a reformed structure can perform better 
than the old one the reform must be completed ( a  half finished railway takes 
nowhere) or a,t any rate it most probably has to reach a minimum critical 
mass. What is worse, some mea.sures without others can be pernicious (e.g., 
enterprise autonomy without competition, foreign exchange liberalization 
without prior stabilization privatiza.tion without markets). 
From the arguments developed above a tentative possible sequencing 
pattern emerges. First monetary restraint and budgetary discipline must 
be placed in position, strengthened by a. wage and prices policy preferably 
enshrined in a social pact, with some indexation guaranteeing living stan- 
dards stability in excha,nge for their moderation. Second, market clearing 
balance must be obtained in existing ma.rkets, whether through supply ef- 
fects (presumed modest if a,ny), net imports (possibly with international 
assistance) or the issue of bonds (non-indexed) without a premature priva- 
tization of state assets). Third, competitive conditions must be ensured, 
not only in the output markets but also in access of the existing capi- 
tal stock, with compulsory surrender of assets by current users if others 
can employ those means more productively and bid more than them for 
their use. Fourth, the redistributive function of the state budget must be 
abolished; the residual nature of entrepreneurial income must be guaranteed; 
enterprise and product subsidies are to be replaced by income subsidies to  
alleviate a,dverse distribution effects. Fifth, the hierarchical link between 
enterprises and central administration must be cut, through leasings, state 
holdings and priva,tization. Sixth, exposure to  international trade signals 
and pressures, up to this point present but mediated through central plan- 
ning structures, can be gradually increa.sed; it is essential that  the exchange 
rate should be unified, in order to avoid trade distortions which might result 
in very low (or even negative) value added of trade operations. Finally, some 
or even extended privatizatioil might be considered, according to  taste. 
This proposed sequellcing is not necessarily unique, let alone superior 
to  all others, but is offered as a sta.rting point for discussion. There is a 
presulnption that  partial and out-of-sequence reforms on a less-than-critical 
scale are bound to  be and to have been not just ineffictive, but actually 
da.maging, not oilly because of the continued and possibly worsened waste 
of resources but also because they have made the task of radical reform 
all that much difficult to implement,; they will have generated and diffused 
"false" signals both for qua.ntities and prices, caused frustration and disillu- 
sionment of all economic a,gents; reduced the effectiveness of those measures 
already tried, misused and reversed, while the underlying imbalances have 
undergone cun~ulative growth over the time wasted attempting this partial, 
out-of-sequence and out-of-scale reform. 

Summary of Discussions* 
C. M. Schneider 
Basically, the goal of a modern economic reform for most countries with pre- 
viously planned or cornnla~ld type systems is to  move to a market economy. 
There are two possible a.pproaches which can be followed in order to achieve 
the desired effects: 
(1) the "big bang" approach (as exemplified by Poland) and 
(2) the "phased" approach. 
The difficulty with the second type is the question of sequencing, because 
no historical precedent exists. When a number of alternatives are available, 
the fundamental rule of transition implies that  the choice which promises 
to  move the existing situation most convincingly toward a market economy 
system is the inore desirable path to choose. 
The prima.ry question facing economists and policy-makers focuses on 
where to  begin to treat the reform issue in a centrally planned economy as 
the Soviet Union. Is there a macroeconomics of a socialist economy? Near 
the top of the list of crucial issues when dealing with this topic are the institu- 
tions of the market place and their role in striving for economic stabilization. 
Naturally, a route must be chosen which speeds up the movement to  a market 
economy. At the same time, central authorities should refrain from intro- 
ducing additional regulation that  impedes adjustments and growth. The 
macro-initiative includes studies to determine whether the economy in ques- 
tion is close to potential output or closer to a balanced situation in the short 
run. The principle characteristic of the Soviet economy is that  the budget 
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is out of balance and a domestic currency overhang exists, which can pro- 
duce inflation or aggravate repressed inflation. In addition, prices are out of 
alignment and there is an  obvious lack of competition. Movement towards 
a market situation must be utilized to  allow economic expansion, although 
such a path usually proves to be initially problematic and painful. The main 
tools that  can be implemented to develop remedies for the present ill condi- 
tion of not sufficiently demand oriented economies are monetary and fiscal 
policy. 
The budget situation of a reforming ecoilomy is largely a flow problem. 
The immense detrimental effects incurred as a result of maintaining a bud- 
get deficit are often overemphasized. Experience proves that  countries with 
relatively large budget deficits of up to 10 percent can do better than just 
survive, in fact, they can even thrive. The problems associated with such an 
attitude concentrate on the difficulty to find financing for a deficit and what 
to  do with the obtained funds. If these are used for productive investments, 
then this policy alternative has a variety of benefits. If the deficit does 
increase, then policy-makers should attempt to  refrain from implementing 
only quick-and-easy, short-run solutions such as simply printing money and, 
instead, look a t  the variety of alternative monetary methods. The lesson is 
to restructure the budget (i.e., by eliminating subsidies, etc.) in an attempt 
to attain macroeconomic stability. As a result of the loss of control of the 
budget, excess demand will emerge and incomes will become greater than 
GNP, while free prices will lead to  product availability, though they may be 
too expensive to  buy. 
In cases of radical economic reform, it is important to  renew both cap- 
ital and money markets. This will entail the separation of central from 
commercial banking. Presently, the central bank of the USSR can supply 
some domestic and foreign currency, but due to  the lack of a system of bank 
reserves there is no capacity to control the money supply. This also reflects 
the weak leverage to  implenlent and enforce other monetary instruments. In 
fact, due to  the ineffective system and the absence of appropriate statistics 
and methods of monitoring, the authorities cannot precisely say how much 
money is in circulation. The present trend and situation in the Soviet Union 
may direct policy more towards monetary reform rather than price reform, 
because the price reform would more negatively affect the population in the 
form of direct costs, opportunity costs and the like. Essentially, monetary 
policy cannot be left to be determined within the market. 
Inflation is a further problem within the realm of economic stabilization, 
which is clearly close to  the heart of most Eastern European reformers and 
policy-makers. Stagflation, indexation, measurements and accounting have 
all been listed as sources of inflation in Eastern Europe. One of the keys to 
the reform is to  achieve market clearing prices without inflation. Due to the 
fact that it is improbable that  restructuring the economy can be successful 
in an inflationary environment, the inflationary pressures must be diffused. 
In order to  achieve this, austerity, strict fiscal policy, tight monetary policy 
and a social pact on wages are required. The citizens must accept and agree 
with measures for any reform program to  attain preferred results. 
The fundamental problem, which is a t  the root of deteriorating economic 
life in countries traditionally bound to a command or planned economic 
framework, is associated with the inability to  apply even simple economic 
principles. The relative roles of microeconomic (structural) and macroeco- 
nomic (stabilization) policies in the reform plans is of crucial importance. 
While the issues are reasonably critical on the micro-side (i.e. incentives, 
competitiveness and prices), the stabilization issues may be those that  are 
more easily dealt with as long as they remain within the given structural 
framework. Of course, the links between the different areas of economic 
stabilization, such as between wages, monetary policy, and budget deficit, 
should not be neglected if a thorough reform is to  be successful. 
In summary, four areas of economic stabilization must be carefully an- 
alyzed and policies developed when attempting to  proceed on the course of 
an economic reforin from a command to a market system. 
( 1 )  Banking and Monetary Reform 
This includes a number of subtopics like: institutions of central bank- 
ing (instruments, appropriate policies in the near future, independence 
and autonomy), commercial banking (supervision, regulation, account- 
ing), other government liabilities (bonds, etc.) and monetary "reform" 
(parallel currency, mandatory conversion). Both complete and decent 
statistics and data  will be necessary to understand the existing situation 
and make appropriate policy decisions for the future. 
( 2 )  Fiscal Policy, Taxation, Deficits 
Under this heading the main points to scrutinize are: the importance of 
budget discipline, the structure of the tax system (including the types 
of taxes, cyclical aspects and stabilization rules), roles of commodity 
subsidies relative to income transfers and the generally appropriate role 
of utilizing the budget relative to allowing market determination. 
(3) Anti-inflation Policy 
Here the main questioil revolves around the reasons for and the problems 
of how to deal with open versus repressed inflation. Other important top- 
ics include: government tools available and utilized to  deal with inflation 
(for example; fiscal, monetary, tax on wages fund, social and/or polit- 
ical support), indexation (how much, nominal versus real anchors and 
problems of the price-wage-price spiral) and social costs of anti-inflation 
policy (such as unemployment, budgetary problems). 
( 4 )  Sequencing of Overall Stabilization 
In this case, the fundamental dilemma to be addressed deals with stabi- 
lization before structural change, or not. Structural change is associated 
with freeing prices, demonopolization, privatization, hard budget con- 
straints and opening the economy. The question of whether t o  choose 
the "BIG BANG" or "GRADUALIZATION" as the transition method 
is also a t  the forefront of discussion. Finally, it is crucial t o  adjust the 
planning system to  compensate for and adjust in the face of changes in- 
duced by the reform such as changes with respect to  deposits, investment, 
wages, and so on. 
